Hi Horse Thanks for the below I particularly agree with ' Intellectual patterns of value are (only) one part of SQ', not sure DMB would.
All the best David M Horse <[email protected]> wrote: >Hi DM > >The way I see it is that there is Quality. That's it. Nothing else. >Then there is the Metaphysics of Quality. >One is not the equivalent of the other. >The MoQ is an intellectual pattern of value. > >On 22/10/2013 11:58, David Morey wrote: >> Hi Horse >> >> There is something in what you say below, I would be pleased if the MOQ >> more clearly stuck to its original division between dynamic and static, > >It does! The MoQ states quite clearly that there is Dynamic Quality (DQ) >and Static Quality (SQ). That's it! >DQ is unpatterned. >SQ is patterned. > > >> the idea of using the notion of concepts to divide the dynamic and static is >> a very bad move I think, > >But that's what the MoQ does! The division of Quality into Dynamic and >Static is the basis for the MoQ. >It's a metaphysics, an intellectual pattern of value. >An idea. A concept! >Metaphysics deals with concepts! >Quality is subdivided into DQ and SQ, then SQ is subdivided further >into Inorganic, Biological, Social and Intellectual. > > >> unpatterned and patterned works well, non-conceptual versus conceptual does >> not fit DQ and SQ, and I have tried to show why, there could be other >> better ways to expand on the difference between SQ and DQ, but concepts is >> not it, > >This is not what I've been saying but perhaps I haven't said it well enough. >DQ is unpatterned. >SQ is patterned. >The division into DQ/SQ is an intellectual pattern of value. > >> sure all concepts are SQ, but I think SQ clearly goes beyond concepts and >> language, to restrict SQ to being exclusively concepts is an intellectual >> muddle, it looks too neat, it is too neat, > >What! All concepts are Intellectual patterns of value but not all >patterns of value are Intellectual - they are Inorganic, Biological and >Social as well. But the division is Intellectual. >An idea. A concept. This is the Metaphysics of Quality - an Intellectual >pattern of value. >Of course SQ goes beyond concepts and language! Who is saying it >doesn't? Certainly not me! >Are you confusing Quality with Metaphysics of Quality? > >> and it fails to reflect what we actually experience and cuts the MOQ off >> from its best way to show that experience is a being-in-the-world, which is >> the best non-dualist approach to experience ever conceived by a Western >> philosopher, ie. Heidegger. > >In the MoQ Experience is synonymous with Dynamic Quality and it is >unpatterned. Why is that such a difficult idea to grasp? >You appear to be confusing or conflating SQ and Intellectual patterns of >value. Intellectual patterns of value are one part of SQ. > >> Non-dualism is best seen as entirely realist as it does away with any >> appearance-reality divide, DMB seems to think non-dualism is anti-realist, >> this is a very out of date and illogical view and seems to underlie his >> inability not to favour a sort of post-modernist approach to the MOQ, in >> the wider world Continental Philosophy is rapidly embracing Speculative >> Realism. > >As far as I'm aware Quality is a monism which the MoQ subdivides into DQ >and SQ - I don't believe this creates a dualistic metaphysics. >I could be wrong, but that's how I understand it! > >Cheers > >Horse > >> >> All the best >> David Morey >> >> Horse <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Hi DM >>> >>> Apologies for the delay - I've been doing other stuff! >>> >>> I'm not quite sure what you're trying to get at here. >>> What we experience directly is DQ - it is unpatterned. >>> Anything else, which is patterned, is SQ. >>> I think the problem you're having is trying to force-fit SOM terminology >>> and ideas into the MoQ. >>> Intellectual patterns describe the levels identified in the MoQ as >>> static patterns - but this does not properly equate to SOM which assumes >>> a pre-existing reality which we passively buy into. >>> As I have hinted previously, animals without either social or >>> intellectual patterns experience DQ in a way that is alien to humans (or >>> animals with 'rudimentary' social/intellectual patterns). I have no idea >>> how a dog or a snake experiences reality as I'm not a dog or a snake! >>> Putting 'pre-' in front of some idea or other and expecting it to make >>> sense is, in my opinion, a bit naive. If something is pre-language or >>> pre-cultural or pre-X or pre-Y or whatever this has little bearing on >>> the MoQ which determines either static quality or dynamic quality - i.e. >>> patterned or unpatterned. >>> X or Y being pre-language or pre-cultural etc. is no more than an >>> intellectual description of some static pattern or other. If it is >>> patterned it is SQ. >>> When we talk about taste, sight, smell .or percepts, concepts etc. these >>> are intellectual descriptions or intellectual patterns. >>> SQ is post-experience and is patterned. >>> >>> Cheers >>> >>> Horse >>> >>> >>> On 13/10/2013 13:35, David Morey wrote: >>>> Hi Horse >>>> >>>> Thanks for that, it makes more sense than what I have been told to date, >>>> OK so taste and other senses are a form of SQ, unlike DMB, you make it >>>> clear this involves concepts, so clearly the word concept here is being >>>> used in a wider sense than something based in language and culture. So >>>> when we talk about percepts these are SQ, they involve some sort of >>>> conceptual grasp, so they are not pre-conceptual, but unlike say full >>>> blown things like the sky and dogs and cats or fruits, say, they are >>>> potentially pre-language and pre-cultural types of SQ, we have all kinds >>>> of patterned even conceptual experiences before we go on to higher levels >>>> of SQ that involve language and culture realised forms of concepts. Is >>>> that a fair way to put it? >>>> >>>> I am OK to drop pre-conceptual and replace it with pre-cultural SQ, and >>>> cultural-SQ, so that all SQ is conceptual but the distinction I have >>>> pointed out is seen as valid, could make the split biological SQ versus >>>> intellectual SQ. So I would see biological SQ as having evolved naturally, >>>> is more given, is less open to change, and intellectual SQ as more open >>>> and can change and develop culturally. Would you agree? >>>> >>>> David M >>>> >>>> Horse<[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi DM >>>>> >>>>> Quality is a monism - the MoQ divides this into Static and Dynamic >>>>> Quality (SQ & DQ). >>>>> DQ is unpatterned. >>>>> SQ is patterned. >>>>> Flavours are SQ, as are bananas and oranges - they are concepts. We >>>>> relate these concepts to learned patterns (SQ). >>>>> Animals (the vast majority) do not know flavours, bananas or oranges as >>>>> concepts - their experience of reality (DQ) is through biological >>>>> patterns (SQ) and sometimes memory (SQ). >>>>> Animals do not have a concept of food. >>>>> If an animal cannot identify its food biologically it will starve. >>>>> Example: a cat with cat flu cannot smell that what is in it's bowl is >>>>> food so it doesn't eat it. Flu doesn't kill the cat, lack of the ability >>>>> to smell and starvation kills the cat! >>>>> For animals there are very few 'rules': >>>>> 1) if it isn't a threat don't run away, if it is a threat run away. >>>>> 2) if you can't mate with it or eat it and it isn't a threat ignore it >>>>> A very simplified view but essentially correct. >>>>> >>>>> Recognising differences is a comparison of static patterns - this is >>>>> post, not pre, experience (DQ). >>>>> Pre-conceptual patterns do not exist in the MoQ. >>>>> There is no problem with this in the MoQ - only in your belief that >>>>> patterns exist prior 'concepts'. >>>>> Most animals have no concepts, as we understand them, they react to DQ >>>>> (experience) biologically, not socially or intellectually. >>>>> Liking and disliking 'bananas' or 'oranges' is SQ. >>>>> Scientific theories are SQ and empirical evidence to support or disprove >>>>> a theory is SQ. >>>>> Experiences that are shared are SQ not DQ or pre-conceptual concepts. >>>>> >>>>> Horse >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 13/10/2013 00:13, David Morey wrote: >>>>>> Hi Horse >>>>>> >>>>>> I pretty much agree with all that, but should not DQ and SQ be a way to >>>>>> understand the whole of experience? Otherwise the MOQ is missing part of >>>>>> experience, so I suspect the way DQ and SQ are being defined has become >>>>>> too rigid and inflexible. What I want to know is where we put for >>>>>> example flavours we experience, oranges and bananas taste differently, >>>>>> here is difference, but the qualities of taste do not need concepts, >>>>>> so we have these patterns that are not due to concepts, seems to me the >>>>>> definitions of MOQ should cover these, they are pre-conceptual >>>>>> patterns, they have an identity without concepts, do we need to >>>>>> recognise such differences in DQ or recognise them as pre-conceptual SQ, >>>>>> happy with either, uncomfortable that they seem to be excluded from >>>>>> both SQ and DQ due to too rigid definition. Can we fix these >>>>>> definitions? Yes pre-conceptual patterns are not in the current MOQ, >>>>>> but they are in experience, underlying culture and concepts, they are >>>>>> in experience, if t >>>>>> he MOQ ignores them does it not need fixing? For me such patterns are >>>>>> covered by the idea if SQ, the error is to limit SQ to concepts, >>>>>> experience is richer than this limit suggests, MOQ should not overcome >>>>>> the aporias of SOM simply to create new ones. I am very happy to have >>>>>> unpatterned DQ and patterned SQ if the attachment of conceptual to SQ is >>>>>> dropped, thus looks like a bad move to me, it solves some problems but >>>>>> creates the new ones I am pointing out. You may think my solution is >>>>>> worse than the problems it is solving, but I think the problems should >>>>>> be clear to everyone, no one has offered a better solution so far I >>>>>> believe. But interpretation all the way down looks suspect to me, we may >>>>>> bring something to the banana, our likes and dislikes, but the banana >>>>>> has something apples do not, their own uniqueness that we experience, >>>>>> their difference from all other fruit tastes. And in science to there is >>>>>> difference, theory is powerful but in the end the evidence decides, what >>>>>> does empirical experienced evidence give us? Is it not something primary >>>>>> and below theory? Experiences have this capacity to be shared, these >>>>>> commonalities, these patterns are the touch points on which conceptual >>>>>> SQ is built. These things matter to politics: >>>>>> >>>>>> http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com >>>>>> >>>>>> Regards >>>>>> David M >>>>>> >>>>>> Horse<[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi DM >>>>>>> >>>>>>> SQ is a concept relating to patterns. It is a human metaphysical >>>>>>> concept. >>>>>>> What we're talking about, w.r.t. Pirsig's MoQ, is static patterns of >>>>>>> value and dynamic quality. >>>>>>> Animals, the vast majority anyway, are biological and inorganic >>>>>>> patterns. Instinct is biological. >>>>>>> The vast majority of animals don't, as far as anyone can say with any >>>>>>> certainty, have concepts. >>>>>>> They can recognise shapes (another fascinating facet of the eye - edge >>>>>>> and shape detection) but do not have a concept of shape - because they >>>>>>> have no concepts! >>>>>>> They use other biological values to navigate and get around in the >>>>>>> world. >>>>>>> Some animals may have social values or patterns - certain types of >>>>>>> hymenoptera and cetaceans come to mind, along with higher primates. Some >>>>>>> of the higher primates (and possibly cetaceans ) may even have concepts >>>>>>> but this can only be inferred and, so far as I'm aware, has not been >>>>>>> conclusively proven. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What I don't get is why you are trying to impose an idea onto the MoQ >>>>>>> that has been shown not to be part of the MoQ. >>>>>>> There are static patterns of value and dynamic quality - that's it. >>>>>>> Nothing else. >>>>>>> DQ is unpatterned. >>>>>>> SQ is patterned. >>>>>>> There is no such thing, in Robert Pirsig's MoQ, as patterned DQ. It >>>>>>> doesn't exist. >>>>>>> What you are suggesting is not Pirsig's MoQ. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Horse >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 12/10/2013 16:13, David Morey wrote: >>>>>>>> Maybe you can help explain it then, do animals with instinctive >>>>>>>> behaviors identify their food and mates using SQ? Yes or no. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Is this SQ conceptual? Yes or no. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Either SQ can be pre-conceptual, which I prefer, but everything >>>>>>>> pre-conceptual is DQ for DMB, or animals use concepts, which is a >>>>>>>> very odd use of the word concept. If you can clear up this obvious >>>>>>>> muddle I will be most grateful. >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> >>> > >-- > >"Without music to decorate it, time is just a bunch of boring production >deadlines or dates by which bills must be paid." >— Frank Zappa > > >Moq_Discuss mailing list >Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. >http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org >Archives: >http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ >http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
