Hi DM
The way I see it is that there is Quality. That's it. Nothing else.
Then there is the Metaphysics of Quality.
One is not the equivalent of the other.
The MoQ is an intellectual pattern of value.
On 22/10/2013 11:58, David Morey wrote:
Hi Horse
There is something in what you say below, I would be pleased if the MOQ more
clearly stuck to its original division between dynamic and static,
It does! The MoQ states quite clearly that there is Dynamic Quality (DQ)
and Static Quality (SQ). That's it!
DQ is unpatterned.
SQ is patterned.
the idea of using the notion of concepts to divide the dynamic and static is a
very bad move I think,
But that's what the MoQ does! The division of Quality into Dynamic and
Static is the basis for the MoQ.
It's a metaphysics, an intellectual pattern of value.
An idea. A concept!
Metaphysics deals with concepts!
Quality is subdivided into DQ and SQ, then SQ is subdivided further
into Inorganic, Biological, Social and Intellectual.
unpatterned and patterned works well, non-conceptual versus conceptual does not
fit DQ and SQ, and I have tried to show why, there could be other better ways
to expand on the difference between SQ and DQ, but concepts is not it,
This is not what I've been saying but perhaps I haven't said it well enough.
DQ is unpatterned.
SQ is patterned.
The division into DQ/SQ is an intellectual pattern of value.
sure all concepts are SQ, but I think SQ clearly goes beyond concepts and
language, to restrict SQ to being exclusively concepts is an intellectual
muddle, it looks too neat, it is too neat,
What! All concepts are Intellectual patterns of value but not all
patterns of value are Intellectual - they are Inorganic, Biological and
Social as well. But the division is Intellectual.
An idea. A concept. This is the Metaphysics of Quality - an Intellectual
pattern of value.
Of course SQ goes beyond concepts and language! Who is saying it
doesn't? Certainly not me!
Are you confusing Quality with Metaphysics of Quality?
and it fails to reflect what we actually experience and cuts the MOQ off from
its best way to show that experience is a being-in-the-world, which is the
best non-dualist approach to experience ever conceived by a Western
philosopher, ie. Heidegger.
In the MoQ Experience is synonymous with Dynamic Quality and it is
unpatterned. Why is that such a difficult idea to grasp?
You appear to be confusing or conflating SQ and Intellectual patterns of
value. Intellectual patterns of value are one part of SQ.
Non-dualism is best seen as entirely realist as it does away with any
appearance-reality divide, DMB seems to think non-dualism is anti-realist,
this is a very out of date and illogical view and seems to underlie his
inability not to favour a sort of post-modernist approach to the MOQ, in the
wider world Continental Philosophy is rapidly embracing Speculative Realism.
As far as I'm aware Quality is a monism which the MoQ subdivides into DQ
and SQ - I don't believe this creates a dualistic metaphysics.
I could be wrong, but that's how I understand it!
Cheers
Horse
All the best
David Morey
Horse <[email protected]> wrote:
Hi DM
Apologies for the delay - I've been doing other stuff!
I'm not quite sure what you're trying to get at here.
What we experience directly is DQ - it is unpatterned.
Anything else, which is patterned, is SQ.
I think the problem you're having is trying to force-fit SOM terminology
and ideas into the MoQ.
Intellectual patterns describe the levels identified in the MoQ as
static patterns - but this does not properly equate to SOM which assumes
a pre-existing reality which we passively buy into.
As I have hinted previously, animals without either social or
intellectual patterns experience DQ in a way that is alien to humans (or
animals with 'rudimentary' social/intellectual patterns). I have no idea
how a dog or a snake experiences reality as I'm not a dog or a snake!
Putting 'pre-' in front of some idea or other and expecting it to make
sense is, in my opinion, a bit naive. If something is pre-language or
pre-cultural or pre-X or pre-Y or whatever this has little bearing on
the MoQ which determines either static quality or dynamic quality - i.e.
patterned or unpatterned.
X or Y being pre-language or pre-cultural etc. is no more than an
intellectual description of some static pattern or other. If it is
patterned it is SQ.
When we talk about taste, sight, smell .or percepts, concepts etc. these
are intellectual descriptions or intellectual patterns.
SQ is post-experience and is patterned.
Cheers
Horse
On 13/10/2013 13:35, David Morey wrote:
Hi Horse
Thanks for that, it makes more sense than what I have been told to date, OK so
taste and other senses are a form of SQ, unlike DMB, you make it clear this
involves concepts, so clearly the word concept here is being used in a wider
sense than something based in language and culture. So when we talk about
percepts these are SQ, they involve some sort of conceptual grasp, so they
are not pre-conceptual, but unlike say full blown things like the sky and dogs
and cats or fruits, say, they are potentially pre-language and pre-cultural
types of SQ, we have all kinds of patterned even conceptual experiences before
we go on to higher levels of SQ that involve language and culture realised
forms of concepts. Is that a fair way to put it?
I am OK to drop pre-conceptual and replace it with pre-cultural SQ, and
cultural-SQ, so that all SQ is conceptual but the distinction I have pointed
out is seen as valid, could make the split biological SQ versus intellectual
SQ. So I would see biological SQ as having evolved naturally, is more given,
is less open to change, and intellectual SQ as more open and can change and
develop culturally. Would you agree?
David M
Horse<[email protected]> wrote:
Hi DM
Quality is a monism - the MoQ divides this into Static and Dynamic
Quality (SQ & DQ).
DQ is unpatterned.
SQ is patterned.
Flavours are SQ, as are bananas and oranges - they are concepts. We
relate these concepts to learned patterns (SQ).
Animals (the vast majority) do not know flavours, bananas or oranges as
concepts - their experience of reality (DQ) is through biological
patterns (SQ) and sometimes memory (SQ).
Animals do not have a concept of food.
If an animal cannot identify its food biologically it will starve.
Example: a cat with cat flu cannot smell that what is in it's bowl is
food so it doesn't eat it. Flu doesn't kill the cat, lack of the ability
to smell and starvation kills the cat!
For animals there are very few 'rules':
1) if it isn't a threat don't run away, if it is a threat run away.
2) if you can't mate with it or eat it and it isn't a threat ignore it
A very simplified view but essentially correct.
Recognising differences is a comparison of static patterns - this is
post, not pre, experience (DQ).
Pre-conceptual patterns do not exist in the MoQ.
There is no problem with this in the MoQ - only in your belief that
patterns exist prior 'concepts'.
Most animals have no concepts, as we understand them, they react to DQ
(experience) biologically, not socially or intellectually.
Liking and disliking 'bananas' or 'oranges' is SQ.
Scientific theories are SQ and empirical evidence to support or disprove
a theory is SQ.
Experiences that are shared are SQ not DQ or pre-conceptual concepts.
Horse
On 13/10/2013 00:13, David Morey wrote:
Hi Horse
I pretty much agree with all that, but should not DQ and SQ be a way to
understand the whole of experience? Otherwise the MOQ is missing part of
experience, so I suspect the way DQ and SQ are being defined has become too
rigid and inflexible. What I want to know is where we put for example flavours
we experience, oranges and bananas taste differently, here is difference,
but the qualities of taste do not need concepts, so we have these patterns
that are not due to concepts, seems to me the definitions of MOQ should cover
these, they are pre-conceptual patterns, they have an identity without
concepts, do we need to recognise such differences in DQ or recognise them as
pre-conceptual SQ, happy with either, uncomfortable that they seem to be
excluded from both SQ and DQ due to too rigid definition. Can we fix these
definitions? Yes pre-conceptual patterns are not in the current MOQ, but they
are in experience, underlying culture and concepts, they are in experience,
if t
he MOQ ignores them does it not need fixing? For me such patterns are covered
by the idea if SQ, the error is to limit SQ to concepts, experience is richer
than this limit suggests, MOQ should not overcome the aporias of SOM simply to
create new ones. I am very happy to have unpatterned DQ and patterned SQ if the
attachment of conceptual to SQ is dropped, thus looks like a bad move to me,
it solves some problems but creates the new ones I am pointing out. You may
think my solution is worse than the problems it is solving, but I think the
problems should be clear to everyone, no one has offered a better solution so
far I believe. But interpretation all the way down looks suspect to me, we may
bring something to the banana, our likes and dislikes, but the banana has
something apples do not, their own uniqueness that we experience, their
difference from all other fruit tastes. And in science to there is difference,
theory is powerful but in the end the evidence decides, what
does empirical experienced evidence give us? Is it not something primary and
below theory? Experiences have this capacity to be shared, these
commonalities, these patterns are the touch points on which conceptual SQ is
built. These things matter to politics:
http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com
Regards
David M
Horse<[email protected]> wrote:
Hi DM
SQ is a concept relating to patterns. It is a human metaphysical concept.
What we're talking about, w.r.t. Pirsig's MoQ, is static patterns of
value and dynamic quality.
Animals, the vast majority anyway, are biological and inorganic
patterns. Instinct is biological.
The vast majority of animals don't, as far as anyone can say with any
certainty, have concepts.
They can recognise shapes (another fascinating facet of the eye - edge
and shape detection) but do not have a concept of shape - because they
have no concepts!
They use other biological values to navigate and get around in the world.
Some animals may have social values or patterns - certain types of
hymenoptera and cetaceans come to mind, along with higher primates. Some
of the higher primates (and possibly cetaceans ) may even have concepts
but this can only be inferred and, so far as I'm aware, has not been
conclusively proven.
What I don't get is why you are trying to impose an idea onto the MoQ
that has been shown not to be part of the MoQ.
There are static patterns of value and dynamic quality - that's it.
Nothing else.
DQ is unpatterned.
SQ is patterned.
There is no such thing, in Robert Pirsig's MoQ, as patterned DQ. It
doesn't exist.
What you are suggesting is not Pirsig's MoQ.
Horse
On 12/10/2013 16:13, David Morey wrote:
Maybe you can help explain it then, do animals with instinctive behaviors
identify their food and mates using SQ? Yes or no.
Is this SQ conceptual? Yes or no.
Either SQ can be pre-conceptual, which I prefer, but everything
pre-conceptual is DQ for DMB, or animals use concepts, which is a very odd
use of the word concept. If you can clear up this obvious muddle I will be most
grateful.
--
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or dates by which bills must be paid."
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