David, On Wed, Dec 10, 2014 at 3:49 AM, David Morey <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi Dan > > I agree science studies SQ, and at best it agrees with MOQ that SQ is > stratified, which means that there are category distinctions between the > levels, when this is recognised materialism and reductionism is denied > because you cannot explain higher level SQ in terms of the lowest level of SQ > where some people derive their ideas about matter and atomism, etc. But what > status should scientists give this SQ that they study?
Dan: First of all, static quality makes up everything we know. To say science studies static quality is such a broad generalization you may as well say science studies the world. What status can scientists give this? Well, I suppose it depends on the scientist and what they're studying. I still cannot see that you have any sort of grip on the MOQ which is rather disconcerting considering how long you have been around. DM: > Yes it is entirely based in experience, but can we think and reason about how > processes understood in SQ terms work in a realist intellectual context, i.e. > when not being experienced by a person or even before human beings or persons > existed. Yes this reasoning all takes place at the intellectual level and yes > it tells us nothing about the more fundamental dynamic quality of reality but > as a study of SQ, there seems no reason not to get on with interpreting our > understanding of process in both SQ and realist terms, sure SQ us totally > derived from experience bu > t we can clearly reason about what takes place in the absence of human > experience or even existence. Dan: No one is saying otherwise. Science is filled with assumptions. The MOQ exposes some of those assumptions and allows for a more expanded view of reality. DM: Science is the analysis of SQ, we really do not to see how this leaves out DQ, but nonetheless it is a crucial thing to study. Science looks at how SQ has evolved the levels, and logically thus looks at time periods when the higher SQ levels had yet to emerge and how the lowers levels create a platform for the higher levels to emerge. Now the whole thrust of such scientific study is clearly realist, and I see no unavoidable harm in this, although its limitations must be kept in mind, seeing DQ as fundamental and untouched by such study and analysis. I think an MOQ science can continue to be realist without becoming either SOM dualist or objectivist, it should recognise that a realist study of SQ leaves out DQ and can only ever be half the story because of this. Of course we never encounter non-human SQ or a pre-human time, but science adopts realism to look at the idea of non > -human existence, non-human time, to see reconstruct a dynamic story of > processes that take place without the human. To reason about the nature of > these processes outside of human experience is highly problematic, which is > why materialism, mechanism, atomism, reductionism are so dubious. If anything > we should perhaps remain silent on the question of the nature of processes > beyond human experience, although clearly stuff persists when we turn away > from it, or has a history before we existed as a species. But if we want to > push it the most obvious leap is to assume that pre-humam or non-human > processes must be as experiencial as all human processes, although perhaps > there character at the different levels may be very different. I think MOQ > can quite readonably open itself up to such a realism, I can see the dangers > of doing so because it does swing close to opening the doors to the readoning > that produces SOM, but with a bit of intellectual discipline I think that > danger can b > e avoided. If we adopt a fully antirealist MOQ, I think we lose the best > aspects of science, instead of a study of SQ that opens the doors to the > great intellectual spaces of cosmology and evolution, it tries to confine SQ > to what seems like solipsism, the study of SQ allows us to intellectually > break out of the confines of the individual, the species, language or the > subject, it should do this because we have broken out of SOM and dualism. > Sure we can and do not break out of the confines of experience, how could we, > fundamental existence and experience are inseparable, but reasoning in a > realist mode about the world beyond the human and without the human is > clearly possible and is what science is clearly doing (quantum theory aside > which perhaps in the end brings us back to a clearly experiencial reality, > but not necessarily human experience). Objectivism is the error that science > can somehow shrug off the experiencial and describe reality only in terms of > SQ, but that is m > adness because SQ is fully grounded in experience, how could it not be, and > it forgets real being i.e. DQ as Pirsig and Heidegger tell us. But I am > suggesting realism as a good intellectual way of understanding SQ can be > separated from objectivism and dualism and SOM. This is a different concept > of realism to standard realism, let's call it realism-2, but it seems > possible and useful to me to do so. It simply accepts that we experience > patterns or processes that persist, we can leave things in an empty room and > they will continue to process whatever they are processing when we are not > there, and will be in a persistent but new state, e.g. more entropic, when we > return to them. This is my suggestion. Dan: Static quality is not fully grounded in experience. We do not experience patterns. Static quality comes after experience. Static quality is a memory of experience, not experience itself. The MOQ sees realism and idealism as both being correct in their own limited fashion. Tell me, how will you know if the things you leave in an empty room continue to process whatever it is they are processing? If you return? What if you don't return? What happens then? >DM: > Yes we cannot know if anything exists outside of our experience, but equally > we cannot deny it either, exploring the idea intellectually is therefore > possible, for me it should lead us to consider a more than human idea of > experience-reality. Yes idealism does not exclude realism, see the link I > gave to a book about Zizek it discusses this in detail. At best the MOQ > contextualises all isms, realism and antirealism are 2 sides of the same > coin, I suggest we keep our ability to look at both sides, so in a way > antirealism comes first and tells us about the inescapability of experience, > but realism allows us to reason about what might lie beyond the human, but > logically must be as experiential as our entirely human existence. All goes > back to Paul's 2 aspects, my position is emphasising the > intellectual/realist/cosmological aspect but only do we do not get left with > a single vision aspect, I do accept that in terms of direct experience, DQ > and the pre-intellectual, that is mor e > fundamental and is, in a pre-intellectual sense, anti-realist. Dan: There is no pre-intellectual sense. How is that even possible? I'm sorry, David, but between your run-on sentences and nonsense like this I am having a terrible time making any sense of what you are saying and worse to take any of it seriously. Is it too much to expect a discussion here to hold at least some semblance of literacy? I guess so, Dan http://www.danglover.com Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
