Hi Dan I agree science studies SQ, and at best it agrees with MOQ that SQ is stratified, which means that there are category distinctions between the levels, when this is recognised materialism and reductionism is denied because you cannot explain higher level SQ in terms of the lowest level of SQ where some people derive their ideas about matter and atomism, etc. But what status should scientists give this SQ that they study? Yes it is entirely based in experience, but can we think and reason about how processes understood in SQ terms work in a realist intellectual context, i.e. when not being experienced by a person or even before human beings or persons existed. Yes this reasoning all takes place at the intellectual level and yes it tells us nothing about the more fundamental dynamic quality of reality but as a study of SQ, there seems no reason not to get on with interpreting our understanding of process in both SQ and realist terms, sure SQ us totally derived from experience bu t we can clearly reason about what takes place in the absence of human experience or even existence. Science is the analysis of SQ, we really do not to see how this leaves out DQ, but nonetheless it is a crucial thing to study. Science looks at how SQ has evolved the levels, and logically thus looks at time periods when the higher SQ levels had yet to emerge and how the lowers levels create a platform for the higher levels to emerge. Now the whole thrust of such scientific study is clearly realist, and I see no unavoidable harm in this, although its limitations must be kept in mind, seeing DQ as fundamental and untouched by such study and analysis. I think an MOQ science can continue to be realist without becoming either SOM dualist or objectivist, it should recognise that a realist study of SQ leaves out DQ and can only ever be half the story because of this. Of course we never encounter non-human SQ or a pre-human time, but science adopts realism to look at the idea of non -human existence, non-human time, to see reconstruct a dynamic story of processes that take place without the human. To reason about the nature of these processes outside of human experience is highly problematic, which is why materialism, mechanism, atomism, reductionism are so dubious. If anything we should perhaps remain silent on the question of the nature of processes beyond human experience, although clearly stuff persists when we turn away from it, or has a history before we existed as a species. But if we want to push it the most obvious leap is to assume that pre-humam or non-human processes must be as experiencial as all human processes, although perhaps there character at the different levels may be very different. I think MOQ can quite readonably open itself up to such a realism, I can see the dangers of doing so because it does swing close to opening the doors to the readoning that produces SOM, but with a bit of intellectual discipline I think that danger can b e avoided. If we adopt a fully antirealist MOQ, I think we lose the best aspects of science, instead of a study of SQ that opens the doors to the great intellectual spaces of cosmology and evolution, it tries to confine SQ to what seems like solipsism, the study of SQ allows us to intellectually break out of the confines of the individual, the species, language or the subject, it should do this because we have broken out of SOM and dualism. Sure we can and do not break out of the confines of experience, how could we, fundamental existence and experience are inseparable, but reasoning in a realist mode about the world beyond the human and without the human is clearly possible and is what science is clearly doing (quantum theory aside which perhaps in the end brings us back to a clearly experiencial reality, but not necessarily human experience). Objectivism is the error that science can somehow shrug off the experiencial and describe reality only in terms of SQ, but that is m adness because SQ is fully grounded in experience, how could it not be, and it forgets real being i.e. DQ as Pirsig and Heidegger tell us. But I am suggesting realism as a good intellectual way of understanding SQ can be separated from objectivism and dualism and SOM. This is a different concept of realism to standard realism, let's call it realism-2, but it seems possible and useful to me to do so. It simply accepts that we experience patterns or processes that persist, we can leave things in an empty room and they will continue to process whatever they are processing when we are not there, and will be in a persistent but new state, e.g. more entropic, when we return to them. This is my suggestion.
Yes we cannot know if anything exists outside of our experience, but equally we cannot deny it either, exploring the idea intellectually is therefore possible, for me it should lead us to consider a more than human idea of experience-reality. Yes idealism does not exclude realism, see the link I gave to a book about Zizek it discusses this in detail. At best the MOQ contextualises all isms, realism and antirealism are 2 sides of the same coin, I suggest we keep our ability to look at both sides, so in a way antirealism comes first and tells us about the inescapability of experience, but realism allows us to reason about what might lie beyond the human, but logically must be as experiential as our entirely human existence. All goes back to Paul's 2 aspects, my position is emphasising the intellectual/realist/cosmological aspect but only do we do not get left with a single vision aspect, I do accept that in terms of direct experience, DQ and the pre-intellectual, that is more fundamental and is, in a pre-intellectual sense, anti-realist. David MOn 10 Dec 2014 07:54, Dan Glover <[email protected]> wrote: > > David, > > I don't know... this seems like pretty much a yawn to me. But let's go > ahead and kick the tires and see if the engine cranks. You never > know... > > On Tue, Dec 9, 2014 at 2:59 PM, david <[email protected]> wrote: > > David Morey asked the MOQers: > > > > > > How does the MOQ describe science? > > Dan: > I'd say science is a set of high quality intellectual patterns. > > DM: > Does science study SQ? > > Dan: > Now, see? This is an asshole question if there ever was one. Come on, > Morey. You've been at this long enough to know better. Read the first > two paragraphs of chapter 12 in Lila and get back with me on this. > > DM: > Does science discover SQ processes that take place in the world beyond > the confines of direct experience? > > Dan: > Now this is somewhat interesting. If by using the term 'direct > experience' you mean Dynamic Quality, then of course static quality is > all that exists beyond 'it.' But that isn't really right. I get the > sense you don't actually understand what it is you are saying, > otherwise you wouldn't be saying it. > > DM: > If not how should the self-understanding of science be corrected or > redescribed in MOQ terms? > > Dan: > If you want self-understanding, I suggest meditation. Science is more > about intellectual understanding. > > > > > > > > > dmb says: > > > > This could be a really great question, a great way to discuss the > > difference between SOM and the MOQ, but there is a glitch in it that needs > > fixing first. In the MOQ, there is no such thing as the world beyond the > > confines of experience - or rather if there were we couldn't know anything > > about it. How would it be possible for us to go beyond the world of > > experience? In the MOQ (and for James), experience and reality amount to > > the same thing because there is no sense in talking about what might be > > beyond our limits. > > Dan: > Yes, exactly. By dropping the qualifier 'direct' the term 'experience' > becomes synonymous with Dynamic Quality. Once defined, we have static > quality. Science is one possible process of identifying experience. > > > > >dmb: > > I think one of the best ways to get at the question is to frame it in terms > > of metaphysical realism or scientific realism - that's more or less the SOM > > view of truth and reality - and then pragmatists like Pirsig and James can > > be put on the other side along with certain kinds of anti-realists. Here > > are the opening lines to a Stanford article called "Challenges to > > Metaphysical Realism". > > > > > > "According to metaphysical realism, the world is as it is independently > > of how humans take it to be. The objects the world contains, together > > with their properties and the relations they enter into, fix the > > world's nature and these objects exist independently of our ability to > > discover they do. Unless this is so, metaphysical realists argue, none > > of our beliefs about our world could be objectively true since true > > beliefs tell us how things are and beliefs are objective when true or > > false independently of what anyone might think. > > Dan: > This is some stuff David Harding ought to be hoisting onto his SOM > website. This is the whole reason behind the MOQ, to combat the notion > of an objective reality that exists independently of observation. What > the realists consistently fail to consider is that there is no way to > know one way or another if reality exists separately and apart from > > > > >dmb: > > Many philosophers believe metaphysical realism is just plain common > > sense. Others believe it to be a direct implication of modern science, > > which paints humans as fallible creatures adrift in an inhospitable > > world not of their making. Nonetheless, metaphysical realism is > > controversial. Besides the analytic question of what it means to > > assert that objects exist independently of the mind, metaphysical > > realism also raises epistemological problems: how can we > > obtain knowledge of a mind-independent world? There are also prior > > semantic problems, such as how links are set up between our beliefs > > and the mind-independent states of affairs they allegedly > > represent. This is the Representation Problem. > > Dan: > Didn't Wittgenstein get into a lot of this? I'd have to go back and > re-read some of his stuff but I think so. > > > > > > >dmb: > > Anti-realists deny the world is mind-independent. Believing the > > epistemological and semantic problems to be insoluble, they conclude > > realism must be false." > > Dan: > Right, and so realism and idealism are seen as mutually exclusive, > whereas the MOQ unites them both... they are both correct in their own > limited ways. Good stuff, Dave... thanks! The engine sounds great. > > Dan > > http://www.danglover.com > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
