Case -- I'm sorry to have disappointed you in my response to your last post. It is well articulated and you obviously put considerable time and thought into composing it. I suppose I saw your substitution of "sensation" for "sensibility" as reverting to an adversarial position, while also demonstrating the hopelessness of trying to accommodate an essential reality to an objectivist perspective.
However, inasmuch as you seem sincere in wanting to work your way through a dilemma, I'll put aside our differences and try to address your thoughts more constructively, starting with what you've called my "grievous factual and conceptual errors." > 1.) Sensation and perception at least as I use them are among the earliest > and most studied subjects of experimental psychological. Wilhelm Wundt is > regarded as the first experimental psychologist and it was in his lab in > the 1870s that many of the techniques of psychophysics were developed. > The term sensation is not subject to the whims of your choices. I'm not familiar with the theories of Wundt and Helmholtz, who apparently influenced him, and I consider "psychophysics" a dubious addition to scientific investigation. Science explores the objective world to learn the principles of nature, applying empirically verified facts to a database of useful knowledge. The study of sensory phenomena in relation to physical stimuli assumes the primacy of a physical reality to which sensation is merely reactive (affective). Thus, a science that calls itself psychophysics is not really investigating the psyche but, rather, making the psyche a passive effect of physical phenomena. I think this is a distortion of the empirical approach to knowledge which is what Science is about. Let's be clear as to my use of Sensibility as pre-intellectual awareness. This is hardly a "whim" on my part, since my concept is not bound to a specific term. What I mean by "sensibilty" is the capacity to realize value, and I posit this capacity as the primary attribute of being-aware. (If "sensation", as you use it, conforms to this epistemology, we're on the same page. Otherwise, we're still at odds.) > 2.) Turning your computer off in analogous more to killing and > resurrecting it rather than putting it to sleep. The lights on your DSL > modem mean that the modem is on and have nothing to do with the > computer. If you lookclosely you will notice a light on the modem > that indicates that the PC is on. That light goes off when you turn the > computer off. The lights that blink indicate that signals are coming > into the modem from the DSL network. My point was that those signals were not reaching the computer's "memory bank" or hard drive. Therefore, the data are insensible to the computer, at least until I turn it on again. > 3.) William James was a psychologist and philosopher NOT a psychiatrist. > His essay "Does Consciousness Exist?" is among the first writings on the > subject and is mentioned in nearly every serious work on consciousness > since his time. I stand corrected, thank you. I meant no attack on this esteemed American psychologist for his pragmatic views. I found his "Varieties of Religious Experience" informative with respect to human perception and paranormal experience, but was not enlightened by his philosophical conclusions. > 4.) The quote you give for Steven Weinberg did not come from Steven > Weinberg. It is a post from the MSN discussion group "Star Children" by > a guy named Derek Jones. He quotes Steven Weinberg then goes on with > what you quoted. I was looking for a Weinberg statement to round out the argument that Lanza was making. The passage from "Star Children" had Weinberg's name above it, so I mistook it for his quote. Again, I stand corrected, although I suspect the Jones statement does reflect Weinberg's views. > I put a lot of thought into that post. I am very interested in what might > actually be wrong with it because I think it sketches out an answer to the > "hard problem". And this is how you respond? I am not trying to be angry > or sarcastic in the least here, Ham. I am flatly disappointed but I invite > you to reread the post and respond thoughtfully this time and when you \> do I will respond in kind. [Case, previously]: > I don't use the words awareness or consciousness above > because that is explicitly NOT what I am talking about at > this point. Sensation does not require awareness or > consciousness. Sensation is the pre-intellectual cutting > edge of reality. It only becomes "real" through perception > and integration. I wasn't trying to be flippant or sarcastic in my earlier remarks. If sensation requires neither awareness nor consciousness, I do not understand how it can be sensible. Again, I view sensation as something like an itch or a pain, which is definitely a conscious feeling. However, if you're talking about "unowned" perceptive awareness, which I call "primary sensibility," I suppose it could be regarded as "pre-conscious", although it is still awareness. Is this what you had in mind? Also, what do you mean by "becomes real"? Is non-proprietary sensation "unreal"? > We receive sensory input while asleep or sedated but we are not > aware of it. People in comas have sensory input that registers in > the brain but they are not aware or conscious of it. Sensation is > prior to awareness, perception or consciousness. In fact when > doctors tell us that sensory input has ceased to register in the > brain we call a person brain dead and family members squabble > over whether to let loved one go in peace or preserve them as > animated corpses. Remember Terri Schiavo? A comatose person is either unconscious or brain-dead. In either state, "sensation" is a meaningless term, in the same way that "input signals" are meaningless from the perspective of a switched-off computer. The actual signals are "real", of course, but not as inputs. For me a "sensation" is what I feel; "sensibility" is what I might feel if I were consciously receptive to the source of it. This, I believe, is where the "self" initially identifies with its organic being. Its receptivity is limited to the value that is perceptible to that being and differentiated by sense receptors of that being. Finally, this value is objectivized by the intellect as space/time 'beings' whose properties represent the values thus differentiated. [Case]: > As James said, the term consciousness, if it has any meaning > at all, means that sensations, nervous impulses are being > processed in the brain. > > This point was also made by the empiricists when they asked > if a brain without sensory input could have anything like > experience or awareness. > There was been a bit of research on this in which normal people > are deprived of sensory input to the extent possible. What is > found is that after a period of time, sensory deprived individuals > begin to hallucinate. They manufacture present experience totally > out of memories. But what if they have no memories, or are rendered amnesic by the experiment? Can one hallucinate from a blank slate? This seems highly speculative to me, as compared with research on fetal development. I don't think the question of emerging consciousness lends itself to objective investigation. [Case]: > Pure sensation is excitation of nerve tissue by the external > environment. We have nerves that respond differentially to the > environment. The nerves in our eyes are excited by light; > the nerves in our finger to pressure and so on. Some sensation > arises internally as with hunger or that annoying sense > that tells us we are low on oxygen and need to breathe. Excitation of nerve tissue is precisely that, and it is sensible only to the conscious individual whose nerves and brain sense this trauma. I don't see "sensation" as the stimulus but as the final state of the organism on feeling the stimulus. And, of course, you speak of the "external environment" as a causal reference. That's the cognizant creature inferring that it is sensing beingness. If sensibility is only affective, it would mean that there is only externality (otherness), and that the psyche has no essential identity. I maintain that experience is "effective" in the sense that it creates the appearance of physical reality. [Case]: The process of valuating sensation begins in the brain when we have collected enough of these impressions to begin comparing them. But pure sensation can have no value until the sensations we pick up from the outside can be compared to how they impact sensations produced on the inside. Does the taste of this food relieve the nagging of hunger? [Ham, previously]: Becoming aware is a differentiating process resulting from the finite limitations of the brain. The "integrated" sense data are selectively and incrementally filtered in the process of cognition. The brain and nervous system reduce the whole of essential value to the fractional appearance of finitude. [Case] > You have this completely backwards. Sensations arise from > within and without through the nervous system. The kinesthetic > senses of touch and balance are truly three dimensional as > they arise from a body that is distributed in three dimensions. > Our primary sense is vision. It arises totally from the two > dimensional surfaces of our retinas. Consciousness and > awareness arise from our ability to integrate these modalities > The filtering process you refer occurs as we discard sensations > that are irrelevant so as to focus on those that are. > Determining relevance requires learning and memory. It is > discernment. As Bob Segar said it is a matter of knowing > "what it leave in and what to leave out." As we struggle against the wind. I would suggest that "within" and "without", like "before" and "after", are constructs of the finitely-limited cognitive process in the same way that objects are. Dimensionality and space/time are the mode of human awareness. It is because we are aware of value configured by these conditions that our reality is experienced in this serialized, dimensional way. How could we possibly know "what is relevant" or "what to leave out"? I would say that the brain, rather than the intellect, is the filter that determines what we experience and what we do not. > But to illustrate further. Dolphins brains are larger than human > brains both in absolute size and as a ratio of brain weight to > body size. And yet while dolphins are among the smartest > animals on the planet they do not seem to be as smart as us. > It has been suggested that the fact that dolphins primary sense > is hearing can account for this. It requires more sensory > processing to convert sound waves into three dimensional > awareness than it does to convert vision. On what evidence is that suggestion based? Frankly, I don't see the point of this dolphin/human comparison, except to show that brain mass is not an indicator of intelligence. [Case]: > The process of integrating the five senses with our > memories involves making new associations and > strengthening old ones. Memories grow stronger > when stories are told and retold. The process of > reflection on memory and making of plans involves > slurring time. It is higher order of mental processing > because it involves moving back and forth in time. > This can be defined in terms of electrochemical > activity in the nerves and chemical balances in the > synapses. Searles says consciousness is a property > of this activity in the same way that solidity is a > property of atoms of iron. I stand by my previous statement: > Physical reality does not create the mind, it is objectivized > by mental processing. Time and space describe the finite > limitations of cognizant awareness. The "gaps" between > all of these phenomena represent the nothingness that limits > human perception. [Case]: > This is a point you should seriously rethink. The mind can > not by definition create objectivity. > Objectivity arises when we compare notes with someone > else. Comparing notes to obtain universal verification is someone "being objective" (i.e., rational). That's a different connotation of objectivity than we are discussing here. Objectivity (otherness) and Value-Awareness are the primary contingencies of existence. The mind does not create objects "by definition" but by differentiating value, as I described above. > All sensation, integration of sensation into perception, > all awareness occurs inside the individual. It is subjective > through and through. This is the sense in which I take > solipsism very seriously. I am trapped in this world of > my own making. I accept the existence of things that are > not a part of me even through everything I "know" about > them IS a part of me. As I have said I can not justify > this rationally. The existence of anything outside of me > can not be proved in a formally logical sense. Acceptance > of an objective reality arises as an axiom from outside > of the system just as Gödel said certain statements in > any proof must do. I take no issue with what you've stated above. Your dilemma is a result of having nothing to account for the "sensation" of existential reality. But the evidence you are looking for is right in front of your eyes. What do you see there? An other. All of physical reality is otherness to you. Existence is an awareness/otherness dichotomy. The You that seeks is a "value" entity that has no existence apart from the "beingness" it makes of otherness. Metaphysically, you are a value-aware-of-the-value-of-other. Existentially you are a being-aware. But the "being" of you is only a contingent identity, not your essence. The essence of your being is the value of the Source in which there is no other. Act ually, I like the way your thought is progressing, Case. If you find my comments disparaging, it's because I'm trying to direct you toward a clearer perspective of my epistemology. (If it's any consolation, this is as painful to me as it is to you.) Essentially yours, Ham moq_discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
