Lynn Wheeler wrote: If you have a scheme that with limited amount of money and user inconvenince allows a citizen to access potentially thousands of e-gov sites, without using TTPs I (and all e-govs in the World), would like to hear about it.
Replacing the _indeed_ stale cert info with a stale signed account claim would not have any major impact this scenario except for a few saved CPU cycles. SSL is by no means perfect but frankly; Nobody have come up with a scalable solution that can replace it. To use no-name certs is not so great as it gives user hassles Anders ----- Original Message ----- From: "Anne & Lynn Wheeler" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Newsgroups: netscape.public.mozilla.crypto To: <[email protected]> Sent: Tuesday, May 24, 2005 21:52 Subject: Re: The Worth of Verisign's Brand "Anders Rundgren" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > Mutual authentication is not rocket science but in order to work you > need OTPs or PKI. That is, it is time to let passwords RIP. so *passwords* by definition require preestablished relationship and a relationship management infrastructure. in the mid-90s some were complaining ... so what if stale, static, redundant and superfluous certificates were redundant and superfluous in an environment involving pre-established relationship and a existing relationship administration and management system ... they can't actually hurt anything. However that doesn't take into account the redundant and superfluous overhead costs of actually doing the redundant and superfluous certificate-oriented processing where there already is an established administrative and management relationship system. The other scenario is that some might get confused and decide to rely on the stale, static, redundant and superfluous certificate data in lieu of actually accessing the real data. the other scenario would be to leverage a certificate-based operations in no-value scenario ... and eliminate any established relationship administrative and management infrastructure. Say, a membership environment, where any member could "buy" (obtain) any resource possible and there was no need to perform per member reconciliation. Say a bank ... that would allow any customer to perform as many withdrawels as they wanted ... regardless of their current balance (in fact, eliminate totally the concept of a financial institution even having to keep track of customer balances ... as being no-value and superfluous). however, the truth is ... with regard to value infrastructure, there tends to be a requirement for a relationship administrative and management infrastructure (some of the methodology has been evolving for hundreds of years) that tracks and accumulates information on individual relationships ... even dynamically and in real time. for value infrastructures that are managing and administrating relationships with tried & true established methodology ... then certificate-oriented PKIs become redundant and superfluous ... as are the stale static certificates themselves. the issue then in a mature and well established administrative and management infrastructure it is straight-forward to upgrade any shared-secret (identity information, SSN#, mother's maiden name, pin, password) oriented authentication infrastructure http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#secrets with a digital signature infrastructure where public keys are registered as authentication information in lieu of shared-secrets and digital signature validation (using the public key) is used in lieu of shared-secret matchine. http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#certless -- Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/ _______________________________________________ mozilla-crypto mailing list [email protected] http://mail.mozilla.org/listinfo/mozilla-crypto _______________________________________________ mozilla-crypto mailing list [email protected] http://mail.mozilla.org/listinfo/mozilla-crypto
