Lynn,

Some TTP CAs actually *do* require RP contracts.

The "only" problem with that is that this is usually also connected to
RP authentication to OSCP services for payment purposes.

So even if the certs are stale the information is dynamically verified.

Unfortunately this kind of PKI has scalability issues and their promoters
(banks) are only losing money.  Therefore VeriSign's model in
spite of its contractual weaknesses still seems to reign.

Maybe you are exaggerating the need to sue CAs for huge sums?

That DNSSEC could kill the SSL CA is probably true but it seems that
DNSSEC suffers from a dysfunctional business model.  The SSL PKI
has a working business model.

Anders

----- Original Message ----- 
From: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Newsgroups: netscape.public.mozilla.crypto
To: <[email protected]>
Sent: Wednesday, June 22, 2005 18:45
Subject: Re: The Worth of Verisign's Brand


Anders Rundgren wrote:
> If you have a scheme that with limited amount of money and user
inconvenince
> allows a citizen to access potentially thousands of e-gov sites, without using
> TTPs I (and all e-govs in the World), would like to hear about it.
>
> Replacing the _indeed_ stale cert info with a stale signed account claim 
> would not
> have any major impact this scenario except for a few saved CPU cycles.
>
> SSL is by no means perfect but frankly; Nobody have come up with a
> scalable solution that can replace it.  To use no-name certs is not
> so great as it gives user hassles

The issue isn't about TTPs specifically ... it is about PKIs and
certificates which have a design point of addressing specific issues
involving offline environments; aka the offline email environment of
the early 80s where somebody dialed up their local (electronic) post
office, exchange email and then hung up. They then possibly had some
first-time email from somebody that they had never communicated with
before ... and needed some method of finding out some information about
the sender. This is somewhat analogous to the "letters of credit" from
the sailing ship days.

The issue isn't about TTPs ... it is about trying to apply a solution
designed to compensate for being in an offline environment and not
having any recourse to the real information (including direct access to
the TTPs with the real informationn) to the emerging online
environment.

The contention is that in a real online environment, resorting to
stale, static information (designed to compensate for lack of access to
real online information in an offline enviornment) ... that the stale,
static information is of lot fundamentally flawed given timely access
to the current real information.

Somewhat as the online environment has become more and more pervasive
... the stale, stale, offline PKI paradigm has attempted to find market
niches in the low/no value areas where the relying party can't justify
the possible incremental cost of having access to real, timely
information. For instance a PKI certificate issued at some point in the
past year ... might claim that an individual has a specific bank
account. ALl other things being equal, would a relying party (about to
execute a high value transaction) prefer to have

1) stale, static information possibly a year old regarding the other
party having a specific bank account

or

2) timely, real-time response from the other party's financial
institution that the other party not only still has an active account
... but also that the account has sufficient funds to cover the
indicated transactions and furthermore the other party's financial
institution will stand behind the transfer of those fund.

One of the passing issues for PKI infrastructures moving into the
low/no value market segments ... they are less & less likely able to
charge any significant amounts for stale, static certificates in
support of no/low value operations.

The other issue is that the typical TTP PKI business model is contrary
to most standard business practices. In most standard business
practices, the relying party contracts directly with a TTP for timely
information ... creating some legal obligation on the part of TTP to
perform in specific manner. In the TTP PKI certificate-push model, the
key owner is contracting with the TTP agency (buying a certificate)
which creates various kinds of legal obligation between the TTP agency
and the key owner. The key owner then pushes that certificate to a
relying party .... where there has been no legal established
relationship between the relying party and the TTP agency.

another issue is that in the early 90s, you somewhat found TTPs
considering grossly overloading X.509 identity certificates with
enormous amounts of privacy information. the problem was that many of
the TTPs had no idea what purposes the X.509 identity certificates
might be put to use and/or with which relying parties (and what
possibly information requirements might unknown and unpredictable
relying parties might want).

then as you moved into the mid-90s, some institutions were starting to
come to the realization the x.509 identity certificates grossly
overloaded with personal information represented significant privacy
and liability issues. the result was somewhat retrenching to
relying-party-only certificates
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#rpo

however, where a replying party registers a key-owner's public key in
some sort of database ... and then issues a stale, static,
relying-party-only certificate effectively only containing some sort of
account number (or other form of database lookup value) bound to the
public key. The key-owner was then to append such certificates in all
communication with the relying party. However, it is trivial to
demonstrate that the appending of such stale, static,
relying-party-only certificates to communication with the relying party
is redundant and superfluous i.e. the relying party already is in
possession of a superset of the information in the stale, static,
relying-party-only certificate.

specifically with respect to SSL certificates
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#sslcert

the issue is that there were concerns about the integriy of the domain
name "TTP" providing real-time responses for real-time domain name
requests thru-out the world. the browsers would validate the
certificate and then compare that the domain name that the user typed
in matched the domain name in the certificate.

the problem for the CA SSL PKIs is that they had to validate the
information for a requested ssl domain name certificate with the actual
authoritative agency (aka TTP) for domain names ... the domain name
infrastructure. The CA SSL PKIs had to get various kinds of
identification information from the SSL domain name certificate
applicant and then perform the time-consuming, expensive and
error-prone task of attempting to match it with the identification
information on file with the domain name infrastructure as to the owner
of the specific domain name.

This, then also put the CA SSL PKIs vulnerable to possible integrity
problems with the domain name infrastructure. Somewhat from the CA SSL
PKI  industry is a proposal to improve the integrity of the domain name
infrastructure by having domain name owners register public keys for
their domains. Future communication is then digital signed and can be
verified with the on-file public key .... not a certificateless public
key operation
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#certless

The other advantage for the CA SSL PKIs is that they can also require
that SSL domain name certificates also be digital signed. Then they can
use the onfile (certificateless) public key to change from the
time-consuming, expensive and error-prone identification process to a
much simpler, less expensive and reliable authentication process (by
retrieving the onfile public key for validation of the digital
signature on the SSL domain name certificate request).

This however represents something of a catch-22 for the CA SSL PKI
industry. If they are able to retrieve trusted onfile public keys from
the domain name infrastructure for validating digital signatures (as
the root of the trust chain for SSL domain name certificates) ... then
it would be technically possible for everybody in the world to also
retrieve trusted onfile public keys in their real-time, online domain
name resolution requests. If everybody in the world could do real-time
retrieval of onfile public keys from the domain name TTP ... for
verifying digital signature in communication with servers that they are
contacting ... then it obsoletes the requirement for having SSL domain
name certificates.

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