james woodyatt wrote:
On Oct 28, 2010, at 09:47, Roger Marquis wrote:
What's wrong is remote apps that [...] initiate those inbound connections
to [...] topologies unabstracted by NAT.
Let's leave aside the parts of your argument I've excised with ellipses.
What precisely is wrong with applications that expect to initiate flows to
destinations in topologies that have not been obfuscated away by a network
address/port translator?
Same thing that would be wrong with applications expecting access to other
internal network details. The opposite question would be what's wrong with
requiring applications to stick to the application layer?
An analogous situation would be if ATT required all phone numbers to be
keyed to GPS coordinates, forbidding forwarding. What business is it of
ATT's, or of remote callers, where their destination is physically
located?
Perhaps a more common but also analogous situation is mail order
companies that require a physical address, email address, and phone
number before they'll process a credit card order.
End-users have good reason for not providing these details. That's
basically what EU Privacy Directives are all about. By using NAT end
users get the privacy they require, freedom from vendor lock-in, and are
able to maintain their internal hosts and topologies as they see fit, not
as their upstream ISP, application designers, or marketing data
aggregators see fit.
Roger Marquis
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