james woodyatt wrote:
I don't understand how this answers my question, because I don't know what's wrong with applications expecting to know A) what addresses the network presents to their peers for them, or B) what addresses the network presents to their peers for all their other peers.
Your mal-understanding is most likely due to having responded to what you paraphrased instead of what I originally wrote. Did you understand the analogy to ATT's demanding to know every phone user's GPS coordinates?
I hope I'm inferring correctly from the above paragraph that the reason you find RFC 4193 insufficient is that it places the burden for using privacy
RFC 4193 replaces RFC 1918. It has nothing directly to do with NAT.
If so, then I-D.mrw-nat66 cannot help you; it offers no privacy addressing. So, right now, it sounds like there isn't a publicly defined way to solve the problem you're here to discuss without using a stateful IPv6/NAT, which does well-understood harm to the Internet architecture and the Internet community beyond the domain of enterprises that use it.
"well-understood harm to the Internet" is pure rhetoric and intellectually dishonest. NAT is part of the Internet whether we like it or not. It also does far more good than harm. How else would it have become so widespread, even within organizations not needing to use RFC 1918 addressing? But we do understand that those writing P2P applications, using a badly designed protocol like SIP, writing viruses and trojans, or otherwise trying to access information that firewalls block, NAT blocks, and plain old ACLs block, you are going to be "harmed" just as was ATT when they lost the right to be a monopoly or deny number portability. That "harm" is intentional.
So, if you want IETF to consider your problem, perhaps the most expedient way to get that to happen is to write up an Internet Draft of your own to compete with I-D.mrw-nat66.
This is a good point, but given the inability of the IETF to implement IPv6 beyond a trivially small niche in over 10 years, their inability to ratify IAX and other protocols, and the level of influence special interests hold within the IETF (many of whom stand to profit from the "harm" caused by forcing GUA on consumers) few consider the IETF capable of much of anything these days. The reasons why the IETF "can't do" are illustrated in this very thread, particularly by the attempts at rhetorical obfuscation like RFC 4193 and claims of "well-understood harm". Roger Marquis _______________________________________________ nat66 mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/nat66
