The fearful scenarios you lay out are all highly plausible, and will dominate till Putin is given greater options by considering a wider history of hegemony in which the US is highly complicit:
In 1990, shortly after the Berlin Wall had fallen, and the Soviet Union was beginning to disintegrate, US Secretary of State James Baker had a conversation with Gorbachev in which he suggested the Soviet Union should support German unification in return for a guarantee that NATO would not expand an inch eastward. On Baker’s return to the US, this option was rejected by George H.W. Bush. NATO’s eastward expansion is bound to be a sensitive matter for Russia’s security. The Cold War established the history of Russia having a hostile frontier to the east, a vulnerability that increased once the buffer of the Warsaw Pact counties disintegrated in the early 90’s. Russia, on its eastern front, is one large plain with no natural defence features such as a mountain range or ocean, so the buffer between its heartland and this hostile frontier is a major concern. Since the 1990’s, NATO has been on a major expansion spree eastwards, adding Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia, North Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro. This was bound to evoke a reaction from Russia, with Ukraine likely to be the straw that broke the camel’s back. This was foreseen 12 years ago by William Burns (then US Ambassador to Russia and current CIA Director) who wrote in a confidential cable (released by WikiLeaks), "Ukraine and Georgia’s NATO aspirations not only touch a raw nerve in Russia, they engender serious concerns about the consequences for stability in the region. Not only does Russia perceive encirclement, and efforts to undermine Russia’s influence in the region, but it also fears unpredictable and uncontrolled consequences which would seriously affect Russian security interests. Experts tell us that Russia is particularly worried that the strong divisions in Ukraine over NATO membership, with much of the ethnic-Russian community against membership, could lead to a major split, involving violence or at worst, civil war. In that eventuality, Russia would have to decide whether to intervene; a decision Russia does not want to have to face.” As Siddharth Varadarajan pointed out in The Wire (a digital media publication in India), “If Ukraine is to Russia today what Cuba was to the US during the missile crisis of 1962 (when it allowed the stationing of Russian nuclear weapons on its soil), then its resort to force – reprehensible though it undoubtedly is – should not surprise us. Putin’s ‘special military operation’ is as much the handiwork of a deranged leader as Kennedy’s illegal ‘quarantine’ of Cuban ports was." NATO’s eastward expansion is driven by the Pax Americana project: a global peace underpinned by global economic, political, and military dominance of the US. This project is validated by Western governments by the argument that “we are the good guys”, the ones supporting the quest for a rule-based international order that has been the aspiration after World War II. This validation is supported by Western mainstream media, and largely accepted by the Western public. This “we are the good guys” perception is not one that is shared by most other parts of the world, which sees the US as one of the major violators of the rule-based International order. Some examples are the invasion of Iraq in the Second Gulf War, NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia, support to Israel’s ruthless annexation of Palestinian territory, interventions affecting regime change in many parts of Latin America, long-standing economic sanctions against Cuba; and there are many more. The Pax Americana project is perceived by most of the world as nothing more than a US quest for global hegemony. This would be felt with greater acuity by Russia. We have now returned to the value-free and rules-free international environment that existed before World War II, with the addition of a game changing element of nuclear armed nations. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is illegal under International law, a violation of the assurances that Russia gave Ukraine as part of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, and must be condemned and resisted. But a way out of the conflict depends on a stronger assurance of a rule-based International order, A precondition for a implementing this is the acceptance that no single superpower should possess global hegemony. To achieve this, we would need a frank and realistic accounting for the history of hegemony since World War II. Due to domestic political concerns, it is unlikely that any Western government will foreground, or even articulate, such a reading of history. Change is only possible with a people’s movement within the West. Sadly, one sees little ground for optimism on this count. > On 08-Mar-2022, at 5:50 PM, patrice riemens <patr...@xs4all.nl> wrote: > > ... has already arrived . > > Aloha, > > Even though the last two posts on the list are mine, I have no intention to > become (again) nettime's #1 poster! So this will be my last one for now. > > This said I still wanted to share my thoughts - was it only to be relieved > of them - about 'the situation' with fellow nettimers. > > ExecSum: I think that war in Western Europe is now inevitable, and it will > descend on us sooner than we all would wish for. > > > > In my mind, there are three options about when NATO will actually go to, or > be dragged into a war against Putin's Russia. > > Option Zero: There will be no war. Putin will enslave Ukraine after having > laid it to waste, annex part of it, and transform the rest in a vassal state, > or whatever 'solution' he has in mind after achieving 'victory'. And 'we' in > the West, will accommodate with the new situation and try to make the best of > it, even if it won't be fun at all on many front. And yet I would feel > insanely optimistic if I gave it half a chance of happening - or even less > than that. > > Having put his war machinery in movement, there is no turning back for > Vladimir Putin, save a number of scenarios for his demise that have been > discussed here and there and which are all entirely speculative. So by > keeping it strictly to the current state of the situation, I see only three > possible outcomes, all based on the assumption that the political and > military deciders in the Western alliance (but also outside of it) have by > now concluded that a war can no longer be averted, the only question being > when it will start 'for real'. > > So there are in my mind three 'moments' when NATO will become involved in an > armed conflict with Putin's Russia: > > Moment 1: The situation in Ukraine becomes so dire, the 'Grosnyfication' of > Ukrainian cities so blatant, the masses of refugees into Ukraine's > neighbours, fleeing the violence under the bombs so colossal, that 'in the > West', populations, politicians, media, and even the military brass get so > agitated as to decide that enough is enough - and that 'we will be next' any > way. So there will be more and more support pouring into Ukraine that will > less and less distinguishable from direct military intervention, a stage that > in the eyes of Putin has been passed long ago in any case. > > Moment 2 happens if Putin indeed achieve his goals in Ukraine, at whatever > cost to the Russian and to the Ukrainian people without NATO actually > intervening, it having be paralysed by the fear of consequences Putin has > repeatedly, and unequivocally threatened with. In which case there is no > reason whatsoever to assume he will stop at that and now will go to menace, > and, if unsuccessful, attack both ex-Soviet, but not NATO members Moldova > and Georgia. Russia annexing Moldova will make Romania very angry and very > anxious, doing the same with Georgia will rattle Turkey to an even larger > extent, and greater consequences. And both Romania and Turkey are NATO > members. At which stage the same 'we'll anyway be next' conclusion might > prevail after all ... > > ... or not. Moldova and far-from-Europe (if not from Turkey) Georgia will be > left to their fate of post-Soviet & pre-Imperial vassal states, whether they > have resisted invasion (& be destroyed in the process) or not. Moment 2 in > any case represents a 'between-in' scenario that could be triggered by the > outcome of Moment 1, ... or not, or might just as well merge with ... > > Moment 3 which will happen when Putin's Russia will directly threaten NATO > countries, arguing yet again that NATO, not Russia, is the 'structural' > aggressor. Unfortunately, the trigger to make it is there, in plain sight, on > the map: it is called the 'Suvalky gap' and it consist in the 90km long > borderline between Poland and Lithuania that separates the Russian > (semi-)exclave of Kaliningrad Oblast from Russia's vassal Belarus - by now, > and surely by then, a nation in name only. No doubt Putin will demand a > 'corridor' to put an end to this insufferable situation, itself the result > from the evenmore insufferable existence of the formerly Soviet Baltic states > as independent countries. And all NATO members, just as Poland. > > There will be no Czechoslovakia 1939. Having gone that far, the analogy with > the precedent of Nazi Germany will have become too stark. NATO will go at > war. What happens next is for any one and everyone to imagine. > > I am aware that there are a lot of holes that can (and will) be shot in my > presentation. The most obvious one being whether Putin can hold Russia > together as it is dragging it into a fratricidal annihilation war with > Ukraine - with the economic disaster that it entails. And whether he can hold > his power (and even his life) in the face of possible (probable?) mounting > discontent, both of the Russian people and of his own clique. Beware of the > Ides of March (in 6 days time!) and the 'Tu quoque' bit they say ... but this > wishful thinking is surely part of my sentiment, but not of my reasoning. > > Conclusion: We - and this time without speech marks - are toast. Sorry. > > Cheers all the same, > p+7D! > > > > > > # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission > # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, > # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets > # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l > # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nett...@kein.org > # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject:
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