It seems the matter is now resolved. Here’s the link:
https://vimeo.com/user5077443/the-beauty-of-force Keith > On Mar 9, 2022, at 7:57 PM, Keith Sanborn <[email protected]> wrote: > > Hi nettimers, > > For some reason my vimeo account has been “automatically flagged” making all > my videos suddenly private. Who knows why? Perhaps because there are Cyrillic > characters in the title of this one? Very odd. I have submitted a ticket to > vimeo support. I’ll post if/when my account matters are resolved. > > In the meantime anyone interested in the video can download a low rez version > here: > > https://we.tl/t-bKVg6QJnZM <https://we.tl/t-bKVg6QJnZM> > > pw:gloom2008 > > Apologies to anyone reluctant to download. > > Keith > > >> On Mar 8, 2022, at 3:12 PM, Brian Holmes <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> Patrice, you have put into words the bitter assessment of many many people. >> >> But you should be checking the twitter status of Andrei V Kozyrev (former >> Russian foreign minister) more often! >> >> March 6: "Russian military. The Kremlin spent the last 20 years trying to >> modernize its military. Much of that budget was stolen and spent on >> mega-yachts in Cyprus. But as a military advisor you cannot report that to >> the President. So they reported lies to him instead. Potemkin military" >> >> https://twitter.com/andreivkozyrev/status/1500611398245634050 >> <https://twitter.com/andreivkozyrev/status/1500611398245634050> >> >> The fearsome Russian fighting force is a cardboard bear in the mud. The >> Ukrainians are well armed, they have been training for this since 2014, and >> so far they have humiliated their opponent and inflicted an historic defeat >> insofar as any future military prestige goes. The Russian capacity to >> intimidate Eastern Europe is plunging. They've lost a staggering quantity of >> tanks and vehicles of all kinds, along with the soldiers driving them, and >> they still have not established air superiority with all the combat-support >> capacity that entails, to the point where analysts have begun to wonder if >> they are simply incapable of coordinating and flying complex missions: >> >> https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html >> >> <https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html> >> https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/rusi-defence-systems/russian-air-force-actually-incapable-complex-air-operations >> >> <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/rusi-defence-systems/russian-air-force-actually-incapable-complex-air-operations> >> >> It's uncertain if they have actually used their thermo-barbaric weapons yet, >> and you would think that if their fearsome hypersonic missile is not a dud, >> they would have already blown up Zelensky's presidential office where he >> sits at a precisely known location (the missile is supposed to arrive in >> seconds). Who knows? It may be that Nato support before and during the >> conflict has included communications-jamming capacities of some >> hitherto-unknown sort, or maybe the armed drones the Ukrainians got from >> Turkey are the only real superweapons of the war (so far, they definitely >> are). In any case, the performance of the Ukrainian David against the >> Russian Goliath doesn't suggest any immediate attack on the Nato >> mega-Goliath (including its little fingers, the Baltic states), or even on >> Moldova. As for the probability that the Nato countries will seize the >> occasion to jump the nuclear tripwire by rashly launching their own massive >> attack, well, their 75-year adherence to deterrence doctrine makes that hard >> to imagine. I don't think Nato will make the nuclear mistake. Concerning the >> other side, however, apparently anything is possible. >> >> Nato has a lot of experience with Just Watching (remember the drawn-out >> atrocities of the former Yugoslavia, where there wasn't even a nuclear >> threat). I think they're gonna just watch while Russia starts >> indiscriminantly dropping bombs from high up in the sky, and the whole thing >> will continue to be even more horrible than it already is, until some point >> at which Putin can claim to have broken the Ukrainian state (maybe through >> the use of tactical nuclear weapons to make their own strategic deterrence >> credible). By that point the Russians will be so weakened that they will >> fall back to some arbitrary cease-fire line in Eastern Ukraine, which they >> will have a hard time defending. After that a remilitarized Nato, a >> remilitarized Europe and a host of other allies will use the now standard >> whole-of-society methods, including every embargo imaginable, to reduce >> Russia from a third-rate economic power and false military giant to a failed >> state on a mammoth scale. No problem, the Chinese will manage them for their >> oil and gas. >> >> These projections are absolutely no better than yours, Patrice, but I >> thought I'd try devil's advocate! >> >> Brian >> >> >> On Tue, Mar 8, 2022 at 6:21 AM patrice riemens <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> ... has already arrived . >> >> Aloha, >> >> Even though the last two posts on the list are mine, I have no intention to >> become (again) nettime's #1 poster! So this will be my last one for now. >> >> This said I still wanted to share my thoughts - was it only to be relieved >> of them - about 'the situation' with fellow nettimers. >> >> ExecSum: I think that war in Western Europe is now inevitable, and it will >> descend on us sooner than we all would wish for. >> >> >> >> In my mind, there are three options about when NATO will actually go to, or >> be dragged into a war against Putin's Russia. >> >> Option Zero: There will be no war. Putin will enslave Ukraine after having >> laid it to waste, annex part of it, and transform the rest in a vassal >> state, or whatever 'solution' he has in mind after achieving 'victory'. And >> 'we' in the West, will accommodate with the new situation and try to make >> the best of it, even if it won't be fun at all on many front. And yet I >> would feel insanely optimistic if I gave it half a chance of happening - or >> even less than that. >> >> Having put his war machinery in movement, there is no turning back for >> Vladimir Putin, save a number of scenarios for his demise that have been >> discussed here and there and which are all entirely speculative. So by >> keeping it strictly to the current state of the situation, I see only three >> possible outcomes, all based on the assumption that the political and >> military deciders in the Western alliance (but also outside of it) have by >> now concluded that a war can no longer be averted, the only question being >> when it will start 'for real'. >> >> So there are in my mind three 'moments' when NATO will become involved in an >> armed conflict with Putin's Russia: >> >> Moment 1: The situation in Ukraine becomes so dire, the 'Grosnyfication' of >> Ukrainian cities so blatant, the masses of refugees into Ukraine's >> neighbours, fleeing the violence under the bombs so colossal, that 'in the >> West', populations, politicians, media, and even the military brass get so >> agitated as to decide that enough is enough - and that 'we will be next' any >> way. So there will be more and more support pouring into Ukraine that will >> less and less distinguishable from direct military intervention, a stage >> that in the eyes of Putin has been passed long ago in any case. >> >> Moment 2 happens if Putin indeed achieve his goals in Ukraine, at whatever >> cost to the Russian and to the Ukrainian people without NATO actually >> intervening, it having be paralysed by the fear of consequences Putin has >> repeatedly, and unequivocally threatened with. In which case there is no >> reason whatsoever to assume he will stop at that and now will go to menace, >> and, if unsuccessful, attack both ex-Soviet, but not NATO members Moldova >> and Georgia. Russia annexing Moldova will make Romania very angry and very >> anxious, doing the same with Georgia will rattle Turkey to an even larger >> extent, and greater consequences. And both Romania and Turkey are NATO >> members. At which stage the same 'we'll anyway be next' conclusion might >> prevail after all ... >> >> ... or not. Moldova and far-from-Europe (if not from Turkey) Georgia will be >> left to their fate of post-Soviet & pre-Imperial vassal states, whether they >> have resisted invasion (& be destroyed in the process) or not. Moment 2 in >> any case represents a 'between-in' scenario that could be triggered by the >> outcome of Moment 1, ... or not, or might just as well merge with ... >> >> Moment 3 which will happen when Putin's Russia will directly threaten NATO >> countries, arguing yet again that NATO, not Russia, is the 'structural' >> aggressor. Unfortunately, the trigger to make it is there, in plain sight, >> on the map: it is called the 'Suvalky gap' and it consist in the 90km long >> borderline between Poland and Lithuania that separates the Russian >> (semi-)exclave of Kaliningrad Oblast from Russia's vassal Belarus - by now, >> and surely by then, a nation in name only. No doubt Putin will demand a >> 'corridor' to put an end to this insufferable situation, itself the result >> from the evenmore insufferable existence of the formerly Soviet Baltic >> states as independent countries. And all NATO members, just as Poland. >> >> There will be no Czechoslovakia 1939. Having gone that far, the analogy with >> the precedent of Nazi Germany will have become too stark. NATO will go at >> war. What happens next is for any one and everyone to imagine. >> >> I am aware that there are a lot of holes that can (and will) be shot in my >> presentation. The most obvious one being whether Putin can hold Russia >> together as it is dragging it into a fratricidal annihilation war with >> Ukraine - with the economic disaster that it entails. And whether he can >> hold his power (and even his life) in the face of possible (probable?) >> mounting discontent, both of the Russian people and of his own clique. >> Beware of the Ides of March (in 6 days time!) and the 'Tu quoque' bit they >> say ... but this wishful thinking is surely part of my sentiment, but not of >> my reasoning. >> >> Conclusion: We - and this time without speech marks - are toast. Sorry. >> >> Cheers all the same, >> p+7D! >> >> >> >> >> >> # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission >> # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, >> # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets >> # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l >> <http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l> >> # archive: http://www.nettime.org <http://www.nettime.org/> contact: >> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >> # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject: >> # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission >> # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, >> # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets >> # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l >> <http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l> >> # archive: http://www.nettime.org <http://www.nettime.org/> contact: >> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >> # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject: > > # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission > # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, > # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets > # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l > # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: [email protected] > # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject:
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