Sorry for a consistent error of saying ‘eastern front’ when I meant ‘western front’. A senior moment.
Thanks Andreas for pointing out the error > On 09-Mar-2022, at 12:05 PM, Prem Chandavarkar <prem....@gmail.com> wrote: > > The fearful scenarios you lay out are all highly plausible, and will dominate > till Putin is given greater options by considering a wider history of > hegemony in which the US is highly complicit: > > In 1990, shortly after the Berlin Wall had fallen, and the Soviet Union was > beginning to disintegrate, US Secretary of State James Baker had a > conversation with Gorbachev in which he suggested the Soviet Union should > support German unification in return for a guarantee that NATO would not > expand an inch eastward. On Baker’s return to the US, this option was > rejected by George H.W. Bush. > NATO’s eastward expansion is bound to be a sensitive matter for Russia’s > security. The Cold War established the history of Russia having a hostile > frontier to the east, a vulnerability that increased once the buffer of the > Warsaw Pact counties disintegrated in the early 90’s. Russia, on its eastern > front, is one large plain with no natural defence features such as a mountain > range or ocean, so the buffer between its heartland and this hostile frontier > is a major concern. > Since the 1990’s, NATO has been on a major expansion spree eastwards, adding > Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, > Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia, North Macedonia, Albania and > Montenegro. > This was bound to evoke a reaction from Russia, with Ukraine likely to be the > straw that broke the camel’s back. This was foreseen 12 years ago by William > Burns (then US Ambassador to Russia and current CIA Director) who wrote in a > confidential cable (released by WikiLeaks), "Ukraine and Georgia’s NATO > aspirations not only touch a raw nerve in Russia, they engender serious > concerns about the consequences for stability in the region. Not only does > Russia perceive encirclement, and efforts to undermine Russia’s influence in > the region, but it also fears unpredictable and uncontrolled consequences > which would seriously affect Russian security interests. Experts tell us that > Russia is particularly worried that the strong divisions in Ukraine over NATO > membership, with much of the ethnic-Russian community against membership, > could lead to a major split, involving violence or at worst, civil war. In > that eventuality, Russia would have to decide whether to intervene; a > decision Russia does not want to have to face.” > As Siddharth Varadarajan pointed out in The Wire (a digital media publication > in India), “If Ukraine is to Russia today what Cuba was to the US during the > missile crisis of 1962 (when it allowed the stationing of Russian nuclear > weapons on its soil), then its resort to force – reprehensible though it > undoubtedly is – should not surprise us. Putin’s ‘special military operation’ > is as much the handiwork of a deranged leader as Kennedy’s illegal > ‘quarantine’ of Cuban ports was." > NATO’s eastward expansion is driven by the Pax Americana project: a global > peace underpinned by global economic, political, and military dominance of > the US. This project is validated by Western governments by the argument that > “we are the good guys”, the ones supporting the quest for a rule-based > international order that has been the aspiration after World War II. This > validation is supported by Western mainstream media, and largely accepted by > the Western public. > This “we are the good guys” perception is not one that is shared by most > other parts of the world, which sees the US as one of the major violators of > the rule-based International order. Some examples are the invasion of Iraq in > the Second Gulf War, NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia, support to Israel’s > ruthless annexation of Palestinian territory, interventions affecting regime > change in many parts of Latin America, long-standing economic sanctions > against Cuba; and there are many more. > The Pax Americana project is perceived by most of the world as nothing more > than a US quest for global hegemony. This would be felt with greater acuity > by Russia. > We have now returned to the value-free and rules-free international > environment that existed before World War II, with the addition of a game > changing element of nuclear armed nations. > Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is illegal under International law, a violation > of the assurances that Russia gave Ukraine as part of the 1994 Budapest > Memorandum, and must be condemned and resisted. But a way out of the conflict > depends on a stronger assurance of a rule-based International order, > A precondition for a implementing this is the acceptance that no single > superpower should possess global hegemony. To achieve this, we would need a > frank and realistic accounting for the history of hegemony since World War II. > Due to domestic political concerns, it is unlikely that any Western > government will foreground, or even articulate, such a reading of history. > Change is only possible with a people’s movement within the West. Sadly, one > sees little ground for optimism on this count. > > >> On 08-Mar-2022, at 5:50 PM, patrice riemens <patr...@xs4all.nl >> <mailto:patr...@xs4all.nl>> wrote: >> >> ... has already arrived . >> >> Aloha, >> >> Even though the last two posts on the list are mine, I have no intention to >> become (again) nettime's #1 poster! So this will be my last one for now. >> >> This said I still wanted to share my thoughts - was it only to be relieved >> of them - about 'the situation' with fellow nettimers. >> >> ExecSum: I think that war in Western Europe is now inevitable, and it will >> descend on us sooner than we all would wish for. >> >> >> >> In my mind, there are three options about when NATO will actually go to, or >> be dragged into a war against Putin's Russia. >> >> Option Zero: There will be no war. Putin will enslave Ukraine after having >> laid it to waste, annex part of it, and transform the rest in a vassal >> state, or whatever 'solution' he has in mind after achieving 'victory'. And >> 'we' in the West, will accommodate with the new situation and try to make >> the best of it, even if it won't be fun at all on many front. And yet I >> would feel insanely optimistic if I gave it half a chance of happening - or >> even less than that. >> >> Having put his war machinery in movement, there is no turning back for >> Vladimir Putin, save a number of scenarios for his demise that have been >> discussed here and there and which are all entirely speculative. So by >> keeping it strictly to the current state of the situation, I see only three >> possible outcomes, all based on the assumption that the political and >> military deciders in the Western alliance (but also outside of it) have by >> now concluded that a war can no longer be averted, the only question being >> when it will start 'for real'. >> >> So there are in my mind three 'moments' when NATO will become involved in an >> armed conflict with Putin's Russia: >> >> Moment 1: The situation in Ukraine becomes so dire, the 'Grosnyfication' of >> Ukrainian cities so blatant, the masses of refugees into Ukraine's >> neighbours, fleeing the violence under the bombs so colossal, that 'in the >> West', populations, politicians, media, and even the military brass get so >> agitated as to decide that enough is enough - and that 'we will be next' any >> way. So there will be more and more support pouring into Ukraine that will >> less and less distinguishable from direct military intervention, a stage >> that in the eyes of Putin has been passed long ago in any case. >> >> Moment 2 happens if Putin indeed achieve his goals in Ukraine, at whatever >> cost to the Russian and to the Ukrainian people without NATO actually >> intervening, it having be paralysed by the fear of consequences Putin has >> repeatedly, and unequivocally threatened with. In which case there is no >> reason whatsoever to assume he will stop at that and now will go to menace, >> and, if unsuccessful, attack both ex-Soviet, but not NATO members Moldova >> and Georgia. Russia annexing Moldova will make Romania very angry and very >> anxious, doing the same with Georgia will rattle Turkey to an even larger >> extent, and greater consequences. And both Romania and Turkey are NATO >> members. At which stage the same 'we'll anyway be next' conclusion might >> prevail after all ... >> >> ... or not. Moldova and far-from-Europe (if not from Turkey) Georgia will be >> left to their fate of post-Soviet & pre-Imperial vassal states, whether they >> have resisted invasion (& be destroyed in the process) or not. Moment 2 in >> any case represents a 'between-in' scenario that could be triggered by the >> outcome of Moment 1, ... or not, or might just as well merge with ... >> >> Moment 3 which will happen when Putin's Russia will directly threaten NATO >> countries, arguing yet again that NATO, not Russia, is the 'structural' >> aggressor. Unfortunately, the trigger to make it is there, in plain sight, >> on the map: it is called the 'Suvalky gap' and it consist in the 90km long >> borderline between Poland and Lithuania that separates the Russian >> (semi-)exclave of Kaliningrad Oblast from Russia's vassal Belarus - by now, >> and surely by then, a nation in name only. No doubt Putin will demand a >> 'corridor' to put an end to this insufferable situation, itself the result >> from the evenmore insufferable existence of the formerly Soviet Baltic >> states as independent countries. And all NATO members, just as Poland. >> >> There will be no Czechoslovakia 1939. Having gone that far, the analogy with >> the precedent of Nazi Germany will have become too stark. NATO will go at >> war. What happens next is for any one and everyone to imagine. >> >> I am aware that there are a lot of holes that can (and will) be shot in my >> presentation. The most obvious one being whether Putin can hold Russia >> together as it is dragging it into a fratricidal annihilation war with >> Ukraine - with the economic disaster that it entails. And whether he can >> hold his power (and even his life) in the face of possible (probable?) >> mounting discontent, both of the Russian people and of his own clique. >> Beware of the Ides of March (in 6 days time!) and the 'Tu quoque' bit they >> say ... but this wishful thinking is surely part of my sentiment, but not of >> my reasoning. >> >> Conclusion: We - and this time without speech marks - are toast. Sorry. >> >> Cheers all the same, >> p+7D! >> >> >> >> >> >> # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission >> # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, >> # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets >> # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l >> <http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l> >> # archive: http://www.nettime.org <http://www.nettime.org/> contact: >> nett...@kein.org <mailto:nett...@kein.org> >> # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject: >
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