that's my point just published https://instituteofradicalimagination.org/2022/03/09/militant-mutualism-and-the-exit-from-empire/?fbclid=IwAR1Q7GBbLIDM04w0oZx6aRdEww73FSZuginaa9htDIiQhMR_x0W2RH-zKNM
On Wed, 9 Mar 2022 at 10:34, Prem Chandavarkar <[email protected]> wrote: > Sorry for a consistent error of saying ‘eastern front’ when I meant > ‘western front’. A senior moment. > > Thanks Andreas for pointing out the error > > On 09-Mar-2022, at 12:05 PM, Prem Chandavarkar <[email protected]> wrote: > > The fearful scenarios you lay out are all highly plausible, and will > dominate till Putin is given greater options by considering a wider history > of hegemony in which the US is highly complicit: > > - In 1990, shortly after the Berlin Wall had fallen, and the Soviet > Union was beginning to disintegrate, US Secretary of State James Baker had > a conversation with Gorbachev in which he suggested the Soviet Union should > support German unification in return for a guarantee that NATO would not > expand an inch eastward. On Baker’s return to the US, this option was > rejected by George H.W. Bush. > - NATO’s eastward expansion is bound to be a sensitive matter for > Russia’s security. The Cold War established the history of Russia having a > hostile frontier to the east, a vulnerability that increased once the > buffer of the Warsaw Pact counties disintegrated in the early 90’s. Russia, > on its eastern front, is one large plain with no natural defence features > such as a mountain range or ocean, so the buffer between its heartland and > this hostile frontier is a major concern. > - Since the 1990’s, NATO has been on a major expansion spree > eastwards, adding Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, > Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia, North Macedonia, > Albania and Montenegro. > - This was bound to evoke a reaction from Russia, with Ukraine likely > to be the straw that broke the camel’s back. This was foreseen 12 years ago > by William Burns (then US Ambassador to Russia and current CIA Director) > who wrote in a confidential cable (released by WikiLeaks), *"**Ukraine > and Georgia’s NATO aspirations not only touch a raw nerve in Russia, they > engender serious concerns about the consequences for stability in the > region. Not only does Russia perceive encirclement, and efforts to > undermine Russia’s influence in the region, but it also fears unpredictable > and uncontrolled consequences which would seriously affect Russian security > interests. Experts tell us that Russia is particularly worried that the > strong divisions in Ukraine over NATO membership, with much of the > ethnic-Russian community against membership, could lead to a major split, > involving violence or at worst, civil war. In that eventuality, Russia > would have to decide whether to intervene; a decision Russia does not want > to have to face.”* > - As Siddharth Varadarajan pointed out in The Wire (a digital media > publication in India), *“If Ukraine is to Russia today what Cuba was > to the US during the missile crisis of 1962 (when it allowed the stationing > of Russian nuclear weapons on its soil), then its resort to force – > reprehensible though it undoubtedly is – should not surprise us. Putin’s > ‘special military operation’ is as much the handiwork of a deranged leader > as Kennedy’s illegal ‘quarantine’ of Cuban ports was."* > - NATO’s eastward expansion is driven by the Pax Americana project: a > global peace underpinned by global economic, political, and military > dominance of the US. This project is validated by Western governments by > the argument that “we are the good guys”, the ones supporting the quest for > a rule-based international order that has been the aspiration after World > War II. This validation is supported by Western mainstream media, and > largely accepted by the Western public. > - This “we are the good guys” perception is not one that is shared by > most other parts of the world, which sees the US as one of the major > violators of the rule-based International order. Some examples are the > invasion of Iraq in the Second Gulf War, NATO’s bombing of > Yugoslavia, support to Israel’s ruthless annexation of Palestinian > territory, interventions affecting regime change in many parts of Latin > America, long-standing economic sanctions against Cuba; and there are many > more. > - The Pax Americana project is perceived by most of the world as > nothing more than a US quest for global hegemony. This would be felt with > greater acuity by Russia. > - We have now returned to the value-free and rules-free international > environment that existed before World War II, with the addition of a game > changing element of nuclear armed nations. > - Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is illegal under International law, a > violation of the assurances that Russia gave Ukraine as part of the 1994 > Budapest Memorandum, and must be condemned and resisted. But a way out of > the conflict depends on a stronger assurance of a > rule-based International order, > - A precondition for a implementing this is the acceptance that no > single superpower should possess global hegemony. To achieve this, we would > need a frank and realistic accounting for the history of hegemony since > World War II. > - Due to domestic political concerns, it is unlikely that any Western > government will foreground, or even articulate, such a reading of history. > Change is only possible with a people’s movement within the West. Sadly, > one sees little ground for optimism on this count. > > > > On 08-Mar-2022, at 5:50 PM, patrice riemens <[email protected]> wrote: > > ... has already arrived . > > Aloha, > > Even though the last two posts on the list are mine, I have no intention > to become (again) nettime's #1 poster! So this will be my last one for now. > > This said I still wanted to share my thoughts - was it only to be > relieved of them - about 'the situation' with fellow nettimers. > > ExecSum: I think that war in Western Europe is now inevitable, and it will > descend on us sooner than we all would wish for. > > > > In my mind, there are three options about when NATO will actually go to, > or be dragged into a war against Putin's Russia. > > Option Zero: There will be no war. Putin will enslave Ukraine after having > laid it to waste, annex part of it, and transform the rest in a vassal > state, or whatever 'solution' he has in mind after achieving 'victory'. > And 'we' in the West, will accommodate with the new situation and try to > make the best of it, even if it won't be fun at all on many front. And yet > I would feel insanely optimistic if I gave it half a chance of happening - > or even less than that. > > Having put his war machinery in movement, there is no turning back for > Vladimir Putin, save a number of scenarios for his demise that have been > discussed here and there and which are all entirely speculative. So by > keeping it strictly to the current state of the situation, I see only three > possible outcomes, all based on the assumption that the political and > military deciders in the Western alliance (but also outside of it) have by > now concluded that a war can no longer be averted, the only question being > when it will start 'for real'. > > So there are in my mind three 'moments' when NATO will become involved in > an armed conflict with Putin's Russia: > > Moment 1: The situation in Ukraine becomes so dire, the 'Grosnyfication' > of Ukrainian cities so blatant, the masses of refugees into Ukraine's > neighbours, fleeing the violence under the bombs so colossal, that 'in the > West', populations, politicians, media, and even the military brass get so > agitated as to decide that enough is enough - and that 'we will be next' > any way. So there will be more and more support pouring into Ukraine that > will less and less distinguishable from direct military intervention, a > stage that in the eyes of Putin has been passed long ago in any case. > > Moment 2 happens if Putin indeed achieve his goals in Ukraine, at whatever > cost to the Russian and to the Ukrainian people without NATO actually > intervening, it having be paralysed by the fear of consequences Putin has > repeatedly, and unequivocally threatened with. In which case there is no > reason whatsoever to assume he will stop at that and now will go to menace, > and, if unsuccessful, attack both ex-Soviet, but not NATO members Moldova > and Georgia. Russia annexing Moldova will make Romania very angry and very > anxious, doing the same with Georgia will rattle Turkey to an even larger > extent, and greater consequences. And both Romania and Turkey are NATO > members. At which stage the same 'we'll anyway be next' conclusion might > prevail after all ... > > ... or not. Moldova and far-from-Europe (if not from Turkey) Georgia will > be left to their fate of post-Soviet & pre-Imperial vassal states, whether > they have resisted invasion (& be destroyed in the process) or not. Moment > 2 in any case represents a 'between-in' scenario that could be triggered > by the outcome of Moment 1, ... or not, or might just as well merge with > ... > > Moment 3 which will happen when Putin's Russia will directly threaten NATO > countries, arguing yet again that NATO, not Russia, is the 'structural' > aggressor. Unfortunately, the trigger to make it is there, in plain sight, > on the map: it is called the 'Suvalky gap' and it consist in the 90km long > borderline between Poland and Lithuania that separates the Russian > (semi-)exclave of Kaliningrad Oblast from Russia's vassal Belarus - by now, > and surely by then, a nation in name only. No doubt Putin will demand a > 'corridor' to put an end to this insufferable situation, itself the result > from the evenmore insufferable existence of the formerly Soviet Baltic > states as independent countries. And all NATO members, just as Poland. > > There will be no Czechoslovakia 1939. Having gone that far, the analogy > with the precedent of Nazi Germany will have become too stark. NATO will go > at war. What happens next is for any one and everyone to imagine. > > I am aware that there are a lot of holes that can (and will) be shot in my > presentation. The most obvious one being whether Putin can hold Russia > together as it is dragging it into a fratricidal annihilation war with > Ukraine - with the economic disaster that it entails. And whether he can > hold his power (and even his life) in the face of possible (probable?) > mounting discontent, both of the Russian people and of his own clique. > Beware of the Ides of March (in 6 days time!) and the 'Tu quoque' bit they > say ... but this wishful thinking is surely part of my sentiment, but not > of my reasoning. > > Conclusion: We - and this time without speech marks - are toast. Sorry. > > Cheers all the same, > p+7D! > > > > > > # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission > # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, > # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets > # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l > # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: [email protected] > # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject: > > > > # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission > # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, > # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets > # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l > # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: [email protected] > # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject:
# distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: [email protected] # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject:
