madhushreeag commented on code in PR #44365: URL: https://github.com/apache/superset/pull/44365#discussion_r4198188559
########## tests/integration_tests/security/login_token_api_tests.py: ########## @@ -0,0 +1,337 @@ +# Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one +# or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file +# distributed with this work for additional information +# regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file +# to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the +# "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance +# with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, +# software distributed under the License is distributed on an +# "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY +# KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the +# specific language governing permissions and limitations +# under the License. +"""Route-level tests for the one-time login token endpoints. + +These complement ``tests/unit_tests/security/login_token_test.py``, which +exercises mint and consume directly. Driving the HTTP routes additionally covers +the decorator stack -- ``@transaction()`` in particular, which does not nest -- +and the session cookie that ``login_user`` writes, neither of which the unit +tests can see. +""" + +from typing import Any +from unittest.mock import patch +from uuid import UUID + +from flask_appbuilder.security.sqla.manager import user_updating + +from superset import db +from superset.daos.key_value import KeyValueDAO +from superset.key_value.models import KeyValueEntry +from superset.key_value.types import KeyValueResource +from superset.utils import json +from tests.conftest import with_config +from tests.integration_tests.base_tests import SupersetTestCase +from tests.integration_tests.conftest import with_feature_flags +from tests.integration_tests.constants import GAMMA_USERNAME + +ENDPOINT = "/api/v1/security/login-token/" +MINT_SECRET = "integration-test-secret" # noqa: S105 + + +def _resolver(request: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, Any] | None: + """Stand-in for a deployment resolver: a shared header plus a username. + + A real one would validate an id token or call an internal service; all this + needs to do is distinguish an authorized caller from an unauthorized one. + """ + if request.headers.get("X-Test-Mint-Secret") != MINT_SECRET: + return None + username = (request.get_json(silent=True) or {}).get("username") + return {"username": username} if username else None + + +def _verbatim_resolver(request: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, Any] | None: + """Return the request body as ``userinfo``, unmodified. + + Lets a test drive an arbitrary resolver result through the real route, which + is the only way to cover shapes a sensible resolver would not produce but a + misbehaving one will. + """ + if request.headers.get("X-Test-Mint-Secret") != MINT_SECRET: + return None + return request.get_json(silent=True) or None + + +class TestLoginTokenApi(SupersetTestCase): + def _mint(self, username: str = GAMMA_USERNAME) -> str: + """Mint a token through the route and return it.""" + response = self.client.post( + ENDPOINT, + data=json.dumps({"username": username}), + content_type="application/json", + headers={"X-Test-Mint-Secret": MINT_SECRET}, + ) + assert response.status_code == 200, response.data + token = json.loads(response.data)["access_token"] + assert token + return token + + @staticmethod + def _stored_tokens() -> int: + return ( + db.session.query(KeyValueEntry) + .filter(KeyValueEntry.resource == KeyValueResource.LOGIN_TOKEN.value) + .count() + ) + + @staticmethod + def _is_stored(token: str) -> bool: + """Whether this specific token still has a row. + + Scoped to one key rather than counting the table: the metadata database + is shared across the suite, so an absolute count couples these + assertions to whatever other tests happen to have left behind. + """ + return ( + KeyValueDAO.get_entry(KeyValueResource.LOGIN_TOKEN, UUID(token)) is not None + ) + + # ---------------------------------------------------------------- closed off + + def test_endpoints_are_404_without_the_feature_flag(self): + """Closed by default: neither verb exists until the flag is on.""" + assert self.client.post(ENDPOINT).status_code == 404 + assert self.client.get(f"{ENDPOINT}?token=x").status_code == 404 + + @with_feature_flags(LOGIN_TOKEN=True) + @with_config({"LOGIN_TOKEN_IDENTITY_RESOLVER": None}) + def test_endpoints_are_404_without_a_resolver(self): + """The flag alone is not enough -- a resolver must also be configured.""" + assert self.client.post(ENDPOINT).status_code == 404 + assert self.client.get(f"{ENDPOINT}?token=x").status_code == 404 + + # --------------------------------------------------------------------- mint + + @with_feature_flags(LOGIN_TOKEN=True) + @with_config({"LOGIN_TOKEN_IDENTITY_RESOLVER": _resolver}) + def test_mint_rejects_a_caller_the_resolver_declines(self): + """No shared header, no token -- and nothing written to the store.""" + before = self._stored_tokens() + response = self.client.post( + ENDPOINT, + data=json.dumps({"username": GAMMA_USERNAME}), + content_type="application/json", + ) + assert response.status_code == 401 + assert self._stored_tokens() == before + + # ------------------------------------------------------------------ consume + + @with_feature_flags(LOGIN_TOKEN=True) + @with_config({"LOGIN_TOKEN_IDENTITY_RESOLVER": _resolver}) + def test_consume_establishes_a_session_and_redirects(self): + """The happy path: 302 to `next`, and the frame is authenticated.""" + token = self._mint() + response = self.client.get(f"{ENDPOINT}?token={token}&next=/dashboard/list/") + + assert response.status_code == 302 + assert response.headers["Location"].endswith("/dashboard/list/") + + # The session belongs to the resolved user, not to whoever called mint. + me = self.client.get("/api/v1/me/") + assert me.status_code == 200 + assert json.loads(me.data)["result"]["username"] == GAMMA_USERNAME + + @with_feature_flags(LOGIN_TOKEN=True) + @with_config({"LOGIN_TOKEN_IDENTITY_RESOLVER": _resolver}) + def test_consume_is_single_use(self): + """A spent token is refused on the second request.""" + token = self._mint() + assert self.client.get(f"{ENDPOINT}?token={token}").status_code == 302 + assert self.client.get(f"{ENDPOINT}?token={token}").status_code == 401 + + @with_feature_flags(LOGIN_TOKEN=True) + @with_config({"LOGIN_TOKEN_IDENTITY_RESOLVER": _resolver}) + def test_consume_burn_survives_a_provisioning_rollback(self): + """Burn durability when provisioning *declines*. + + Flask-AppBuilder's ``add_user`` / ``update_user`` catch their own + failures, call ``rollback()`` on the shared session and return ``False`` + without raising -- and ``update_user_auth_stat`` discards that return + value. Before ``consume`` committed the delete itself, that rollback + discarded the pending DELETE, and a token already handed to a browser + became redeemable a second time. + + This covers the 401 branch. The harder case -- a rollback on a login that + nonetheless *succeeds* -- is + :meth:`test_consume_burn_survives_a_failing_user_updating_hook`. + """ + token = self._mint() + + def rollback_and_decline(_userinfo: Any) -> None: + db.session.rollback() + return None + + with patch.object( + self.app.appbuilder.sm, + "auth_user_oauth", + side_effect=rollback_and_decline, + ): + first = self.client.get(f"{ENDPOINT}?token={token}") + + # Provisioning declined, so no session -- but the token is still spent. + assert first.status_code == 401 + + second = self.client.get(f"{ENDPOINT}?token={token}") + assert second.status_code == 401, ( + "the token was redeemable after a provisioning rollback -- the burn " + "was not committed independently of provisioning" + ) + assert not self._is_stored(token) + + @with_feature_flags(LOGIN_TOKEN=True) + @with_config({"LOGIN_TOKEN_IDENTITY_RESOLVER": _resolver}) + def test_consume_burn_survives_a_failing_user_updating_hook(self): + """Burn durability on a login that *succeeds* despite a rollback. + + This is the worst case, and it uses the real Flask-AppBuilder code path + rather than a patched security manager. In FAB 5.2.2, + ``SecurityManager.update_user`` emits ``user_updating`` as a pre-commit + signal *inside* its ``try``, and ``_emit_pre_signal`` re-raises whatever a + handler throws. The handler's exception therefore lands in + ``update_user``'s own ``except``, which calls ``rollback()`` on the shared + session and returns ``False``. + + Nothing upstream notices: ``update_user_auth_stat`` discards that return + value, and ``auth_user_oauth`` returns the user regardless. So the request + completes as a **successful login** -- a 302 and a valid session cookie -- + while the rollback has silently undone whatever the endpoint had pending. + + If the burn were not committed inside ``consume``, the token would be back + in the key-value store and redeemable for the rest of its TTL, even though + the user is now logged in. ``FAB_SECURITY_SIGNALS_ENABLED`` defaults to + ``True`` and Superset does not override it, so this is reachable in a + default deployment, not a contrived one. + """ + token = self._mint() + + def failing_hook(_sender: Any, **_kwargs: Any) -> None: + raise RuntimeError("user_updating handler failed") + + # ``connected_to`` holds a strong reference for the duration; a plain + # ``connect`` of a local function can be garbage collected before the + # signal fires, which would silently make this test vacuous. + with user_updating.connected_to(failing_hook): + first = self.client.get(f"{ENDPOINT}?token={token}") + + # The login SUCCEEDED -- that is precisely what makes this dangerous. + assert first.status_code == 302, ( + f"expected a successful login despite the failing hook, got " + f"{first.status_code}" + ) + + second = self.client.get(f"{ENDPOINT}?token={token}") + assert second.status_code == 401, ( + "the token was redeemable after a successful login whose " + "user_updating hook rolled the session back -- the burn must be " + "committed before provisioning runs" + ) + assert not self._is_stored(token) + + @with_feature_flags(LOGIN_TOKEN=True) + @with_config({"LOGIN_TOKEN_IDENTITY_RESOLVER": _resolver}) + def test_consume_rejects_unknown_and_malformed_tokens(self): + """Missing, malformed and well-formed-but-unknown are the same 401.""" + for token in ("", "not-a-uuid", "6d2b9921-2274-43b8-94d6-e5e1f05372c4"): + with self.subTest(token=token): + response = self.client.get(f"{ENDPOINT}?token={token}") + assert response.status_code == 401 + + @with_feature_flags(LOGIN_TOKEN=True) + @with_config({"LOGIN_TOKEN_IDENTITY_RESOLVER": _verbatim_resolver}) + def test_empty_identity_keys_do_not_mint_a_doomed_token(self): + """A token that mints must be redeemable, end to end. + + ``auth_user_oauth`` selects the identifier on key *presence*: ``if + "username" in userinfo`` wins even when the value is empty, and the empty + username is then rejected outright. So a resolver returning + ``{"username": "", "email": ...}`` used to mint a perfectly good token + that could only ever 401 on redemption, instead of falling back to the + email. Surrounding whitespace failed the same way, via ``find_user``. + + Both now normalize before minting, so each of these redeems. Note FAB + uses whichever value it selected as the ``find_user`` lookup key, which + is why the email slot here holds a username rather than an address. + """ + for userinfo in ( + {"username": "", "email": GAMMA_USERNAME}, + {"username": f" {GAMMA_USERNAME} "}, + {"username": "", "first_name": "", "email": GAMMA_USERNAME}, + ): + with self.subTest(userinfo=userinfo): + response = self.client.post( + ENDPOINT, + data=json.dumps(userinfo), + content_type="application/json", + headers={"X-Test-Mint-Secret": MINT_SECRET}, + ) + assert response.status_code == 200, response.data + token = json.loads(response.data)["access_token"] + + redeemed = self.client.get(f"{ENDPOINT}?token={token}") + assert redeemed.status_code == 302, ( + f"minted a token for {userinfo} that could not be redeemed " + f"({redeemed.status_code}) -- empty or padded identity keys " + "must be normalized before minting" + ) + + @with_feature_flags(LOGIN_TOKEN=True) + @with_config({"LOGIN_TOKEN_IDENTITY_RESOLVER": _verbatim_resolver}) + def test_mint_rejects_an_identity_with_no_usable_identifier(self): + """If nothing survives normalization there is no identity to mint for.""" + for userinfo in ( + {"username": "", "email": ""}, + {"username": " "}, + {"first_name": "Jane", "last_name": "Doe"}, + ): + with self.subTest(userinfo=userinfo): + response = self.client.post( + ENDPOINT, + data=json.dumps(userinfo), + content_type="application/json", + headers={"X-Test-Mint-Secret": MINT_SECRET}, + ) + assert response.status_code == 401, response.data + + # --------------------------------------------------------------------- next + + @with_feature_flags(LOGIN_TOKEN=True) + @with_config({"LOGIN_TOKEN_IDENTITY_RESOLVER": _resolver}) + def test_consume_falls_back_to_root_for_a_non_relative_next(self): + """`next` is site-relative only; anything else lands on `/`. + + Absolute URLs are rejected even for the deployment's own origin. That is + deliberate: comparing against ``WEBDRIVER_BASEURL`` would have made a + legitimate same-origin URL depend on report-worker configuration. + """ + for requested_next in ( + "https://superset.example.com/dashboard/1/";, + "//evil.example.com/", + "/\\evil.example.com/", + "javascript:alert(1)", + ): + with self.subTest(next=requested_next): + token = self._mint() + response = self.client.get( + f"{ENDPOINT}?token={token}&next={requested_next}" + ) + + assert response.status_code == 302 + location = response.headers["Location"] + assert location.endswith("/"), location Review Comment: Good catch! Now asserts `Location == "/"` for each rejected `next`, with the input in the failure message. Werkzeug 3.1.6 emits the header verbatim (`redirect("/")` → `Location: /`), so exact equality is stable here rather than depending on autocorrect behavior. Tightened the happy path the same way, it asserted `endswith("/dashboard/list/")`, which an absolute URL ending in that path would also satisfy; it's now `== "/dashboard/list/"`. -- This is an automated message from the Apache Git Service. To respond to the message, please log on to GitHub and use the URL above to go to the specific comment. To unsubscribe, e-mail: [email protected] For queries about this service, please contact Infrastructure at: [email protected] --------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe, e-mail: [email protected] For additional commands, e-mail: [email protected]
