On Tue 2018-01-09 18:41:25 -0800, William Bathurst wrote:
> [ dkg wrote: ]
>> My understanding is that the algorithm designers and primary advocates
>> have not been particularly forthcoming with their design goals, and
>> their reputation is mixed, at best.
> Simon and Speck has been in the public domain for a number of years and 
> there are quite a few white papers and articles on the Ciphers. Allowing 
> public scrutiny and crypto-analysis is one way to put a cipher through 
> the grinder to make sure there are no back doors or weaknesses.

It sounds like we agree that adversarial cryptanalysis is a necessary
component of evaluating cryptographic algorithms today. :)

And yes, Simon and Speck have indeed been published for a while now.  My
understanding is that there has been a steady stream of cryptanalysis
against them, which has made some non-negligible progress in whittling
down their initially-claimed security levels.

Meanwhile (as i said above), the designers have not been particularly
forthcoming with producing their design goals and their own
cryptanalysis, despite requests for those documents.  Shouldn't the
designers of algorithms intended to be used by the public also be
transparent about their design goals and their own understanding of the
strengths and weaknesses of the algorithms they're proposing?  This
seems particularly relevant when the designers have been plausibly
accused of trying to pass off sub-standard cryptographic algorithms as
acceptable for public consumption (e.g. "we got punked" as one NIST
representative described the Dual EC DRBG fiasco).

I'd personally like to see documentation of the internal design goals
and cryptanalysis from the authors of Simon and Speck before considering
it for wider adoption, especially given that reasonably efficient strong
ciphers are already available.  Or do you think that knowing the
designers' goals and internal analysis should not a relevant criterion
for consideration?



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