Jack, List: JRKC: I would ask only that you present one example of a true proposition which represents things as they really are.
This is the test as you originally stated it, and I passed it easily, because *every *true proposition represents things as they really are. As I said yesterday, a true proposition expresses a *fact *prescinded from the "one *individual*, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the all of reality" (CP 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906). That is the very *definition *of a true proposition, so the only way to fail the test would be if there were no true propositions *at all*, which is obviously absurd. What you now seem to be requesting instead--moving the goalposts--is an example of a true proposition which *completely and exhaustively *represents things as they really are, although you have already admitted that "the test cannot be passed." I actually agree with you on that, but for different reasons--not because the thing-in-itself is incognizable, but because the concepts that we attribute to things in propositions are *general*, and therefore indeterminate to some degree. Accordingly, I have never claimed that *one *true proposition, or even a very large but still finite *collection* of true propositions, can completely and exhaustively represent things as they really are. It would require an *infinite *collection of true propositions to do that, or more accurately, an inexhaustible *continuum *of true propositions--again, not what any actual individual or group *will *believe, but what an infinite community of inquirers *would *believe after infinite investigation and thus infinite experience, representing "the fact that is not abstracted but complete" (EP 2:304, 1901). You also seem to be under the false impression that resolving our dispute is a matter of determining which one of us "is logically/mathematically correct" about all this, as if the right proof within a formal system could settle it once and for all. I have already acknowledged the soundness of yours but continue to deny the relevance of its conclusion about incompleteness and undecidability. Moreover, as I pointed out previously, "it is impossible to reason necessarily concerning anything else than a pure hypothesis. Of course, I do not mean that if such pure hypothesis happened to be true of an actual state of things, the reasoning would thereby cease to be necessary. Only, it never would be known apodictically to be true of an actual state of things" (CP 4.232, 1902). Again, formal systems of deductive logic *preserve *truth, but they cannot *establish *truth; the latter only happens by means of experience, the "outward clash" between our habits of conduct and reality. This limitation is plainly evident in Existential Graphs (EG), where the only *provable *propositions are those that can be derived directly from the blank sheet, all of which are *conditional *(if-then) propositions. The steps are always the same--scribe an empty scroll, insert the antecedent graphs (premisses) in the ring-shaped shaded area, iterate them to the inner unshaded area, and transform them there to obtain the consequent graph (conclusion). EG cannot *demonstrate *that the shaded "postulates" are true, only that the unshaded "theorems" follow necessarily from them. Accordingly, since you reject the conclusion of Peirce's straightforward and valid deductive argumentation in CP 5.525 for the meaninglessness of an incognizable thing-it-itself, you must also reject at least one of its premisses. The bottom line is that you absolutely do misunderstand that paragraph, along with the other passages by Peirce that I have quoted and cited. I do not expect you to treat him (or me) as authoritative, but I find it appalling when you blithely allege that he goes from genius to nonsense in consecutive sentences, rather than questioning your own (mis)interpretation that leads to such an utterly implausible assessment. Since you refuse to hear it from me, maybe you should try feeding the verbatim text of CP 5.525 into your chatbot of choice and asking whether it supports or refutes the *Ding an sich*. My guess is that you still would not like the answer. I know that these are strong words, but at this point, I have given you every opportunity to recognize and correct your mistake, and instead you keep doubling down on it. *That *is why our exchange has been largely unproductive so far, and likely would continue to be if we were to keep trying. Frankly, I am not sure that we should bother--repeating myself has gotten tiresome. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Sep 3, 2025 at 9:38 PM Jack Cody <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Helmut, List, > > JAS: On the contrary, I passed it with flying colors, and you continue to > exhibit a fundamental misunderstanding of Peirce's logical principle as > stated in CP 5.525. > > No, you completely failed it and I can prove that failure, by any > logician's/mathematician's standard within a slightly revised schema. Of > course, the test cannot be passed — and so it's not that I locate failure > with you personally, it's merely the way such is. Gary R gave a helpful > review (with a chatbot?) which is fine, but it lacks certain things, namely > sufficiently precise inputs to give an informed decision as to whether > person 1 (me in that instance) or person 2 (you as GR used the LLM) is > logically/mathematically correct. Indeed, it's only useful as a kind of map > unless the inputs are mathematically specific (that's how I use such > things: logically precise, and enormously qualified, so that a statement in > natural language is parsed with respect variously precise > proof-structures). If anyone is thinking of using LLMs, I'd encourage them > to understand that constructive use can only be had that way as such are > only as good as the input value with respect to output over such variables > as "confirmation bias" (which I spot some of in GR's results). > > No, I don't misunderstand it — if anything, I think might massively > overdetermine it. I've read the Essential Papers and of course the > Collected Papers. I've read that page. It's another example where I can > understand what Peirce means but where use of language isn't doing him any > favors. Anyway, it does nothing to alter/change what is written in 5.525 > which has been the primary topic. > > I'd cite Roman Jakobson's work dealing with Saussure and Peirce within > structural linguistic contexts. It might help you understand certain things > I'm not sure you do understand — or certain terms you understand as Peirce > uses them within certain contexts but are entirely valid beyond Peirce's > own context (if extended consistently). That is, you say "cognition" works > this or that way — which is interesting, but I cannot accept that (I > wouldn't care if Peirce said it to me personally, I'd demand a proof). > Meanwhile, you tend to dispute how language works but I'm not sure you've > read the likes of Saussure, Chomsky, Skinner, Jakobson, Lakov, and twenty > more one could name. And that's fine. There'll be much you know of that I > haven't read. The only reason I say so is because it is easier to > understand the function of language than it is "thought" (or cognition) but > even that, the function of language and how that works, is massively > contested (and that is not thought/cognition). So, to reiterate, I'm > massively skeptical of anyone claiming "this is how cognition works". > That's an opinon — it's not a fact and it doesn't matter who you cite or > how many times (you'd require one hell of a proof if you wanted to continue > that assertation!). > > I intend to proceed with that — once more — in the context of another > proof-structure which I hope will be as acceptable as the last. I think > that better than quoting back and forth for that threatens to go nowhere. I > don't see how that's productive — in this scenario. > > At any rate, if I prove certain claims you clearly refute, without proof, > but with argumentation, here, sufficiently (which I'm certain I can...) > then I can merely use these posts of yours, not all of them, of course, but > some, and certain areas at that, as "objections" which are answered within > said proof-structures. > > That's the best way in my opinion as some of these claims can be easily > proven within a very robust logical/matehmatical framework which then > stands until one, any-one, can knock it down. That is, I do not have the > energy for daily exchanges when the crux of the issue tends to buried in > the flow of posts — pivoting from one core issue to another that the last > reply had not referenced. 00I'd rather make what proofs I can make and then > cite them consistently which moves inquiry much further along (one has to > refute the proof-structure or else come up with something else/etc.). > > I agree, Helmut, insofar as I understand what it is you are saying. You > would be right on the qualitative note. If something is such a way, > qualitatively, *though it has be narrowed down*, then yes, I agree. > > Best, > Jac > >
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