Jon, Helmut, List, JAS: On the contrary, I passed it with flying colors, and you continue to exhibit a fundamental misunderstanding of Peirce's logical principle as stated in CP 5.525.
No, you completely failed it and I can prove that failure, by any logician's/mathematician's standard within a slightly revised schema. Of course, the test cannot be passed — and so it's not that I locate failure with you personally, it's merely the way such is. Gary R gave a helpful review (with a chatbot?) which is fine, but it lacks certain things, namely sufficiently precise inputs to give an informed decision as to whether person 1 (me in that instance) or person 2 (you as GR used the LLM) is logically/mathematically correct. Indeed, it's only useful as a kind of map unless the inputs are mathematically specific (that's how I use such things: logically precise, and enormously qualified, so that a statement in natural language is parsed with respect variously precise proof-structures). If anyone is thinking of using LLMs, I'd encourage them to understand that constructive use can only be had that way as such are only as good as the input value with respect to output over such variables as "confirmation bias" (which I spot some of in GR's results). No, I don't misunderstand it — if anything, I think might massively overdetermine it. I've read the Essential Papers and of course the Collected Papers. I've read that page. It's another example where I can understand what Peirce means but where use of language isn't doing him any favors. Anyway, it does nothing to alter/change what is written in 5.525 which has been the primary topic. I'd cite Roman Jakobson's work dealing with Saussure and Peirce within structural linguistic contexts. It might help you understand certain things I'm not sure you do understand — or certain terms you understand as Peirce uses them within certain contexts but are entirely valid beyond Peirce's own context (if extended consistently). That is, you say "cognition" works this or that way — which is interesting, but I cannot accept that (I wouldn't care if Peirce said it to me personally, I'd demand a proof). Meanwhile, you tend to dispute how language works but I'm not sure you've read the likes of Saussure, Chomsky, Skinner, Jakobson, Lakov, and twenty more one could name. And that's fine. There'll be much you know of that I haven't read. The only reason I say so is because it is easier to understand the function of language than it is "thought" (or cognition) but even that, the function of language and how that works, is massively contested (and that is not thought/cognition). So, to reiterate, I'm massively skeptical of anyone claiming "this is how cognition works". That's an opinon — it's not a fact and it doesn't matter who you cite or how many times (you'd require one hell of a proof if you wanted to continue that assertation!). I intend to proceed with that — once more — in the context of another proof-structure which I hope will be as acceptable as the last. I think that better than quoting back and forth for that threatens to go nowhere. I don't see how that's productive — in this scenario. At any rate, if I prove certain claims you clearly refute, without proof, but with argumentation, here, sufficiently (which I'm certain I can...) then I can merely use these posts of yours, not all of them, of course, but some, and certain areas at that, as "objections" which are answered within said proof-structures. That's the best way in my opinion as some of these claims can be easily proven within a very robust logical/matehmatical framework which then stands until one, any-one, can knock it down. That is, I do not have the energy for daily exchanges when the crux of the issue tends to buried in the flow of posts — pivoting from one core issue to another that the last reply had not referenced. 00I'd rather make what proofs I can make and then cite them consistently which moves inquiry much further along (one has to refute the proof-structure or else come up with something else/etc.). I agree, Helmut, insofar as I understand what it is you are saying. You would be right on the qualitative note. If something is such a way, qualitatively, though it has be narrowed down, then yes, I agree. Best, Jac ________________________________ From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Sent: Wednesday, September 3, 2025 6:20 PM To: Peirce-L <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Propositions, Truth, and Experience (was Will and Belief) Jack, List: JRKC: 5.525 demonstrates that when words migrate to predicates and all which can be "said" of a subject is said there remains a subject, the truth of which, cannot be what has been said of it--the subject is not what is given in the proposition That is not what CP 5.525 (c. 1905) demonstrates at all. Again, Peirce simply states the logical principle that every proposition has at least one subject that must be indicated or found, not merely described using words. An index or precept identifies an individual object, and words attribute general concepts to it by means of syntax. If that object really conforms to those concepts accordingly, then the proposition is true--it represents the object as it really is. JRKC: Accordingly, I find your two propositions confuse agreement on facts with truth of the subject as it really is. There is no such thing as "truth of the subject," only truth of propositions about a subject. In other words, what you call "agreement on facts" is the only kind of truth there is. Remember, "A fact is so highly a prescissively abstract state of things, that it can be wholly represented in a simple proposition" (CP 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906). It is a fact that the grass in my yard is (mostly) green today, i.e., my grass really is green. It is a fact that Peirce died in 1914, i.e., Peirce really did die that year. Hence, these are both true propositions that represent things as they really are--exactly what you requested. JRKC: Yet equivocation with selective, functionally adequate propositions with the subject’s reality is a categorical error. They tell us something about the subject, but they are never identical with what the subject really is. This is obvious. It is not equivocation nor a category error, it is how cognition works. It is indeed obvious that propositions are not identical with their objects, and no one is claiming otherwise--that would be a category error. We prescind facts from the "one individual, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the all of reality" (ibid.); and we represent them in true propositions, correctly attributing general concepts (signified by words) to individual objects (denoted by indices or precepts) in accordance with logical relations (embodied by syntax). A complete representation would require infinitely many such propositions, i.e., the beliefs of an infinite community after infinite investigation and thus infinite experience. JRKC: Thus, while such propositions may be “valid-true” in the pragmatic sense (our habits are not confounded by them), they do not achieve the stronger claim: representing the subject as it really is (which was the test one had to pass here). That’s precisely the barrier the model-theoretic result marks out. Any proposition expressing a belief whose corresponding habits of conduct would never be confounded by any possible future experience is true (full stop), i.e., it represents its subject as it really is. The model-theoretic result has no bearing whatsoever on whether a given proposition does this; it only demonstrates that in most cases, it cannot be proved true as a theorem within a formal system. Truth and provability are not synonymous. JRKC: I just wanted to point out that you didn't pass the test ... Peirce's logical conclusion has to be overturned for you to pass it On the contrary, I passed it with flying colors, and you continue to exhibit a fundamental misunderstanding of Peirce's logical principle as stated in CP 5.525. It is patently absurd to ascribe blatant self-contradiction to him by interpreting it as somehow confirming an incognizable thing-in-itself, when he explicitly employs it for directly refuting that notion. Here is more detailed statement of what he is actually highlighting there. CSP: Every subject of a proposition, unless it is either an Index (like the environment of the interlocutors, or something attracting attention in that environment, as the pointing finger of the speaker) or a Subindex (like a proper name, personal pronoun, or demonstrative) must be a Precept, or Symbol, not only describing to the Interpreter what is to be done, by him or others or both, in order to obtain an Index of an individual (whether a unit or a single set of units) of which the proposition is represented as meant to be true, but also assigning a designation to that individual, or, if it is a set, to each single unit of the set. (CP 2.330, EP 2:286, 1903) Again, we do not need to represent something completely in order to represent it as it really is; we just need an index or precept to denote it, in addition to words that accurately describe it. I also still recommend carefully reading EP 2:168 (1903)--the whole page--and this time, I have attached an image of it, in case you do not have access to it. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Wed, Sep 3, 2025 at 6:23 AM Jack Cody <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Jon, Jerry, Mike, list JAS:You requested one example of a true proposition which represents things as they really are. That very sentence of mine is one example of a true proposition which represents things as they really are--you really made that specific request. Other obvious examples include "the grass in my yard is (mostly) green today" and "Charles Sanders Peirce died in 1914." Again, every true proposition represents things as they really are--that is the very definition of a true proposition. Why did you think that complying with your request would be at all difficult, let alone "close to impossible"? As I said before, most of our beliefs can be expressed as true propositions, because otherwise our corresponding habits of conduct would be constantly confounded by experience. I asked because 5.525 demonstrates that when words migrate to predicates and all which can be "said" of a subject is said there remains a subject, the truth of which, cannot be what has been said of it — the subject is not what is given in the proposition (and that's why the structural incompleteness is highly relevant, especially if we're discussing 5.525 where such is organically derived). Accordingly, I find your two propositions confuse agreement on facts with truth of the subject as it really is. Saying “Peirce died in 1914” or “the grass is green today” is certainly valid within our practices: these statements fit records, habits of use, and expectations. But that is not the same as representing the subject as it really is — you are not giving the truth of either subject — and that is what I expect cannot be done (in propositions), following Peirce's own logic, carefully explicated, in 5.525. The bar for that claim (this is the truth of the subject: as it "really" is) is much higher and thus why I cannot think of a propostion which meets that truth-standard. Why? Because what is predicated is always partial and conventional. “Green” is one, categorically linguistic, aspect of grass, but even ignoring the categorical linguistic (I mean categorial error/conflation...), such as it is ignores infinitely many other aspects of what "grass" is or would be. And, even then, qua 5.525, there would remain whatever "grass" is which could not be the finite nor infinite descriptions/definitions of such (minimally in propositions). Peirce “died in 1914” is likewise: may be said to capture a historical record about Peirce, but it is not the truth of Peirce (as subject). Only God knows how you could go about that in a written/spoken record. Yet equivocation with selective, functionally adequate propositions with the subject’s reality is a categorical error. They tell us something about the subject, but they are never identical with what the subject really is. This is obvious. Thus, while such propositions may be “valid-true” in the pragmatic sense (our habits are not confounded by them), they do not achieve the stronger claim: representing the subject as it really is (which was the test one had to pass here). That’s precisely the barrier the model-theoretic result marks out. Anyway, you have your own distinct framework, Mike has another interesting way of demonstrating how Peirce would respond to the result Peirce himself anticipates, and then Jerry has made an interesting set of remarks which I have to read more closely as I think it's highly interesting in the most technical respect of what "interesting" conveys. So I'll spend most of the day reading through other people's comments as I think there's lots there to consider. I just wanted to point out that you didn't pass the test (but that I do not understand how you could pass it, so it's not a dig or anything personal {Peirce's logical conclusion has to be overturned for you to pass it — and it won't be}). Best, Jack
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