Helmut, List: Indeed, the direction of semiosis is *always *from the object through the sign toward the interpretant, *never *in the other direction. "In its relation to the Object, the Sign is *passive*; that is to say, its correspondence to the Object is brought about by an effect upon the Sign, the Object remaining unaffected" (EP 2:544n22, 1906). A map is co-determined by the territory itself at the time when it is drawn (as the dynamical object) and the intentions of the person drawing it (as the utterer). A street map of a major city looks very different from a subway map of the same city, and a landscape plan shows the territory as it *would *be after alteration in accordance with the new design.
I agree that complete knowledge of any *one *thing within our existing universe would require complete knowledge of *everything *within our existing universe. This is implied by Peirce's remarks that I have quoted several times, "There is but one *individual*, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the all of reality. A *fact *is so highly a prescissively abstract state of things, that it can be wholly represented in a simple proposition" (CP 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906). Every true proposition that we formulate *prescinds *a fact from the universe as a continuous whole--reality is not built up of individual facts any more than an argument is built up of individual propositions. Regards, Jon On Fri, Sep 5, 2025 at 8:03 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, List, > > I see, the way you put it, it is bridgeable. But not immediately, I mean, > you change the territory, and the map doesn´t change then, you have to draw > a new map. The other way, if you change the map, the territory doesn´t > change. Though the map might be about the anticipated future, drawn by a > garden-landscape-architect, and workers change the territory accordingly. > > I think, what I wrote is relevant in the sense of noumenon too, because, > as any thing is also governed by universal laws, types, and constants, so > one might say, it partially consists of them. Then, to completely know a > thing, would mean, to completely know all these universal affairs too. Not > only their equations and values, but also, why they exist. Ok, one might > answer, after an infinite inquiry, an infinite group of inquirers > theoretically could know all, that now only God can know. But still there > is the problem of entangled particles, that would lose their entanglement > due to an inquiry about them. This was not known at Peirce´s time. > > Best, Helmut > 5. September 2025 um 00:05 > "Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected]> > *wrote:* > Helmut, List: > > Why would that distinction be "not bridgeable"? The map is a *sign *of > the territory, just as anyone's knowledge of an object consists of > *signs *of that object. In both cases, *semiosis* connects them. Of > course, in my view, it connects *everything *in the universe, conceived > as an immense semiosic continuum. > > "Thing-in-itself" is the established philosophical term in English for > Kant's "*Ding an sich*" in the original German. It has nothing to do with > persistence or existence, only whether there is something real but > incognizable (noumenon) underlying any and every object that we perceive > (phenomenon). Kant says yes (so does Jack), Peirce says no (so do I). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Thu, Sep 4, 2025 at 9:36 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Edwina, Jon, List, >> >> Jon, with "Epistemic cut" (Term by Howard Pattee) I meant the not >> bridgeable distinction between, metaphorically, or is it metonymically, the >> map and the territory (Term by Alfred Korzybski). >> Ding an sich: "An" means "at". "An sich" is translated by Google with >> "per se", but that is latin. "Thing in itself" to me sounds like a >> matrjoschka. I would prefer "thing of itself", as I think, what is meant, >> is persistence, which is existence as long as it exists. The question "does >> a thing in itself exist?" might be replaced with first "does a thing >> persist?", and is answered with "yes", and second with "is the persistence >> of a thing due to the thing?", meaning, does it exist (for some time) of >> itself? >> >> I think, only partly. A thing keeps its form firstly due to its matter, >> but secondly, due to universal laws like cohesion, Van-Der-Waals-forces. >> And the matter consists of tokens of universal types (particles...). So the >> persistence of a thing, at least of a trivial (not complex) thing is not >> self-organized. Self-organized persistence too exists, is called >> homeostasis, and applies e.g. to complex adaptive systems in dissipative >> processes. I would say, these CASses, if you call them things too, "exist >> of themselves", with "of" meaning self-organized, which Maturana called >> "autopoiesis". but of course the matter, which flows through their >> dissipative processes, is again governed by universal laws. So, if with "in >> itself" is meant "completely and only because of itself", then there is >> obviously not such thing. >> >> Best, Helmut >> >
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