Gary R., Jack, List: For the record, although the quotations attributed below to Peirce's 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism are accurate summaries, he did not actually state either of them. He does say, "I am myself a scholastic realist of a somewhat extreme stripe" (CP 5.470), but not until 1907, in one of several manuscript drafts for an introductory article about pragmatism that was not published during his lifetime (R 318).
I cannot speak for anyone else, but I am not using "nominalist" as an epithet--I am simply positing it as a common philosophical root that might explain various disagreements that have emerged in recent threads. Accordingly, I agree with Gary R. that it is a matter of careful definitions. For one thing, it is very important to recognize that in this context, we are not talking about *realism *as the doctrine that reality is independent of human thought, perception, or experience, which is opposed to *idealism* as the doctrine that reality is mentally constructed. Instead, we are talking about *scholastic *realism as the doctrine that "*laws *and general *types *... are real," which is opposed to *nominalism* as the doctrine that these are "figments of the mind." Conveniently, it turns out that Peirce prepared the entry for "nominalism" in *The Century Dictionary* (1889-91). He distinguishes several varieties, associating them with (a) the Stoics, (b) Roscellin, (c) Peter Abelard, (d) William of Occam, (e) Thomas Hobbes, (f) modern science, and (g) "Kant, who maintained that all unity in thought depends upon the nature of the human mind, not belonging to the thing in itself." It is evidently in *this* specific sense that Peirce views Kant as holding that "general *types *are figments of the mind," thus qualifying him--and anyone who agrees with him on this point--as a nominalist *in that respect*. Again, Peirce suggests elsewhere that purging the incognizable thing-in-itself from Kant's philosophy would effectively make him a pragmatist and scholastic realist after all. There has been some debate about whether Peirce was a nominalist *initially *(e.g., Max Fisch) or a scholastic realist from the very beginning (e.g., Rosa Mayorga), but it is indisputable that his realism only became stronger with time. As early as 1892, he describes his younger self as "too nominalistic" (CP 6.270, EP 1:350); and by 1905, he admits that he "went too far in the direction of nominalism" in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (1878) asserting that his mature position "amounts to extreme scholastic realism" (CP 8.208). My understanding is that Rorty went in the other direction--scholastic realist at first, but increasingly nominalist over the years. In any case, I asked Google, "What scholars claim that Peirce was a nominalist?" It replied, "No major scholars claim that Charles Sanders Peirce was a nominalist. Peirce was a staunch opponent of nominalism and viewed it as a detrimental philosophy with negative consequences for science, ethics, and civilization." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Sep 12, 2025 at 6:51 PM Jack Cody <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary, List, > > Firstly, I'm not agreed nor saying that Peirce is/was a nominalist. I > think it "empty verbiage". However, there are some who both read/teach > Peirce at the highest level who do think such things. I cannot give those > names here. For others are on the record you can do a quick search and > qualified opinions, nominalism with an asterisk, follows from the likes of > Rorty and so forth. Those who I know personally, of course, are as literate > and published in Peircean studies as any on this list but I cannot use > their names here and won't as it's a personal thing. > > Again, it was more to Edwina's point. And I think your reaction, (that is, > it's almost a sin to say it (against Peirce), verifies Edwina's general > commentary that the term is used more insultingly than it is to elucidate. > I think that commentary correct. If one here says "such and such was a > nominalist" it's only, as far as I can tell, insofar as the other person > isn't and the right opinion/in salience, is with the non-nominalist. I > think that is apt. Neither Kant nor Peirce were nominalist, but you can > find as many as you like who can give you those opinions if you're willing > to do cursory searches (from the best known names, too, I might add). Here, > on-list, it's more of what went above — "y is nominalist and you cite y, > whereas n/Peirce is not, and the right opinion, or n, (naturally enough on > a list devoted to one philosopher), is not y". I see no value to it and > think Jeffrey and Edwina have put it to bed. > > Best, > Jack > ------------------------------ > *From:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Friday, September 12, 2025 10:04 PM > *To:* [email protected] <[email protected]>; Jon Alan Schmidt < > [email protected]> > *Cc:* Jack Cody <[email protected]>; Jeffrey Brian Downard < > [email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Propositions, Truth, and Experience (was Will > and Belief) > > Jon, Jeff, Jack, List, > > Jon: [Pierce] spells out "the question of nominalism and realism" a few > paragraphs earlier as "whether *laws *and general *types* are figments of > the mind or are real" (CP 1.16), so he evidently perceives all these > thinkers as proponents of the first option in one way or another. > > It seems to me that a lot depends on one's definitions of nominalism and > realism. > > Peirce's scholastic realism, associated with Duns Scotus, held that > universals are real in some way, though *not* as Platonic Ideas existing > apart from things. Rather, they exist *in re*: that is, they are general > kinds (like redness or triangularity) so that they are not just names or > mental constructs but are genuinely real. For him, to deny the reality of > generals is to make the world unintelligible. Indeed, science presupposes > that there are real patterns and laws, not just brute individual facts and > his 'extreme Scholastic Realism' claims that generals are real in the > strongest sense: continuity, possibility, and “would-bes” are all real > features of the world this, again, versus the nominalist's position that > that only individual things are real and that words like ‘humanity’ or > ‘law of gravity’ are just convenient labels. > > Here are a couple of quotations I was able to quickly grab which > succinctly give Peirce's meaning of 'extreme Scholastic realism." > > "I am a scholastic realist of a somewhat extreme stripe. I hold that > generals are real, that laws are real, that possibilities are real, without > depending upon their being realized.” 1903, Harvard Lectures on > Pragmatism > > “When I say that I am a scholastic realist of a somewhat extreme stripe, I > mean, for example, that I hold that a law, although it does not exist as an > individual thing, is as real as if it did.” 1903, Harvard Lectures on > Pragmatism > > So, laws don’t *exist* like physical objects, but they are just as *real* > because they govern how things behave and even possibly will behave and > denying this -- as most if not all forms of nominalism do -- actually > undermines > science, because science assumes laws are real and discoverable. > > Jack: "I'll let it be known though that many philosophers I have spoken > with consider Peirce a nominalist." I would like you to point to one or > two quotations from philosophers of any note who have called Peirce a > nominalist. I can't think of even one myself. > > Best, > > Gary R >
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