List - I’m not sure if the thread title above represents the recent discussion correctly, That is it wasn’t a discussion about nominalism vs scholastic realism. Indeed, as both Gary R and I pointed out - neither term was even defined! A rather vital ‘black hole!’
To my recollection, it began within the discussion of 5.525; and the categorical process of symbolic indexical[ 3-2] in semiosic interactions... with JAS calling Kant a nominalist [ as a blanket term rather than contextual]….and so - it went. Not a very fruitful discussion - which would have far better looked at the difference between the external and Dynamic Objects and also - the role of and nature of Thirdness in the universe [ not merely in human cognition]. Edwina > On Sep 12, 2025, at 9:56 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Gary R., Jack, List: > > For the record, although the quotations attributed below to Peirce's 1903 > Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism are accurate summaries, he did not actually > state either of them. He does say, "I am myself a scholastic realist of a > somewhat extreme stripe" (CP 5.470), but not until 1907, in one of several > manuscript drafts for an introductory article about pragmatism that was not > published during his lifetime (R 318). > > I cannot speak for anyone else, but I am not using "nominalist" as an > epithet--I am simply positing it as a common philosophical root that might > explain various disagreements that have emerged in recent threads. > Accordingly, I agree with Gary R. that it is a matter of careful definitions. > For one thing, it is very important to recognize that in this context, we are > not talking about realism as the doctrine that reality is independent of > human thought, perception, or experience, which is opposed to idealism as the > doctrine that reality is mentally constructed. Instead, we are talking about > scholastic realism as the doctrine that "laws and general types ... are > real," which is opposed to nominalism as the doctrine that these are > "figments of the mind." > > Conveniently, it turns out that Peirce prepared the entry for "nominalism" in > The Century Dictionary (1889-91). He distinguishes several varieties, > associating them with (a) the Stoics, (b) Roscellin, (c) Peter Abelard, (d) > William of Occam, (e) Thomas Hobbes, (f) modern science, and (g) "Kant, who > maintained that all unity in thought depends upon the nature of the human > mind, not belonging to the thing in itself." It is evidently in this specific > sense that Peirce views Kant as holding that "general types are figments of > the mind," thus qualifying him--and anyone who agrees with him on this > point--as a nominalist in that respect. Again, Peirce suggests elsewhere that > purging the incognizable thing-in-itself from Kant's philosophy would > effectively make him a pragmatist and scholastic realist after all. > > There has been some debate about whether Peirce was a nominalist initially > (e.g., Max Fisch) or a scholastic realist from the very beginning (e.g., Rosa > Mayorga), but it is indisputable that his realism only became stronger with > time. As early as 1892, he describes his younger self as "too nominalistic" > (CP 6.270, EP 1:350); and by 1905, he admits that he "went too far in the > direction of nominalism" in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (1878) asserting > that his mature position "amounts to extreme scholastic realism" (CP 8.208). > My understanding is that Rorty went in the other direction--scholastic > realist at first, but increasingly nominalist over the years. > > In any case, I asked Google, "What scholars claim that Peirce was a > nominalist?" It replied, "No major scholars claim that Charles Sanders Peirce > was a nominalist. Peirce was a staunch opponent of nominalism and viewed it > as a detrimental philosophy with negative consequences for science, ethics, > and civilization." > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > On Fri, Sep 12, 2025 at 6:51 PM Jack Cody <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> Gary, List, >> >> Firstly, I'm not agreed nor saying that Peirce is/was a nominalist. I think >> it "empty verbiage". However, there are some who both read/teach Peirce at >> the highest level who do think such things. I cannot give those names here. >> For others are on the record you can do a quick search and qualified >> opinions, nominalism with an asterisk, follows from the likes of Rorty and >> so forth. Those who I know personally, of course, are as literate and >> published in Peircean studies as any on this list but I cannot use their >> names here and won't as it's a personal thing. >> >> Again, it was more to Edwina's point. And I think your reaction, (that is, >> it's almost a sin to say it (against Peirce), verifies Edwina's general >> commentary that the term is used more insultingly than it is to elucidate. I >> think that commentary correct. If one here says "such and such was a >> nominalist" it's only, as far as I can tell, insofar as the other person >> isn't and the right opinion/in salience, is with the non-nominalist. I think >> that is apt. Neither Kant nor Peirce were nominalist, but you can find as >> many as you like who can give you those opinions if you're willing to do >> cursory searches (from the best known names, too, I might add). Here, >> on-list, it's more of what went above — "y is nominalist and you cite y, >> whereas n/Peirce is not, and the right opinion, or n, (naturally enough on a >> list devoted to one philosopher), is not y". I see no value to it and think >> Jeffrey and Edwina have put it to bed. >> >> Best, >> Jack >> From: Gary Richmond <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> >> Sent: Friday, September 12, 2025 10:04 PM >> To: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>>; Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> >> Cc: Jack Cody <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>; >> Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> >> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Propositions, Truth, and Experience (was Will and >> Belief) >> >> Jon, Jeff, Jack, List, >> >> Jon: [Pierce] spells out "the question of nominalism and realism" a few >> paragraphs earlier as "whether laws and general types are figments of the >> mind or are real" (CP 1.16), so he evidently perceives all these thinkers as >> proponents of the first option in one way or another. >> >> It seems to me that a lot depends on one's definitions of nominalism and >> realism. >> >> Peirce's scholastic realism, associated with Duns Scotus, held that >> universals are real in some way, though not as Platonic Ideas existing apart >> from things. Rather, they exist in re: that is, they are general kinds (like >> redness or triangularity) so that they are not just names or mental >> constructs but are genuinely real. For him, to deny the reality of generals >> is to make the world unintelligible. Indeed, science presupposes that there >> are real patterns and laws, not just brute individual facts and his 'extreme >> Scholastic Realism' claims that generals are real in the strongest sense: >> continuity, possibility, and “would-bes” are all real features of the world >> this, again, versus the nominalist's position that that only individual >> things are real and that words like ‘humanity’ or ‘law of gravity’ are just >> convenient labels. >> >> Here are a couple of quotations I was able to quickly grab which succinctly >> give Peirce's meaning of 'extreme Scholastic realism." >> >> "I am a scholastic realist of a somewhat extreme stripe. I hold that >> generals are real, that laws are real, that possibilities are real, without >> depending upon their being realized.” 1903, Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism >> >> “When I say that I am a scholastic realist of a somewhat extreme stripe, I >> mean, for example, that I hold that a law, although it does not exist as an >> individual thing, is as real as if it did.” 1903, Harvard Lectures on >> Pragmatism >> >> So, laws don’t exist like physical objects, but they are just as real >> because they govern how things behave and even possibly will behave and >> denying this -- as most if not all forms of nominalism do -- actually >> undermines science, because science assumes laws are real and discoverable. >> >> Jack: "I'll let it be known though that many philosophers I have spoken with >> consider Peirce a nominalist." I would like you to point to one or two >> quotations from philosophers of any note who have called Peirce a >> nominalist. I can't think of even one myself. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]?subject=SIG%20peirce-l";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]?subject=SIG%20peirce-l";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
