RM: The distinctions between "designations" and "reagents" noted by Sebeok are nothing more than observations made prior to the systematic formalization that Peirce would set out in the Syllabus of 1903, 5th lecture, EP2 289-299, MS 540.
I am glad that we agree about this--I already suggested that designation vs. reagent in CP 8.368n23 (c. 1899-1900) corresponds closely to rhematic index vs. dicent index in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy. Of course, he did not stop there; again, his later taxonomies recognize two objects--dynamical, which is "outside of the Sign," and immediate, which is "within the Sign" (SS 83, EP 2:480, 1908 Dec 23). In a Logic Notebook entry, he likewise states that a sign "has two Objects, the immediate, to which it is degenerately Secundan, the dynamic, to which it is genuinely Secundan" (R 339:247r, 1905 Jul 7). This is consistent with his much earlier remark, "All degenerate seconds may be conveniently termed internal, in contrast to external seconds, which are constituted by external fact, and are true actions of one thing upon another" (CP 1.365, EP 1:254, 1887-8).
Peirce's trichotomy according to "the Mode of Presentation of the Immediate Object" is based on how it serves its primary function, which is indicating the sign's dynamical object. He ultimately presents it as a division into "Descriptives, which determine their Objects by stating the characters of the latter"; "Designatives ... which like a Demonstrative pronoun, or a pointing finger, brutely direct the mental eyeballs of the interpreter to the object in question"; and "Copulants, which neither describe nor denote their Objects, but merely express universally the logical sequence of these latter upon something otherwise referred to" (CP 8.344&350, EP 2:482&484, 1908 Dec 24-25).
Peirce initially suggests that ordinary words can be descriptives, such as "Predicates" and "Abstract nouns," as well as designatives, such as "essentially nominative signs" (CP 8.352, EP 2:485). In particular, a descriptive is a sign whose dynamical object "is indicated (always more or less vaguely) by means of its Qualities, etc." (SS 84, EP 2:480, 1908 Dec 23). This seems paradoxical, but the key is that a list of qualities, no matter how extensive, can only vaguely indicate something. "No words are so well understood as vernacular words, in one way; yet they are invariably vague" (CP 6.494, c. 1906). Accordingly, the immediate object of a single word by itself is whatever possibly could satisfy its verbal definition, which is its immediate interpretant. "A general term denotes whatever there may be which possesses the characters which it signifies" (CP 2.434, 1901-2).
On the other hand, Peirce says later the same day that as famisigns (or types), ordinary words can only be copulants (CP 8.361, EP 2:487-8). He evidently remains convinced that when arranging the different correlate trichotomies for applying the "rule of determination" to classify signs, "the Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign itself" (SS 84, EP 2:481). Accordingly, "if the Dynamical Object be a mere Possible [abstractive] the Immediate Object could only be of the same nature [descriptive], while if the Immediate Object were a Tendency or Habit [copulant] then the Dynamical Object must be of the same nature [collective]. Consequently an Abstractive must be a Mark [or Tone], while a Type must be a Collective, which shows how I conceived Abstractives and Collectives" (CP 8.367, EP 2:489). In short, every type--including every ordinary word--must be both a copulant and a collective.
We encounter the same apparent inconsistency where Peirce gives "the word Beauty" as an example of an abstractive and "a written narrative of any series of events" as an example of a concretive, a sign whose dynamical object "is an Occurrence (Existent thing or Actual fact of past or future)" (SS 83-4, EP 2:480). We find it again where his examples are "Color, Mass, Whiteness, etc." as abstractives and the common noun "Man" as a concretive along with the proper name "Charlemagne" (CP 8.366, EP 2:489). How might we resolve it? I am working out some ideas on this but will give others an opportunity to comment before sharing them.
Atila, Jon, List,
What JAS calls “logical principle” actually covers the affinities between classes of signs defined by Peirce in CP 2.264, which are governed by a phenomenological principle of embodiments. All of his arguments, like those of Sebeok (who chaired my thesis committee in 1989), can be easily understood in the structure (lattice) that results from their algebraic treatment[1], as follows:
In this diagram, the numbers represent the categorial membership of the correlates, the dotted arrows represent the intercategorial embodiments (or involvements) of the corresponding correlates, and the continuous arrows represent identities between the categorial memberships of the correlates.
This latticework shows that Dicent Symbols ([332] CP 2.262, e.g., a proposition) embody, in particular, Dicent Indexical Legisigns ([322] CP 2.260, e.g., a street cry), which embody Rhematic Indexical Legisigns ( [321] CP 2.259, e.g., a demonstrative pronoun). JAS refers to them as indexical parts. The former govern replicas Dicent Indexical Sinsigns ([222] CP 2.257, e.g. a weathercock), the latter govern replicas Rhematic Indexical Sinsigns ([221] CP 2.256, e.g., a spontaneous cry). In addition, Dicent Indexical Sinsigns embody Rhematic Indexical Sinsigns.
The distinctions between "designations" and "reagents" noted by Sebeok are nothing more than observations made prior to the systematic formalization that Peirce would set out in the Syllabus of 1903, 5th lecture, EP2 289-299, MS 540. In this regard, I would like to point out that I have proposed on the List for discussion Part 1 of a chapter[2] in which I demonstrate that there is a way to obtain ten classes of Representamens using only Triadic Relations, which become ten classes of signs when their Interpretant is mental. In part 2, which I will discuss soon, I demonstrate that the generalized notion of affinity between classes of Representamens of CP 2.264, which incorporates a notion of adjacency of these classes arranged in an equilateral triangle diagram, leads to the structuring of the set of classes of Representamens in a lattice structure that is none other than the structure above.
The interest of this structure lies in its ability to facilitate a cross-reading of any assertion concerning classes of signs, in particular those mentioned by Peirce in his comments from CP 2.255 to 2.263 and also 2.265. It is a theorem of Relational Algebra that postulates itself as a good candidate for the Grammatica Speculativa.
Best Regards,
Robert Marty
[1] Marty, 1982, "C.S.Peirce phaneroscopy and semiotics", Semiotica, vol. 41, nos 1-4,p. 169-181.
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
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