Jon, List,
I also want to briefly return to the question of the order of the six
trichotomies. I have no problem considering only the four trichotomies
that, as I understand it, you are proposing (if I interpret your notation
Od-S as equivalent to I). They lead to a lattice with 15 classes, which may
be interesting due to its intermediate complexity between the lattices of
10 and 28. As for the community agreement, the order that places the final
Interpretant at the end is very much in the majority. In his letter of
December 23, 1908, Peirce calls it "Explicit," a term consistent with 8.184
(review of LW's book "What is meaning?, 1903, London: Macmillan & Co) in
which he writes:
As to the Interpretant, i.e., the "signification," or "interpretation"
rather, of a sign, we must distinguish an Immediate and a Dynamical, as we
must the Immediate and Dynamical Objects. But we must also note that there
is certainly a third kind of Interpretant, which I call the Final
Interpretant, because it is that which *would finally *be decided to be the
true interpretation if consideration of the matter were carried so far that
an ultimate opinion were reached. (CP 8.184) [highlighted by *Peirce*]
It is very clear, and I find it difficult to understand why you use the
word "clearly" while admitting, quite honestly, that "some of his examples
seem inconsistent with it" in the same sentence. But I agree with you that
we should definitely close the debate "*in this thread."*
Next, I come to the question of representamen versus sign. You abruptly
conclude that Peirce ended up considering them synonymous on the grounds
that he no longer uses them in his letters from 1908. This is not what
Peirce says, since he simply states that Representamen "is not necessary,"
which in no way confuses the two terms. This text is part of my list of 76
definitions of the Sign. [1] It's number 31. However, I quoted the passage
in which he gives his reasons:
My notion in preferring "representamen" was that it would seem more natural
to apply it to representatives in legislatures, to deputies of various
kinds, etc I admit still that it aids the comprehension of the definition
to compare it carefully with such cases. But they certainly depart from the
definition, in that this requires that the action of the Sign as such shall
not affect the Object represented. A legislative representative is, on the
contrary, expected in his functions to improve the condition of this
constituents; and any kind of attorney, even if he has no discretion, is
expected to affect the condition of his principal. The truth is, I went
wrong from not having a formal definition all drawn up. This sort of thing
is inevitable in the early stages of a strong logical study; for if a
formal definition is attempted too soon, it will only shackle thought. [...]
Peirce expresses his distrust here of what he considers to be a "natural"
implementation, which should therefore occur in every mind. One reason that
is easy to formalize is the relation between the Object and the Sign must
be an *oriented* determination of the Object towards the Sign, which
excludes the existence of an inverse relation from the Sign to the Object,
as exists in the case of this "natural" relation. Furthermore, quite
simply, we can say that if Peirce does not talk about Representamens, it is
because he is talking about Signs in the real world (*a posteriori*), which
are in fact Representamens (*a priori*) inscribed in Real.
I come to "beauty." Let me clarify: I went overly far when I said that I
agree with you. Let's just say that I found elements in your statements
that could match, but nothing more. I stand by my own analysis. As a
general rule, there can only be two meanings for "beauty": one that refers
to a set of qualities (Qualisigns) attached to an existing Object, and the
other, as a word (i.e., a Rhematic Symbol) that governs responses through a
set of embodiments that can be read in the lattice. In fact, I seek to give
coherence to this dual semiotic status, and I find it in the lattice at the
level of the *Iconic Sinsign*, which is embodied in a Rhematic Indexical
Sinsign that contains replicas of the word "beauty" (a Rhematic Symbol) and
also contains replicas of Iconic Legisigns.
Let's look at the definitions :
An *Iconic Sinsign* [*e.g., *an individual diagram] is any object of
experience in so far as some quality of it makes it determine the idea of
an object.[…] *It will embody a Qualisign*. (CP 2.255)
A *Rhematic Symbol or Symbolic Rheme* [*e.g., *a common noun] is a sign
connected with its Object by an association of general ideas in such a way
that its Replica calls up an image in the mind which image, owing to
certain habits or dispositions of that mind, tends to produce a general
concept, *and the Replica is interpreted as a Sign of an Object *that is an
instance of that concept. […] The Interpretant of the *Rhematic Symbol *often
represents it as a *Rhematic Indexical Legisign* at other times as an *Iconic
Legisign*; *and it does in a small measure partake of the nature of both*.
(CP 2.261)
I insist: "*partake of the nature of both*" is something that can only
occur in the Real, here at the level of *the Iconic Sinsign* where replicas
of both are found. There may therefore be *Rhematic Symbols *that have this
dual status. I make this visible by converting the lattice subdiagram into
a Venn diagram, in which the understanding of each class of signs is
represented by its extension, with the embodiments of classes appearing as
inclusion relations. The class of its iconic signs can contain replicas of
dicent symbols through successive embodiments via two distinct descending
paths, with the possibility that some of its replicas may be common. Then
the Qualisign "beauty" could materialize (Peirce calls this a "Fact of
firstness" in MS 478) in a common replica of the same dicent symbol, which
answers the question.
[image:
image.png]
For "Some S are P," Peirce is correct! Because the lattice shows that a
Dicent Symbol has a replica in Dicent Indexical Sinsign (pheme), but also,
through a path that passes through the Iconic Legisign, it has its replicas
in the class of Iconic Sinsigns (seme, descriptive). However, the lattice
also shows that the class of Dicent Indexical Sinsigns (phemes) embodies
that of Iconic Sinsigns (seme). This class is therefore the possible
"meeting place" for the two possible replicas of a Dicent Symbol (pheme).
Regards,
Robert Marty
[1]https://cspeirce.com/rsources/76defs/76defs.htm
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*
Le jeu. 2 oct. 2025 à 19:44, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> a
écrit :
> List:
>
> As I noted in my previous post in this thread (
> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-09/msg00119.html), there is
> widespread consensus that the proper order of the first four trichotomies
> for sign classification in Peirce's late taxonomies is Od → Oi → S → Od-S.
> He clearly affirms this in the draft letters to Lady Welby that he wrote in
> late December 1908 (SS 73-86, EP 2:478-91), and he states that all words
> are types (here called famisigns), which must be collectives and copulants
> accordingly. However, he also states that the words "beauty," "color,"
> "mass," and "whiteness" are abstractives; and that predicates, predicative
> signs, abstract nouns, and particular propositions like "Some S is P" are
> descriptives. If that were correct, then all these signs would have to be
> tones (not tokens or types) and icons (not indices or symbols).
>
>
>
> Robert Marty seemed to suggest that every word is indeed an iconic tone
> (and an abstractive) when someone hears or reads an instance of it for the
> very first time, and a symbolic type only thereafter. This is plausible--on
> that initial occasion, the actual sound or appearance (embodied quality) of
> a token of the word is unfamiliar to the interpreter, an "indefinite
> significant character" not associated with any meaning; and there is a
> sense in which its dynamical object is the type itself, "a definitely
> significant Form" (CP 4.537, 1906). In fact, every token of a type
> *iconically *represents that type (NEM 3:887, 1908 Dec 5), by embodying
> tones that make it recognizable as an instance of the type. Moreover, we
> come to know words as types in the same way that we get acquainted with
> other dynamical objects of signs--by means of collateral experience (CP
> 8.183, EP 2:495, 1909 Feb 26). The new thread on "Peirce's semeiotic
> holism" is a timely reminder that ordinary words effectively function as
> *names*, initially *indicating* their dynamical objects within a
> propositional context before becoming iconic and then symbolic over time (CP
> 2.329, EP 2:286, 1903).
>
>
>
> Nevertheless, this does not strike me as what Peirce had in mind when he
> said that words representing qualities are abstractives, and it obviously
> does not explain how particular propositions could be descriptives. My
> guess is that he simply had not yet thought through all the details of his
> still-evolving speculative grammar, and maybe that is precisely why those
> letters are *drafts* that he never actually sent to Lady Welby--he was
> still working things out as he was composing them, and he ended up being
> dissatisfied with the results. As I said before, this is not just a matter
> of terminology, but of enhancing our understanding of signs, their two
> objects, and the relations between them. In my view, Peirce was right about
> the order of the first four trichotomies and wrong about the initial sign
> classifications that were inconsistent with it.
>
>
>
> For example, the word "beauty" as a type does not refer to an *individual*
> quality, but to a *continuum* of possible qualities; its dynamical object
> is not a *specific* kind of beauty, but a *general* concept of beauty,
> and that makes it a collective. Although the word *vaguely* indicates the
> concept by means of other qualities in accordance with its verbal
> definition, it also *implicitly* expresses its logical relations; its
> immediate object is not just a list of characters, it includes the
> concept's *valency* as a monadic predicate, and that makes it a copulant.
> When the word is uttered by someone as a token of the type, its dynamical
> object is often an *embodied* quality, making it a concretive; and its
> immediate object is the idea that it *involuntarily *calls up in the mind
> of an interpreter who understands it, making it a designative. An
> abstractive descriptive, whose dynamical object is one possible quality
> that it vaguely indicates by means of other qualities, must *itself* be a
> quality that is iconically embodied in a token as a tone; and a concretive
> descriptive, whose dynamical object is an existent thing that it vaguely
> indicates by means of its qualities, must be that very *combination *of
> qualities that are iconically embodied in a token as tones.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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