Robert, List: The Od-S trichotomy is according to the sign's relation with its dynamical object (iconic/indexical/symbolic), not any of the interpretants. I deliberately omitted *all *the additional trichotomies for the latter because (a) I know that we disagree about their proper order, and (b) this thread is specifically about indexicality, which pertains to the objects of signs and not their interpretants.
Your approach understandably employs Peirce's well-known 1903 taxonomy with only three trichotomies and ten sign classes, while mine adds the first two trichotomies of his expanded 1908 taxonomy, which are according to the mode of being of the dynamical object (abstractive/concretive/collective) and the mode of presentation of the immediate object (descriptive/designative/copulant). With five trichotomies (Od → Oi → S → Od-S → S-If), applying the rule of determination yields 21 sign classes instead of 3^5 = 216. Every abstractive is also a descriptive, a tone (qualisign), an icon, and a seme (rheme); and every argument is also a symbol, a type (legisign), a copulant, and a collective. I presented my resulting analysis of the *word *"beauty" in my previous post in this thread ( https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-10/msg00006.html). Peirce was mistaken when he initially classified it as an abstractive, because although it is a seme, it is obviously not an iconic tone, as all abstractives must be and no words (except onomatopoeia) can be. As a symbolic type, it must be a collective and a copulant--its dynamical object is the *general *concept of beauty, and its immediate object includes its *valency *as a monadic predicate. As an uttered token of that type, it can instead be a concretive and a designative--when its dynamical object is the *embodied *quality of beauty, and its immediate object is the idea that it *involuntarily *brings to mind. We agree that "Some S is P" is a symbolic pheme. However, Peirce was again mistaken when he twice classified it as a descriptive, because it is likewise obviously not an iconic tone, as all descriptives must be and no propositions (or other phemes) can be. As a symbolic type, it must also be a copulant; and as a token of that type, it can instead be a designative. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Oct 3, 2025 at 5:15 AM robert marty <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, List, > > I also want to briefly return to the question of the order of the six > trichotomies. I have no problem considering only the four trichotomies > that, as I understand it, you are proposing (if I interpret your notation > Od-S as equivalent to I). They lead to a lattice with 15 classes, which may > be interesting due to its intermediate complexity between the lattices of > 10 and 28. As for the community agreement, the order that places the final > Interpretant at the end is very much in the majority. In his letter of > December 23, 1908, Peirce calls it "Explicit," a term consistent with 8.184 > (review of LW's book "What is meaning?, 1903, London: Macmillan & Co) in > which he writes: > > As to the Interpretant, i.e., the "signification," or "interpretation" > rather, of a sign, we must distinguish an Immediate and a Dynamical, as we > must the Immediate and Dynamical Objects. But we must also note that there > is certainly a third kind of Interpretant, which I call the Final > Interpretant, because it is that which *would finally *be decided to be > the true interpretation if consideration of the matter were carried so far > that an ultimate opinion were reached. (CP 8.184) [highlighted by *Peirce* > ] > > It is very clear, and I find it difficult to understand why you use the > word "clearly" while admitting, quite honestly, that "some of his examples > seem inconsistent with it" in the same sentence. But I agree with you that > we should definitely close the debate "*in this thread."* > > Next, I come to the question of representamen versus sign. You abruptly > conclude that Peirce ended up considering them synonymous on the grounds > that he no longer uses them in his letters from 1908. This is not what > Peirce says, since he simply states that Representamen "is not necessary," > which in no way confuses the two terms. This text is part of my list of 76 > definitions of the Sign. [1] It's number 31. However, I quoted the passage > in which he gives his reasons: > > My notion in preferring "representamen" was that it would seem more > natural to apply it to representatives in legislatures, to deputies of > various kinds, etc I admit still that it aids the comprehension of the > definition to compare it carefully with such cases. But they certainly > depart from the definition, in that this requires that the action of the > Sign as such shall not affect the Object represented. A legislative > representative is, on the contrary, expected in his functions to improve > the condition of this constituents; and any kind of attorney, even if he > has no discretion, is expected to affect the condition of his principal. > The truth is, I went wrong from not having a formal definition all drawn > up. This sort of thing is inevitable in the early stages of a strong > logical study; for if a formal definition is attempted too soon, it will > only shackle thought. [...] > > Peirce expresses his distrust here of what he considers to be a "natural" > implementation, which should therefore occur in every mind. One reason that > is easy to formalize is the relation between the Object and the Sign must > be an *oriented* determination of the Object towards the Sign, which > excludes the existence of an inverse relation from the Sign to the Object, > as exists in the case of this "natural" relation. Furthermore, quite > simply, we can say that if Peirce does not talk about Representamens, it is > because he is talking about Signs in the real world (*a posteriori*), > which are in fact Representamens (*a priori*) inscribed in Real. > > I come to "beauty." Let me clarify: I went overly far when I said that I > agree with you. Let's just say that I found elements in your statements > that could match, but nothing more. I stand by my own analysis. As a > general rule, there can only be two meanings for "beauty": one that refers > to a set of qualities (Qualisigns) attached to an existing Object, and the > other, as a word (i.e., a Rhematic Symbol) that governs responses through a > set of embodiments that can be read in the lattice. In fact, I seek to give > coherence to this dual semiotic status, and I find it in the lattice at the > level of the *Iconic Sinsign*, which is embodied in a Rhematic Indexical > Sinsign that contains replicas of the word "beauty" (a Rhematic Symbol) and > also contains replicas of Iconic Legisigns. > > Let's look at the definitions : > > An *Iconic Sinsign* [*e.g., *an individual diagram] is any object of > experience in so far as some quality of it makes it determine the idea of > an object.[…] *It will embody a Qualisign*. (CP 2.255) > > A *Rhematic Symbol or Symbolic Rheme* [*e.g., *a common noun] is a sign > connected with its Object by an association of general ideas in such a way > that its Replica calls up an image in the mind which image, owing to > certain habits or dispositions of that mind, tends to produce a general > concept, *and the Replica is interpreted as a Sign of an Object *that is > an instance of that concept. […] The Interpretant of the *Rhematic Symbol > *often represents it as a *Rhematic Indexical Legisign* at other times as > an *Iconic Legisign*; *and it does in a small measure partake of the > nature of both*. (CP 2.261) > > I insist: "*partake of the nature of both*" is something that can only > occur in the Real, here at the level of *the Iconic Sinsign* where > replicas of both are found. There may therefore be *Rhematic Symbols *that > have this dual status. I make this visible by converting the lattice > subdiagram into a Venn diagram, in which the understanding of each class of > signs is represented by its extension, with the embodiments of classes > appearing as inclusion relations. The class of its iconic signs can contain > replicas of dicent symbols through successive embodiments via two distinct > descending paths, with the possibility that some of its replicas may be > common. Then the Qualisign "beauty" could materialize (Peirce calls this a > "Fact of firstness" in MS 478) in a common replica of the same dicent > symbol, which answers the question. > [image: > image.png] > > For "Some S are P," Peirce is correct! Because the lattice shows that a > Dicent Symbol has a replica in Dicent Indexical Sinsign (pheme), but also, > through a path that passes through the Iconic Legisign, it has its replicas > in the class of Iconic Sinsigns (seme, descriptive). However, the lattice > also shows that the class of Dicent Indexical Sinsigns (phemes) embodies > that of Iconic Sinsigns (seme). This class is therefore the possible > "meeting place" for the two possible replicas of a Dicent Symbol (pheme). > > Regards, > > Robert Marty > > [1]https://cspeirce.com/rsources/76defs/76defs.htm > Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy > fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty > *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* >
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