Gary F. Jeff, List, Gary, I'm glad you brought up the difference between James' and Peirce's views of what constitutes a 'phenomenon' which, I believe, diverges both in scope and method.
Peirce’s phenomenology is, of course, *classificatory *in the sense of distinguishing three categories, but it is also in my view, and I think more importantly, *methodological*. In the 'blackboard' lecture it appears to me to initiate a systematic analysis of the 'phaneron', one which isn't intrinsically physical or psychological (or metaphysical in James' sense, although it most certainly will find its role in Peirce's metaphysics). His phenomenology doesn't begin with what one finds in some actual or, even, possible *occurrence* (2ns), but with those *formal elements* one can discover in any and every phenomenon. In short, Peirce's formal categorial 'modes' -- 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns -- are not contents of some existential experience but, rather, *three universal ways of phenomena appearing within the phaneron*. In later work he will characterize these categories as irreducible, mutually independent, that is, the three *always appearing together* (except, of course, for the purpose of analysis). This is to say, for example, that to explore 1ns *as such* is to consider that category in the abstract, *prescinding* from the fullness of tricategoriality where no one category ever appears independent of the other two. While James (and Husserl, for that matter) seems to see phenomena as a kind of temporal stream of pure *existential experience,* Peirce treats the phaneron as having *essential modes* (the categories) which can be studied and classified without necessarily referring to time, ego, or the existential world. Further down in the classification of sciences they will, naturally, find an important role in providing principles to especially semeiotics and metaphysics and, eventually, even the special and applied sciences. So, in a word, James’s phenomenon remains *experiential and concrete* while Peirce’s is *formal, structural and, *perhaps*, normative* (although I'd like to hear yours and others ideas regarding this last point as the normative sciences, of course, follow phenomenology in Peirce's classification of the theoretic sciences). One might say that Peirce is introducing a modal classificatory phenomenology not oriented directly toward lived experience (it is, after all, a theoretic science which, however, will find an important role in providing principles to the normative sciences, to metaphysics and, eventually, even the special and applied sciences). In my view, Peirce's phenomenology initiates an inquiry into the logical architecture of appearance itself. Best, Gary R On Thu, Dec 11, 2025 at 8:22 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R, your answer to Jeff’s question is as good or better than anything > I could have come up with. I might only add that Mill’s usage of the word > “phenomenon” is radically different from the use Peirce would make of it > later when he wrote to James in 1904 that “My ‘phenomenon’ for which I must > invent a new word is very near your ‘pure experience’ but not quite since I > do not exclude time and also speak of only one ‘phenomenon’” (CP 8.301). > Peirce on the other hand is already in 1898 practicing what we now call > “phenomenology” *avant la lettre, *in my opinion. > > > > Love, gary f. > > Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg > > > > *From:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > *Sent:* 11-Dec-25 05:25 > *To:* [email protected] > *Cc:* [email protected]; Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Firstness and sentience > > > > Gary F, Jeff, List, > > Gary, thanks for introducing this intriguing question as to the nature of > 1ns. And, Jeff, your introduction of Mills' discussion of 'quality' seems > to me to provide a useful contrast to Peirce’s account of qualitative > possibility,1ns, in the 1898 Cambridge Lectures. > > Of course, both reject the old scholastic notion that a quality is some > mysterious entity inhabiting an object. And for both of them, the way we > encounter qualities is as feelings (sensations). But Mill shrinks 'quality' > into a kind of regularity of sensation: to call snow “white” is, in Mill's > view, simply to say that when snow is present under normal conditions that > we have a certain sensation: the quality, for him, is nothing other than > the sensation. > > Peirce, on the other hand, does not reduce qualities to > physio/psychological events. Rather, he examines the issue through > phenomenological prescission by abstracting from any subject/object > relation to extract, as it were, the *pure suchness* of a quality -- what > it would be 'for itself'. True, this mode of being can only be > *experienced* as feeling. But quality is not a mere feeling in a subject, > nor, as mentioned above, some occult causal 'power' in an object but, > rather, the irreducible 1ns that any sensation instantiates (but is not > limited to). > > > So, Peirce’s claim that “whatever is First is ipso facto sentient” is most > certainly not some panpsychist idea that stones and the like have minds. It > is a statement about how we can conceive qualitative being. Feeling, in the > RLT analysis, is not yet a psychological event. 1ns is, rather, the > category under which pure feeling can be presented to thought in > phenomenological analysis. Mill never argues anything like this as his > 'sensations' presuppose a subject and an object, while Peirce is trying to > describe what is prior both to reaction (2ns) and mediation/interpretation > (3ns). Thus Mill’s account, as I see it, is nominalist: qualities for him > are only names for kinds of sensations. On the other hand, Peirce’s view is > grounded in extreme scholastic realism such that *qualities are real > possible modes of feeling* whether or not they are embodied in any > particular experience. Actual subjective feeling arises only when certain > kinds of complex, semiotic systems emerge (for prime example, biological > systems) and, indeed, Peirce initiated an inquiry into how complex semiotic > systems emerge. What distinguishes him from Mill in this matter is his > insistence that qualities (1nses) are not merely descriptions of sensations > but, rather, *genuine modes of semeiotic being*, prescindible from any > particular instance of their appearance. > > > > In my view, with this insight Peirce deepens the inquiry into the > qualitative aspect of reality as being in its own distinct category, > namely, 1ns. > > Best. > > Gary R > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
