List: With regard to Gary F’s question of ‘Can a stone be sentient’? Here’s a thought fantasy….
I think one has to define the term ‘sentient’. The dictionary meaning is ‘able to perceive or feel things’ which suggests a form of awareness of otherness by a discrete entity but does not require this entity to have any self-consciousness of this awareness. Certainly a stone, in its composition, reacts to heat, wind, water and the effects of chemicals poured over it! But are these reactions in pure Secondness indicative of a sentient being? Peirce insists that ‘protoplasm ‘, a biological slime, ‘feels’ [6.255] and has defined Feeling as a mode of Firstness [1.306]. What is Firstness? “If the universe is thus progressing from a state of all but pure chance to a state of all but complete determination by law”..EP 1.243 The First is that whose being is simply in itself, not referring to anything” 1.356 “Firstness is the mode of being which consists in is subject’s being positively such as it is regardless of aught else’. 1.25 and 8.328 That is – there is nothing in the above definitions to define Firstness as awareness of otherness. Instead, the definitions seem to refer to a mode of being with no factor of ’otherness’ involved. Is this ‘wholeness of sensation’ the meaning of sentient? According to Peirce, “By a feeling I mean an instance of that kind of consciousness which involves no analysis, comparison or any process whatsoever, nor consists in whole or in part of any act by which one stretch of consciousness is distinguished from another’…[1.306 ]. What is a stone? The material or chemical composition of a non-biological entity, a stone, combines elements like Oxygen Silicon, Iron, Calcium, Sodium..etc. all of which elements are operative within the mode of Thirdness as well as Secondness. Thirdness, or habits, can be understood as ‘mass’ or inertia . Does Firstness function in this situation? In its nature as a stone, the material elements of the stone have moved into a fixed state of habits, into determination by law, ie,Thirdness. Is Firstness operative within this ‘stone-cold state’? I think it is important to understand Firstness not in a linear order, ie, as ‘First’, but as a distinct mode of being of energy/matter. What does this imply? In this thought fantasy- I analyze matter within the theory of mass/energy equivalence of special relativity. There are two variables to consider: energy and the speed of light. I consider that energy, existing near the speed of light functions in a mode of Pure Firstness – see the above definitions. Slow down the speed of this energy, slow it down by requiring its existence to ‘take time’ - and this energy becomes individual units of matter/mass within a mode of Secondness. Slow the matter down even further by introducing the habits of Thirdness – and you get the inertia of mass. [See outline of emergence of the universe 1.412]. So- the stone is energy ‘frozen’ in Thirdness and functioning as matter/mass. But has it lost the capacity for this mode of Firstness which is the mode of being of the chemicals which make up this stone near the speed of light’? I don’t think so. It retains the possibility of being moved into a state near the speed of light and thus losing the laws that hold its atoms and molecules together, losing its individual composition and moving very close to pure energy, which I consider the mode of Being of Firstness. Ie..mass can be converted into a huge amount of energy. That is, as Peirce writes ‘this breaking up of habit and renewed fortuitous spontaneity will, according to the law of mind, be accompanied by an intensification of feeling” [6.264] and ‘Wherever chance-spontaneity is found, there in the same proportion feeling exists,, In fact, chance is but the outward aspect of that which within itself is feeling” [6.265]. To me, this means that the stone retains Firstness within its composition [because it is made up of energy/matter] and what holds it back from expressing it as Feeling is that its mass is ‘frozen’ within the habits of Thirdness. So- can a stone be sentient? Answer: A stone has the capacity to be sentient if and only if its mass is operating near the speed of light. And how often does that happen? After all- that would be the end of the stone! End of thought-fantasy. Oh, wait – what if this stone is a crystal? Is that different? Hmm. -The crystal , let’s say quartz, grows its mass [ into its stable modes of 3ns and 2ns], via, I’d suggest a process of Secondness operating in a mode of Firstness, 2-1, where, when the chemicals are heated, the attraction of the habit is ‘felt’ [1ns] between the solid and fluid modes [ 2-1] within the surrounding liquid or gas. So- the quartz crystal IS sentient in its growth phases. And the non-crystal stone is sentient when it is almost..no longer a ‘stone’… End of thoughts… Edwina > On Dec 14, 2025, at 1:34 AM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > > Ivar, Gary F, Jeff, List, > > Ivar, your question as to whether stones can be seen as sentient seems to me > to go to the heart of what Peirce is attempting in his phenomenology. In my > view, the question of sentience in non-living things looks paradoxical only > if we consider it from a psychological or biological sense. > > What I am more and more coming to imagine is that the key to understanding > this perplexing question is seeing that Peirce’s phenomenology is not an > inquiry into minds, organisms, or into any 'thing' but, rather, an inquiry > into the formal modes of appearance within the phaneron. As I remarked in an > earlier post, Peirce’s phenomenology does not begin with lived experience > but, rather, with the phaneron: that is, to whatever is present to a mind in > any way. The categories are not meant to express the 'contents' of some > individual, personal experience; rather, they are the formal modes under > which something can appear. > > In my view, Peirce is not claiming that a stone feels in the ordinary sense > in which we think of feeling (since that presupposes 2ns and 3ns). For him > 1ns is a suchness: the immediacy of a quality which is prior to any relation. > So when Peirce says that whatever is "First" (i.e.,1ns) is sentient, he does > this in a truly radically non-psychological, non-existential sense: 1ns is > not something that has a feeling; it is feeling as such before it is > realized, embodied. > > Your suggestion that sentience ought require an “internal drive” toward > something external doesn't, in my view, seem to apply to Peirce's > phenomenology because drive, will, purpose, etc. refer to organized, temporal > systems. These systems are existential and relational so that they > necessarily bring in the categories of 2ns and 3ns. > > Phenomenology offers only the formal categorial elements which may be present > in a possible appearance (as they have been seen to be present in, say, a > particular phaneroscopic observation). As Jon Alan Schmidt has argued, before > something can be actualized, it must be possible. Phenomenology is all about > what qualities, what characters may possibly manifest themselves. > > When Peirce defines the phaneron as the total content of consciousness he is, > I'm pretty sure, not claiming that everything in the phaneron is itself > conscious. Rather, a phenomena's appearance, say as a particular diamond > buried deep in the earth -- its hardness, size, shape, color, etc. -- belongs > (so to speak) to the phaneron. What is categorial 1ns is neither the > diamond’s 'consciousness' as we think of it (certainly an absurdity) but, > rather, a mode of appearance abstracted from any subject-object relation > whatsoever. > > Seen in this light, the claim that a 1st is sentient is not a matter of > projecting our human experience onto inanimate things. Indeed, Peirce rejects > all that would psychologize quality. His point is that there is no such > 'thing' as a 'quality' that is not of the nature of feeling, even though that > feeling is not experienced by a subject. It is simply what immediacy is like > (formally) prior to any embodiment. But embodied, it may be experienced as a > quality in the ordinary sense: as hard, red, cold, sharp, etc. > > You may recall that Peirce's “would-be” account of a diamond hidden deep in > the earth -- and perhaps never to be seen -- saves realism by locating > reality not in hidden, actual properties but, rather, in law-like tendencies > that govern how things would behave under definite conditions. The buried > diamond (in his later revision of his earlier view) is real insofar as it > conforms to certain habits -- such as resisting pressure, brilliance, etc. > -- which would manifest themselves in a suitable interaction, even if no such > interaction ever occurs. Reality, therefore, is fundamentally a continuous, > law-governed order of tendencies some of which are actualized. Actualities, > as Jon Alan Schmidt has shown, are discontinuities in the cosmic semiosic > continuum. (Thank goodness for those discontinuities or we earthlings > wouldn't be here at all!) > > So, to cut to the chase: diamonds and other 'stones' and such are obviously > not sentient in the ordinary sense. As I commented in an earlier post, Peirce > is most certainly not offering some form of proto-panpsychism. Rather, he is > insisting on the irreducibility of 1ns within the logical architecture of > appearance itself. In my view, the language of sentience that Peirce employs > is meant to, shall we say, constrain our descriptions of 'that which is'. It > is meant to suggest that before reaction (2ns), even before the evolution of > the laws inherent in our cosmos (3ns), that there is qualitative possibility > (1ns). Perhaps one might conclude that quality can only be understood as > feeling in a maximally abstract and formal sense. > > In his classification of the discovery (theoretic) sciences, Peirce put > phenomenology just above the normative sciences (so, offering principles to > them), and just after First Science, mathematics (from which it garners its > own abstract principles). > > As I see it, Peirce's phenomenology is far from being fully developed. > > Best, > > Gary R > > On Sat, Dec 13, 2025 at 10:37 AM Ivar Borensved > <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> Gary F, Gary R, List, >> >> >> >> Gary R: Peirce’s phenomenology is normative. >> >> I’m not sure I fully agree that it is normative, but when I look closer I >> have begun doubting myself. As I understand Peirce, his phenomenology is >> primarily an observational science and should avoid making any normative >> claims or prescriptions. But, in a sense it comes into play if we consider >> the method of phenomenology. Following Richard K. Atkins in Charles S. >> Peirce’s Phenomenology (2018), one can argue that Peirce has a fourfold >> method of doing phenomenology: “First, she observes the phaneron. Second, >> she describes the phaneron. Third, she analyzes the phaneron. Fourth, she >> evaluates the accuracy and adequacy of her descriptions and analyses.” (p. >> 106, see also EP2:147-8). The fourth step, Atkins argues, is something >> Peirce made use of, even if he rarely discussed it. In the step of >> evaluation we do make judgments on how accurate a description is of a >> phenomenon, the result should be a normative claim in the sense that we and >> others should make use of the description that seems to fit best with the >> observation. So perhaps Peirce’s phenomenology is indeed normative, in the >> evaluation and critique of descriptions of phenomena inside the phaneron? Or >> did you have anything else in mind Gary R? Maybe you mostly thought of it in >> comparison to James? >> >> And I have to say I like your summation that “Peirce's phenomenology >> initiates an inquiry into the logical architecture of appearance itself.” >> very much! >> >> >> >> Gary F: Can stones be sentient? >> >> I enjoy the question, as it is something I have been pondering myself! But I >> have great difficulty in understanding Peirce’s claim that “whatever is >> First is ipso facto sentient”. Is it that the First of a stone, is that of >> being in the feeling of a stone (or stonyness)? Is not sentience tied to at >> least some other object, introducing secondness? The problem is exacerbated >> by me not having access to RLT or CP 6 at the moment… >> >> To at least answer your first question over at Turning Point, I believe that >> we usually attribute feelings to object that we somehow believe have some >> will or want. A chat bot might seem to want to make us happy or hurt us. An >> organism might search for food or mates for reproduction. Stones do not seem >> to exhibit this behavior. I think that the dividing line between sentient >> objects and non-sentient ones hinges on the condition of whether the object >> has some sort of “internal drive” towards something external. Gravity could >> explain the moments of a stone, such that the stone on its own does not have >> an internal will or power. This is a very crude sketch of an undeveloped >> idea. But then we return to your question Gary F, when does something feel >> sentient? Or from my perspective, have an internal drive? >> >> Also, is not the stone or the feeling of the stone part of phaneron, which >> is the collective total of consciousness? “I propose to use the word >> Phaneron as a proper name to denote the total content of any one >> consciousness (for any one is substantially any other), the sum of all we >> have in mind in any way whatever, regardless of its cognitive value.” (EP2: >> 362, 1905). Thus, the stone is content of a consciousness. Is it also >> consciousness then? Or is it not a “content” of a consciousness, but rather >> as a whole, the entirety of a consciousness? >> >> This part of Peirce’s philosophy has always puzzled me. So I would happily >> hear what you all think it means that a First is sentient. Is sentience here >> the pure feeling as presented in the mode of thought? Does it not mean that >> we only talk about ourselves when we say that a stone has sentience? >> >> >> Best regards >> Ivar >> Le samedi 13 décembre 2025 à 08:19, Gary Richmond <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit : >>> Gary F. Jeff, List, >>> >>> Gary, I'm glad you brought up the difference between James' and Peirce's >>> views of what constitutes a 'phenomenon' which, I believe, diverges both in >>> scope and method. >>> >>> Peirce’s phenomenology is, of course, classificatory in the sense of >>> distinguishing three categories, but it is also in my view, and I think >>> more importantly, methodological. In the 'blackboard' lecture it appears to >>> me to initiate a systematic analysis of the 'phaneron', one which isn't >>> intrinsically physical or psychological (or metaphysical in James' sense, >>> although it most certainly will find its role in Peirce's metaphysics). His >>> phenomenology doesn't begin with what one finds in some actual or, even, >>> possible occurrence (2ns), but with those formal elements one can discover >>> in any and every phenomenon. In short, Peirce's formal categorial 'modes' >>> -- 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns -- are not contents of some existential experience >>> but, rather, three universal ways of phenomena appearing within the >>> phaneron. In later work he will characterize these categories as >>> irreducible, mutually independent, that is, the three always appearing >>> together (except, of course, for the purpose of analysis). This is to say, >>> for example, that to explore 1ns as such is to consider that category in >>> the abstract, prescinding from the fullness of tricategoriality where no >>> one category ever appears independent of the other two. >>> >>> While James (and Husserl, for that matter) seems to see phenomena as a kind >>> of temporal stream of pure existential experience, Peirce treats the >>> phaneron as having essential modes (the categories) which can be studied >>> and classified without necessarily referring to time, ego, or the >>> existential world. Further down in the classification of sciences they >>> will, naturally, find an important role in providing principles to >>> especially semeiotics and metaphysics and, eventually, even the special and >>> applied sciences. >>> >>> So, in a word, James’s phenomenon remains experiential and concrete while >>> Peirce’s is formal, structural and, perhaps, normative (although I'd like >>> to hear yours and others ideas regarding this last point as the normative >>> sciences, of course, follow phenomenology in Peirce's classification of the >>> theoretic sciences). One might say that Peirce is introducing a modal >>> classificatory phenomenology not oriented directly toward lived experience >>> (it is, after all, a theoretic science which, however, will find an >>> important role in providing principles to the normative sciences, to >>> metaphysics and, eventually, even the special and applied sciences). >>> >>> In my view, Peirce's phenomenology initiates an inquiry into the logical >>> architecture of appearance itself. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >>> On Thu, Dec 11, 2025 at 8:22 AM <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> Gary R, your answer to Jeff’s question is as good or better than anything >>>> I could have come up with. I might only add that Mill’s usage of the word >>>> “phenomenon” is radically different from the use Peirce would make of it >>>> later when he wrote to James in 1904 that “My ‘phenomenon’ for which I >>>> must invent a new word is very near your ‘pure experience’ but not quite >>>> since I do not exclude time and also speak of only one ‘phenomenon’” (CP >>>> 8.301). Peirce on the other hand is already in 1898 practicing what we now >>>> call “phenomenology” avant la lettre, in my opinion. >>>> >>>> Love, gary f. >>>> >>>> Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg >>>> >>>> From: Gary Richmond <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> >>>> Sent: 11-Dec-25 05:25 >>>> To: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >>>> Cc: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>; Jeffrey Brian Downard >>>> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >>>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Firstness and sentience >>>> >>>> Gary F, Jeff, List, >>>> >>>> Gary, thanks for introducing this intriguing question as to the nature of >>>> 1ns. And, Jeff, your introduction of Mills' discussion of 'quality' seems >>>> to me to provide a useful contrast to Peirce’s account of qualitative >>>> possibility,1ns, in the 1898 Cambridge Lectures. >>>> >>>> Of course, both reject the old scholastic notion that a quality is some >>>> mysterious entity inhabiting an object. And for both of them, the way we >>>> encounter qualities is as feelings (sensations). But Mill shrinks >>>> 'quality' into a kind of regularity of sensation: to call snow “white” is, >>>> in Mill's view, simply to say that when snow is present under normal >>>> conditions that we have a certain sensation: the quality, for him, is >>>> nothing other than the sensation. >>>> >>>> Peirce, on the other hand, does not reduce qualities to >>>> physio/psychological events. Rather, he examines the issue through >>>> phenomenological prescission by abstracting from any subject/object >>>> relation to extract, as it were, the pure suchness of a quality -- what it >>>> would be 'for itself'. True, this mode of being can only be experienced as >>>> feeling. But quality is not a mere feeling in a subject, nor, as mentioned >>>> above, some occult causal 'power' in an object but, rather, the >>>> irreducible 1ns that any sensation instantiates (but is not limited to). >>>> >>>> >>>> So, Peirce’s claim that “whatever is First is ipso facto sentient” is most >>>> certainly not some panpsychist idea that stones and the like have minds. >>>> It is a statement about how we can conceive qualitative being. Feeling, in >>>> the RLT analysis, is not yet a psychological event. 1ns is, rather, the >>>> category under which pure feeling can be presented to thought in >>>> phenomenological analysis. Mill never argues anything like this as his >>>> 'sensations' presuppose a subject and an object, while Peirce is trying to >>>> describe what is prior both to reaction (2ns) and mediation/interpretation >>>> (3ns). Thus Mill’s account, as I see it, is nominalist: qualities for him >>>> are only names for kinds of sensations. On the other hand, Peirce’s view >>>> is grounded in extreme scholastic realism such that qualities are real >>>> possible modes of feeling whether or not they are embodied in any >>>> particular experience. Actual subjective feeling arises only when certain >>>> kinds of complex, semiotic systems emerge (for prime example, biological >>>> systems) and, indeed, Peirce initiated an inquiry into how complex >>>> semiotic systems emerge. What distinguishes him from Mill in this matter >>>> is his insistence that qualities (1nses) are not merely descriptions of >>>> sensations but, rather, genuine modes of semeiotic being, prescindible >>>> from any particular instance of their appearance. >>>> >>>> In my view, with this insight Peirce deepens the inquiry into the >>>> qualitative aspect of reality as being in its own distinct category, >>>> namely, 1ns. >>>> >>>> Best. >>>> >>>> Gary R >>>> >>>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >>>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]> . >>>> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>">UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, >>>> if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then >>>> go to >>>> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . >>>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and >>>> co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]> . >> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>">UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, >> if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go >> to >> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and >> co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> > . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, > then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
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