Jeff, Gary, List, [note: I completed this message late last night but didn't post it as I wanted to proofread/edit it today. As a result, I obviously hadn't read your post today, Gary. Thanks for excerpting more of the Lecture 8 of RLT as it puts what I wrote below in perspective. GR]
First, thank you for this most stimulating post, Jeff. It made me look at the issue in an entirely fresh manner. While at first glance there would seem to be a near irreconcilable tension between the position which Gary F and I have been outlining and yours in this post, I am beginning to see things *somewhat *differently. Your analysis, centered as it is on Lecture 8 of RLT, appears to me to distance itself from the phenomenological categorial topic, framing/'translating' Peirce’s cosmology into the contemporary idioms of certain 20th and 21st scientific fields, esp. contemporary cosmology. Following Peirce, Gary F's and my more *strictly **phaneroscopic *remarks insist that 1ns cannot be explained, translated, or made intelligible through any relational-theoretical framework without being false. On further reflection, though, I think that once we see that Peirce is operating on different methodological planes in two different (although categorially not unrelated) sciences, viz. phenomenology and cosmology, the confusion begins to clear up, at least somewhat for me. Phenomenology and cosmology are two very different sciences with* different subject matter and methodologies*; also, in Peirce's architectonic, phenomenology (as being higher in the classification) offers principles to cosmology, while cosmology may offer examples, etc. to phenomenology. The confusion arises, I think, when results from one one scientific discipline are either imported into or conflated with another discipline. Peirce’s remark that “every description of [1ns] must be false to it” suggests a fundamental investigatory principle of phaneroscopy proper and a key to its methodology as well. At the level of phaneroscopy,1ns is immediately given as *qualitative suchness*. We recognize a quality precisely by encountering it, and any attempt to explain it -- such as discussing particular objects in which it may be embodied, causes of it, etc -- already introduces 2ns and 3ns. In the strictly first phenomenological phase, that is, phaneroscopy [see*** below my signature for more on this] there is no subject-object division, no self, no inference, no temporal flow. As Peirce says in his late reflections on the matter, and which Gary F noted, what I am conscious of and the fact that I am conscious are one and the same fact, so that phaneroscopic awareness is “the entire universe, so far as I [as phenomenologist] am concerned.” So, sentience here names nothing cognitive or mental but, rather, immediacy,* the suchness*. The Lecture 8 passage we've been discussing in a couple of threads, however, is obviously not operating at the level of phaneroscopy. Here Peirce isn't asking what 1ns is as encountered, but how the categories might be cosmologically 'initiated' and 'interact', how the categories *could* give rise to our universe's laws and matter, the last with its myriad qualities. When he says that “whatever is [1ns] is ipso facto sentient,” and that dead matter represents the extreme hardening of habit, it seems to me that Peirce is proposing a metaphysical history or genealogy of the early cosmos, being an account of how 3ns (as law) and 2ns (as matter) *could *emerge with all the qualities of the last. Jon and I have discussed this on the List several times in the past, and he has published at least one paper which takes up that theme in some detail. Seen this way, the contemporary 'field, habit, and information' reframing you're arguing doesn't really explain 1ns as such, but rather asks whether our best physical theories are naturally aligned with Peirce's views. Your claim seems to be not that, say, quantum fields *are* 1ns, but that a field ontology makes it easier to imagine how something like 1ns could be metaphysically basic while still producing stable regularities through habit-taking. As an attempt at an answer to that problem Peirce, of course, offers the 'blackboard' diagram to show how an original continuity (continuity exemplifying 3ns 'to near perfection') is a prerequisite of there being three categories operative in our universe. To me, the theory behind Peirce's 'blackboard' discussion )of what I've called an ur-continuum as the aboriginal 'field' of categorial play) allows for the sporting of 1ns until some of these qualities/characters 'stay' long enough that interactions and habits begin to form, and these enable-empower that *Platonic world* to become into existence as an actual universe, our Universe. As for the rock example being a category mistake, no one is claiming that a rock, a more or less stable, physical object, is sentient in the sense of *having feeling*. Your suggestion seems to be that rocks can only be seen as products of the hardening of habit, that they are late stage regularities that are indurate or dead to the primordial qualitative 'play' that Peirce associates with 1ns (despite their involving the activity of atoms, quarks, and other subatomic particles). Be that as it may, returning to phenomenology, 1ns is pure immediacy, ineffable, non-relational, encountered as *such,* and *as it appears*; here “sentience” names *qualitative suchness* alone and, therefore, cannot be argued into acceptance at all: it must be observed phaneroscopically. On the other hand, cosmologically Peirce asks how a universe which categorially commences with 1ns could evolve laws and matter. In my view, that 'how' is the principal point of the 'blackboard' discussion in RLT which Jon Alan Schmidt and I have occasionally discussed on the List, and on which topic Jon has written at least one paper. (Those truly interested in this topic should probably study the excerpts that you and Gary F have posted from RLT.) To conclude, I would say that both strands of argumentation discussed above are definitely Peircean as long as we don't confuse the various levels of science as developed in Peirce's "Classification of the Sciences" in the Syllabus. In my view, the difficulty arises when cosmological, or other metaphysical questions, are asked of phaneroscopy; or, conversely, when phenomenological questions are asked of metaphysics, including, of course, cosmology. I think it is quite easy to conflate the two and, admittedly, I've done it myself. After all, tricategoriality is a characteristic of both sciences. Finally, Peirce’s own warning that phenomenology is an “exceedingly difficult science” which only some are suited to, applies doubly here. And this is not only because, as Peirce saw it, few have the requisite interest or natural abilities to do it well. But also because even for those who do have that interest and such abilities, 1ns is extremely challenging to grasp in its suchness because is nearly impossible to keep from sublating (to use Hegel's term) pure experience. I think one would have to admit that it is likely that most 'philosophical types' tend much more toward logic than toward phenomenology, and so we begin to try to explain the world rather than attend to what is immediately given. Best, Gary R ***I *see not one, but three possible branches of phenomenological science. The first (in my schema) *Peirce *t*ermed* "phaneroscopy*,*"* being the pure observation of phenomena within the phaneron, and this is the one we've principally been discussing in this thread. This is the 'single science' that Peirce began to outline, although he was quick to put his phenomenological findings to work in logic as semeiotic and metaphysics. In a 2013 paper, "Iconoscopy Between Phaneroscopy and Semeiotic," Andre de Tienne introduced a possible new not-quite-a-science,* Iconoscopy* (although even in that paper he says 'iconoscopy' doesn't quite convey the meaning he intended). Also, in 2005 I introduced *Trikonic* as a possible 3rd branch of phenomenology, imagining that de Tienne's Iconoscopy (or, Semioscopy, as he alternatively termed it) might be developed as a branch of Peirce's Phenomenology (however, Andre wrote me that he himself had abandoned work on Iconoscopy). Neither of these two possible additional branches has found much traction in the literature. On Mon, Dec 15, 2025 at 8:42 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > Jeff, list, > > I have to confess that when I quoted the remark by Peirce that has puzzled > me — “whatever is First is *ipso facto* sentient” — I was taking it out > of context, and trying to explain it in a *different* context, namely > Peirce’s post-1902 phenomenology. I don’t see any evidence that Peirce > himself ever tried to explain that 1898 remark in his explicit > phenomenology, or that he would have made that assertion at all in that > context. (In fact I have not found a single instance of the word “sentient” > in any Peirce text after 1898!) > > I may also be guilty of some misdirection by introducing the question of > whether a stone can be sentient. A stone is an existing thing, and a First > is not. Obviously some existing things can be sentient, as I believe you > and I are sentient; but this has nothing to do with the proposed sentience > of a *First*. > > Getting back to Cambridge Lecture 8, which was the context of Peirce’s > claim about the sentience of a First, Peirce is clarly *not* doing > phenomenology, but rather a logical cosmology (the “logic of the > universe”). Specifically he is defending his doctrine of Tychism, that > *chance* (or indeterminacy, as I prefer to call it) is fundamental to the > evolutionary process. I see your post (below) as an attempt to bridge the > gap between current *physical* cosmology and Peirce’s *logical* > cosmology. How successful your attempt is, I’ll leave others to judge, but > I’d like to bring in more of the text leading up to the paragraph you’ve > already provided from Peirce’s Lecture 8, just to clarify what the issue is > here. This is CP 6.192 ff.: > > [[ From this point of view we must suppose that the existing universe, > with all its arbitrary secondness, is an offshoot from, or an arbitrary > determination of, a world of ideas, a Platonic world; not that our superior > logic has enabled us to reach up to a world of forms to which the real > universe, with its feebler logic, was inadequate. > > 193. If this be correct, we cannot suppose the process of derivation, a > process which extends from before time and from before logic, we cannot > suppose that it began elsewhere than in the utter vagueness of completely > undetermined and dimensionless potentiality. > > 194. The evolutionary process is, therefore, not a mere evolution of the > *existing > universe,* but rather a process by which the very Platonic forms > themselves have become or are becoming developed. > > 195. We shall naturally suppose, of course, that existence is a stage of > evolution. *This existence* is presumably but a *special* existence. We > need not suppose that every form needs for its evolution to emerge into > this world, but only that it needs to enter into *some* theatre of > reactions, of which this is one. > > 196. The evolution of forms begins or, at any rate, has for an early > stage of it, a vague potentiality; and that either is or is followed by a > continuum of forms having a multitude of dimensions too great for the > individual dimensions to be distinct. It must be by a contraction of the > vagueness of that potentiality of everything in general, but of nothing in > particular, that the world of forms comes about. > > 197. We can hardly but suppose that those sense-qualities that we now > experience, colors, odors, sounds, feelings of every description, loves, > griefs, surprise, are but the relics of an ancient ruined continuum of > qualities, like a few columns standing here and there in testimony that > here some old-world forum with its basilica and temples had once made a > magnificent *ensemble.* And just as that forum, before it was actually > built, had had a vague underexistence in the mind of him who planned its > construction, so too the cosmos of sense-qualities, which I would have you > to suppose in some early stage of being was as real as your personal life > is this minute, had in an antecedent stage of development a vaguer being, > before the relations of its dimensions became definite and contracted. > > 198. The sense-quality is a feeling. Even if you say it is a *slumbering* > feeling, > that does not make it less intense; perhaps the reverse. For it is the > absence of *reaction* — of feeling *another* — that constitutes slumber, > not the absence of the immediate feeling that is all that it is in its > immediacy. Imagine a magenta color. Now imagine that all the rest of your > consciousness — memory, thought, everything except this feeling of magenta > — is utterly wiped out, and with that is erased all possibility of > comparing the magenta with anything else or of estimating it as more or > less bright. That is what you must think the pure sense-quality to be. Such > a definite potentiality can emerge from the indefinite potentiality only by > its own vital Firstness and spontaneity. Here is this magenta color. What > originally made such a quality of feeling possible? Evidently nothing but > itself. It is a First. > > … > > 200. In short, if we are going to regard the universe as a result of > evolution at all, we must think that not merely the existing universe, that > locus in the cosmos to which our reactions are limited, but the whole > Platonic world, which in itself is equally real, is evolutionary in its > origin, too. And among the things so resulting are time and logic. The very > first and most fundamental element that we have to assume is a Freedom, or > Chance, or Spontaneity, by virtue of which the general vague > nothing-in-particular-ness that preceded the chaos took a thousand definite > qualities. … ]] > > What follows the part you quoted is of course the “blackboard” metaphor > that Gary R and others have mentioned. I’ll leave it at that for now … > > Love, gary f > > Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg > > > > *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> *On > Behalf Of *Jeffrey Brian Downard > *Sent:* 14-Dec-25 17:58 > *To:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]>; [email protected]; Ivar > Borensved <[email protected]> > *Cc:* Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Firstness and sentience > > > > Gary F, Gary R, Ivar, Edwina, List, > > My earlier note to Gary F zoomed in on one strand in Lecture 3 of *RLT*: > Peirce’s work reads especially well when we see him arguing *against*--and > sometimes *with*--contemporaries like Mill who are also wrestling with > logic—especially the question of how signs (icons, indices, symbols) relate > to qualities, and how those relations can be made intelligible without > reducing them to mere mechanics. > > By Lectures 7–8, however, Peirce is largely doing cosmological > metaphysics. He is trying to say something substantive about how *law* could > emerge—how “natural laws” might be understood as the gradual formation and > hardening of *habits*—and he recruits multiple notions of *continuity* to > push the inquiries forward, including mathematical conceptions of > continuity (e.g., topological/projective conceptions) alongside logical > continuity (methodeutic, habits of inquiry, and the growth of > intelligibility). > > That brings me to Gary’s original question—whether it makes sense to say > that a rock might be sentient. The following passage from Lecture 8 seems > to put the issue as sharply as anywhere: > > “But there is another class of objectors for whom I have more respect. > They are shocked at the atheism of Lucretius and his great master. They do > not perceive that that which offends them is not the Firstness in the > swerving atoms, because they themselves are just as much advocates of > Firstness as the ancient Atomists were. But what they cannot accept is the > attribution of this firstness to things perfectly dead and material. Now I > am quite with them there. I think too that whatever is First is ipso facto > sentient. If I make atoms swerve, — as I do, — I make them swerve but very > very little, because I conceive they are not absolutely dead. And by that I > do not mean exactly that I hold them to be physically such as the > materialists hold them to be[,] only with a small dose of sentiency > superadded. For that, I grant, would be feeble enough. But what I mean is, > that all that there is is First, Feelings; Second, Efforts; Third, Habits; > — all of which are more familiar to us on their psychical side than on > their physical side; and that dead matter would be merely the final result > of the complete induration of habit reducing the free play of feeling and > the brute irrationality of effort to complete death. Now I would suppose > that that result of evolution is not quite complete even in our beakers and > crucibles.” (RLT, 260–261) > > If we set aside—just for the moment—the narrower task of *textual > interpretation* and ask how one might translate the *cosmological > suggestion* into 21st-century terms, I think the question shifts. “Is a > rock sentient?” is easy to hear as a category mistake, because “rock” names > a macroscopic, late-formed, highly stabilized object—precisely the kind of > thing Peirce is tempted to describe as “indurated habit.” A chunk of > malpaís in my yard (lava that flowed millions of years ago) looks about as > inert as anything could look; and yet, on Peirce’s picture, that inertness > is itself an *achievement* of habit—a near “end-state” of stabilization, > not the primordial baseline. > > So I’m inclined to reframe the issue at a different level of description. > In contemporary physics, the rock is an organized pattern of fields and > interactions. In the Standard Model idiom, protons and neutrons are > composite; quarks interact via gluons; and what we call “particles” are, in > many presentations, excitations of underlying fields. (If it’s useful as a > shared visual reference, here’s a simple animation of the strong > interaction: > *https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strong_interaction#/media/File:Nuclear_Force_anim_smaller.gif > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strong_interaction#/media/File:Nuclear_Force_anim_smaller.gif>* > > .) > > From a Peircean perspective, what matters is not whether the *rock* has a > mindlike interior, but whether the more basic levels of reality involve (i) > qualitative possibilities (*Firstness*), (ii) constraints/compulsions or > “brute suchness” (*Secondness*), and (iii) the formation of stable > regularities (*Thirdness* as habit/law). If one takes a *continuous field* > ontology seriously, then the primitives are not little billiard balls, but > loci of qualitative character (charge, spin, etc.) standing in relations of > mutual susceptibility—what Peirce calls the peculiar relation of > *affectability*. And if one further takes seriously the idea that law is > not merely “written into” the cosmos from the outset but becomes > increasingly definite—then the growth of regularity begins to look like the > growth of a kind of *memory*: not memory as personal recollection, but > memory as the persistence of constraints, the consolidation of tendencies, > the sedimentation of habits across time—all involving the growth and flow > of information. > > On that way of putting it, the sharper question becomes something like: Is > a primordial field of potentiality the kind of thing to which Peirce’s > “whatever is First is ipso facto sentient” could intelligibly apply? That > is: are the qualitative aspects and couplings of the most basic reality > better thought of as utterly mindless “dead matter,” or as something whose > most primitive mode is closer, in kind and not just in degree, to > *feeling/possibility*—with “dead matter” emerging as the highly > constrained limit where habit has hardened and the range of qualitative > “free play” has been drastically narrowed? > > I’m not claiming this settles the textual question, and I’m certainly not > claiming that quantum field theory proves Peirce is right. My more modest > suggestion is that Peirce’s provocative line—*“whatever is First is ipso > facto sentient”*—sounds least absurd when we do not start with a rock, > atom or proton, but with the metaphysical role he assigns to Firstness and > continuity: a world whose earliest mode is possibility/quality, whose > constraints and collisions are secondary, and whose laws are habits that > grow, stabilize, and in the limit can “indurate” into what looks like dead, > inert stuff. > > If this is even directionally right, it gives a different angle on Gary’s > worry. The claim wouldn’t be “rocks are sentient” in any ordinary sense; it > would be that the metaphysical roots of law and order are not best modeled > as perfectly dead. Rocks would then be *products* of habit-taking: > late-stage regularities that tend to conceal rather than display the > primordial qualitative loci in continuous fields of potentiality that are, > on this account, more fundamental. > > I’d be very interested in pushback on two points in particular: (1) > whether this reframing of the questions is faithful to what Peirce is doing > in Lecture 8, and (2) whether the “field, habit and information” > translation does any genuine explanatory work, or merely redescribes the > mystery in prettier terms. > > Yours, > > Jeff > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >
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