Note: This message from Vincent Colapietro seems intended for the List. GR
The point re *how* anything is experienced seems to be of the most pressing importance. I am reminded of a remark by Wm James in *MT*: "It is quite true that the abstract word 'how' hasn't the same meaning as the abstract *word* 'what,' but in this universe of concrete facts you cannot keep hows and whys asunder" (*Pragmatism and MT*, Harvard, p. 275 [109]). What anything is, for us, is inseparable from both how it is encountered and how *it *discloses itself. Moreover, attention to mediation is no less pressing and important. What I want to hold onto, with utmost tenacity, is that our experience is itself a medium of disclosure (no one is better on this than John E Smith, though Joe is of course equally forceful and illuminating on it). To bring coal to Newcastle, the respects and degree to which mediating factors are at play in experience call for critical attention (you and the other participants on this exchange are clearly on this). But what I want to stress is that the emotional interpretant is ineliminable in a sequence of interpretants. Our experience of the world is mediated by feelings or affectivity (at least according to CSP). How feelings are named, interpreted, conceived, etc. of course adds to the complexity of this fact about experience, but affective mediation as an irreducible dimension of human experience seems, to me at least, important to consider in re to AI. As odd as it might sound, the recent papal encyclical might be one of the best formulations of the stakeholders in the debates swirling around the development of AI. Vincent Colapietro The Center for the Humanities Swan Hall, 175G 60 Upper College Road University of Rhode Island (URI) Kingston, RI 02881 Liberal Arts Research Professor Emeritus Philosophy & African American Studies Pennsylvania State University University Park, PA On Sat, Jul 18, 2026 at 8:40 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Vincent, Jon, Gary F, List, > > Vincent, you are quite right that I was merely making explicit what has > long been implicit -- and often enough *explicit* --in your work. It was > certainly not my intention to suggest otherwise. > > If, as Peirce argues, intelligence learns from experience, then we need to > ask not only what counts as experience, but also *how experience is > mediated within communities of inquiry*. Scientific experience, after > all, is not merely that of isolated individuals because the fruits of those > experiences are continually evaluated and disseminated through communal > practices: conference papers, books, lectures, etc. > > This tends to sharpen the AI question (at least for me). Even if AI > systems do not themselves 'have experience', they may still 'participate' > in inquiries whose experiential grounding remains thoroughly human and > communal. If that is so, then the normative question becomes increasingly > important: It is not simply what AI systems can do, but what are the ends > of its participation in inquiry, Jon's concern in initiating this thread. > In my view, technology ought to assist in deepening inquiry and, so, > contributing to human flourishing, not merely by accelerating computation, > and *certainly not* by concentrating power. In my view, the jury is still > out on the role and value of AI. > > Again, like Gary Fuhrman, I am deeply concerned that the development of AI > is largely being directed by a small number of individuals and corporations > whose priorities seem not at all aligned with the broader well-being of > humanity or the planet. And I tpp am deeply troubled by the enormous energy > and water demands of contemporary AI data centers. > > So, perhaps the most important question regarding AI may be whether its > future development will be governed primarily by commercial interests or by > a commitment to human flourishing and ecological responsibility. > > Best, > > Gary R > > On Sat, Jul 18, 2026 at 12:05 PM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jon, List, >> >> having thought about "expectation", and what you wrote, which of course >> is correct, I have come to this temporary conclusion: >> >> Premisses: >> >> 1. (not necessarily true): Expectation, which antecedes the sign, is >> such an essential requirement for a sign, that it must be a part of the >> sign triad, otherwise Peirce´s method of mostly leaving the interpreter >> out >> of consideration would not be justified. >> 2. Everything that antecedes the sign token pertains (...) to the >> dynamical object (your post). >> >> Conclusion: The interpreter´s expectation belongs to the dynamical >> object. Now this case: >> >> Somebody is looking at a cloud and sees a face in it, of somebody he >> knows. >> >> Before, we were talking about the (necessary) purpose of a sign. But what >> is the sign in this case? Is it the assumed similarity between the cloud >> and the face? I guess so, because if it were the cloud, it would not have a >> purpose, just a reason, which is chance due to chaotic turbulence. So I >> guess, the cloud is not the sign, so is the cloud what people (Peirce too?) >> call "sign vehicle"? But the assumed similarity is the interpretant too. >> Are sign and interpretant identical in this case? It cannot be the >> similarity (without "assumed"), because then it neither would have a >> purpose. >> >> Best, Helmut >> 17. Juli 2026 um 00:17 >> "Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected]> >> >> Helmut, List: >> >> I already quoted Peirce's explicit statements that *every *sign's >> purpose is to express fact and *every *sign's ultimate interpretant is >> the Truth. Anyone is welcome to disagree with him about this, but it is >> fully consistent with his speculative grammar, in which every sign has a >> *final >> *interpretant in the sense of a final cause--the effect that it *would *have >> under ideal circumstances, including the shared beliefs of an indefinite >> community after unlimited investigation. It is also fully consistent with >> what he called "the Meliorist view" of human knowledge in a >> still-unpublished manuscript. >> >> >> CSP: [T]here are in the first place certain real facts, which are as they >> are quite independently of what you or I or any man may think about them. >> Secondly, truth, being the agreement of our assertions with those facts, is >> something definitely one way, and not otherwise. Thirdly, observation and >> reflection, stimulated by an eager desire to ascertain that truth, >> gradually lead minds toward it, so that, though ignorance and error always >> remain in reference to each question, yet they become gradually dispelled. >> (R 953, c. 1897) >> >> >> The dynamical interpretant--any effect that a sign token *does *have in >> an actual event of semiosis--always *succeeds *that sign token, while >> anything that *antecedes *it pertains instead to its dynamical object >> (cf. EP 2:410, 1907). It seems to me that an interpreter's expectation, >> like an utterer's intention, is a determination of that individual >> quasi-mind by *previous *signs--not an interpretant of the sign that is >> *currently >> *being uttered and interpreted. The latter is a determination of the >> commens, "that mind into which the minds of utterer and interpreter have >> to be fused in order that any communication should take place" (SS >> 196-7, EP 2:478, 1906 Mar 9). >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Thu, Jul 16, 2026 at 12:34 PM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> Correction: Sorry! I meant dynamical interpretant (fat letters in the >> text below) >> Jon, List, >> I guess, the analysis, that AI processes symbols iconically, and does not >> have access to dynamical objects, is only correct as long as it merely >> crawls sites and posts in the internet. But what, if AI is connected with >> mechanical robots that interact in the real world, and have artificial eyes >> and ears? Maybe this already is so, maybe in Silicone Valley and China >> there are already some robots striding about? >> >> Purpose of a sign: I think, a sensible sign must have a purpose to exist >> (to be perceived). I don´t think, we can narrow "purpose" to play-impulse, >> habituation, reasonableness, and the quest for truth. I think, it may be >> just any purpose. The other requirement of a sign is, that it rings a bell, >> that it fits to an expectation. This is the requirement for any sign, while >> purpose is only a reqirement of a sensible sign. A sign, that does not have >> a purpose, but fits to an expectation, is not a sensible, but a false sign, >> like a theme conspiracy theorists use to have with numbers or faces in >> smoke clouds. A sign, that has a purpose, but the purpose is completely >> different from the expectation, and so from the interpretation too, is also >> a false sign, but may be corrected in the following semiosis, other than a >> purposeless sign, whose interpretant, and retrospectively it itself, only >> can be discarded. >> >> In any case, this expectation is a part of the *dynamical* interpretant, >> because it cannot be a part of the other two in any case, and neither a >> part of the object. But this would mean, that a part of the *dynamical* >> interpretant pre-exists. >> >> Best, Helmut >> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or >> "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. 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