Gary R., List: The question in bold below is the subject of a new paper that Vincent Colapietro just published online <https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/76328/50654> in *Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia*, entitled "C. S. Peirce’s Radically Heuristic Conception of Inquiry: Futural Endeavors, Substantive Discoveries, and Sublime Play." As he explains in the text itself, "What I mean by a radically *heuristic *account of inquiry is one in which inquiry is undertaken *for the sake of inquiry*, and this implies that it is undertaken for the sake of the *growth* of inquiry and, by implication, the growth of understanding." Here is the full abstract.
In a late manuscript (MS 283 [1906]), Peirce addressed the question, "What are signs for, anyhow?" and raised the possibility that they have no purpose other than being instruments of a *Spieltrieb *(a play-impulse). Peirce however rejected this view and proposed a rival one: signs ultimately serve habituation, the processes by which habits, especially ones more finely and fully attuned to the circumstances of our lives, are formed. But the exercise of our most reliable habits generates sequences of signs apparently displaying a life of their own (e.g., witness the history of science or indeed that of culture). That is, the operation of habits itself seems to be in the service of the generation of novel signs, the furtherance of open-ended processes, destined to transform even some of our most settled habits. Closely connected to this, Peirce appears to slight the monumental achievements of experimental inquiry, treating them as merely the ashes of what was once living science; in effect, he denies their contemporary salience to experimental inquiry. For these and other reasons, the author explores the extent to which inquiry for inquiry’s sake might be seen as an instance of pure play, having its purpose solely in its own perpetuation. While this radically heuristic conception of pure inquiry needs to be qualified, an appreciation of it might require a revision of how the relationship between habits and semiosis is to be understood (a revision in which neither is subordinated to the other). However, it seems to me that there is an important difference between inquiry for *its own* sake and inquiry for the sake of increased *understanding*. Peirce himself identified the growth of *concrete reasonableness* as the *summum bonum*, the ideal end toward which the entire universe is tending asymptotically (though not monotonically). Accordingly, I suggest that the proper end of inquiry is increased *knowledge*, i.e., adopting true beliefs--affirming only those propositions whose dynamical objects are realities, such that the corresponding habits of conduct would not be confounded by any possible future experience. "The purpose of every sign is to express 'fact,' and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the *perfect Truth*, the absolute Truth ... [which] is the ultimate interpretant of every sign" (NEM 4:239-40, EP 2:305, 1901). As I have said before, this is what makes logic as semeiotic a *normative *science--it identifies the principles to which any sincere inquiry *ought *to conform. "In logic, it will be observed that knowledge is reasonableness; and the ideal of reasoning will be to follow such methods as must develop knowledge the most speedily" (CP 1.615, EP 2:255, 1903). With that in mind, it seems noteworthy that the dynamical objects of all the signs that "AI" systems generate are *other signs*. Tracing the entire chain of those signs back far enough would *eventually *reach dynamical objects that *humans *actually experienced and then represented in their writings, thereby providing the texts on which the "AI" systems were "trained." However, as Ulysses has pointed out, the latter are always and only processing those symbolic signs *iconically*; and as a doubly degenerate sign, an icon "gives no assurance that any such object as it represents really exists" (NEM 4:242-3, EP 2:307, 1901). Consequently, as I have said before, "AI" systems cannot *verify *the truth of any given sentence apart from probabilistically comparing it with a massive collection of *other *sentences, so it is no wonder that they sometimes suffer from "hallucinations" that produce false or misleading responses to prompts. They lack the "outward clash" that causes the irritation of doubt when our belief-habits *are *confounded by *actual *experience with reality, thereby prompting inquiry. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Jul 13, 2026 at 10:27 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary F., List,. > > Your examples of the surgical robot and the climate-monitoring AI are > especially helpful in that they help make concrete what we've been > discussing somewhat abstractly. From a Peircean point of view, a crucial > consideration is *that inquiry remains answerable to reality*. Whether > the relevant observations come through human perception, scientific > instruments, robotic and other sensors, or some future combination of these > (and who knows what else?)* reality continues to constrain inquiry* by > resisting inadequate interpretants and interpretations and supporting > better ones. Human collateral experience no doubt remains paradigmatic, > but it is conceivable that future AI systems might participate more > directly in the larger web of observations through which communities of > inquiry remain connected to the world. So, perhaps we differ a bit here > (that is, *should* humanity, let alone life-valuing inquiry survive the > onslaught of planet degrading activity by the 'masters of destruction' -- > you know whom I mean). > > Which brings us to your related question of *alignment*. For even if > future AI systems were to become increasingly integrated into inquiry > through richer forms of interaction with reality, the normative question > would still remain: *To what ends is inquiry directed?* That returns us > to Peirce's architectonic where logic ultimately depends upon ethics and > ethics upon esthetics. (There's much more to be said here, but I happen to > be on vacation in the Finger Lakes district of New York State.) > > Suffice it to say that I too radically distrust "the small group of > owners and developers of AI [who] have purposes which are clearly *out* of > alignment with the purposes and the well-being of life on earth *including > the rest of humanity*." And I too am frankly horrified by AI's "energy- > and water-sucking data centers." As for the first, the "filthy rich" > owners of AI: they already own so much and control so much of what has > become destructive of humanity and the planet that AI would appear to be > just another 'add on' to their greedy lust for wealth and power *if *it were > not for the second, the already horrific waste of energy and water of their > data centers. While I personally think AI is 'here to stay', I personally > fear for humanity's and the planet's future. > > Best, > > Gary R >
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