Vincent, Jon, Gary F, List,
I agree, Vincent, that "the recent papal encyclical might be one of the
best formulations of the stakeholders in the debates swirling around the
development of AI." [see: *M**agnifica Humanitas* (On Safeguarding the
Human Person in the Time of Artificial Intelligence),
https://www.vatican.va/content/leo-xiv/en/encyclicals/documents/20260515-magnifica-humanitas.html
]
I recently read sections of two chapters of the encyclical which a friend
recommended as perhaps being at the heart of Pope Leo's epistle, namely,
Chapter 3 ("Technology and Dominance") and Chapter 4 ("Truth, Work,
Freedom"). Chapter 5, "The Culture of Power and the Civilization of Love,"
also appears relevant to our discussion although I haven't yet read it.
Chapters 3 and 4 develop many of the themes we've recently been discussing
on Peirce-L: the primacy of the human person, the social purposes
technology *ought* to serve, and the problematic concentration of
technological power in the hands of a very few persons and corporations
seemingly much more interested in amassing wealth and power than in
contributing to the common good. Some topics which we haven't much
discussed -- truth in consideration of democratic dialogue, how AI might
affect the dignity of work, and the ethical governance of AI -- are
discussed at length in the pope's letter. Interestingly, the encyclical
doesn't present AI itself as the principal problem; indeed, one section is
even titled "A valuable tool that requires vigilance."
I might note that the environmental costs of AI, regarding which several
forum members (including me) have commented, have themselves become objects
of inquiry, some research pointing to ongoing work on more energy-efficient
practices (such as liquid cooling and so-called 'closed-loop' water
systems). Whether such likely (in my opinion) advances in engineering are
developed to serve human and ecological ends is, from a Peircean
standpoint, a normative one: *What kinds of persons and human communities
are we cultivating; do we want to cultivate*? And, given the assault on
democracy in the USA and many places in the world, will we even be able to
create the conditions for the cultivation of such communities?
In that regard, your reminding us, Vincent, that the emotional interpretant
cannot sensibly be eliminated seems to me to be of quintessent importance.
If inquiry is mediated by lived, *qualitative* experience, then AI should
not simply be evaluated by its computational capability no matter how fully
developed; no matter how powerful. The deeper question is how AI *ought* to
function within communities whose research is grounded in human experience,
human feeling, and communal responsibility.
Best,
Gary R
On Mon, Jul 20, 2026 at 6:14 AM Gary Richmond <[email protected]>
wrote:
> Note: This message from Vincent Colapietro seems intended for the List. GR
>
>
> The point re *how* anything is experienced seems to be of the most
> pressing importance. I am reminded of a remark by Wm James in *MT*: "It
> is quite true that the abstract word 'how' hasn't the same meaning as the
> abstract *word* 'what,' but in this universe of concrete facts you cannot
> keep hows and whys asunder" (*Pragmatism and MT*, Harvard, p. 275 [109]).
> What anything is, for us, is inseparable from both how it is encountered
> and how *it *discloses itself. Moreover, attention to mediation is no
> less pressing and important. What I want to hold onto, with utmost
> tenacity, is that our experience is itself a medium of disclosure (no one
> is better on this than John E Smith, though Joe is of course equally
> forceful and illuminating on it). To bring coal to Newcastle, the respects
> and degree to which mediating factors are at play in experience call for
> critical attention (you and the other participants on this exchange are
> clearly on this). But what I want to stress is that the emotional
> interpretant is ineliminable in a sequence of interpretants. Our experience
> of the world is mediated by feelings or affectivity (at least according to
> CSP). How feelings are named, interpreted, conceived, etc. of course adds
> to the complexity of this fact about experience, but affective mediation as
> an irreducible dimension of human experience seems, to me at least,
> important to consider in re to AI.
>
> As odd as it might sound, the recent papal encyclical might be one of the
> best formulations of the stakeholders in the debates swirling around the
> development of AI.
>
>
>
> Vincent Colapietro
> The Center for the Humanities
> Swan Hall, 175G
> 60 Upper College Road
> University of Rhode Island (URI)
> Kingston, RI 02881
>
> Liberal Arts Research Professor Emeritus
> Philosophy & African American Studies
> Pennsylvania State University
> University Park, PA
>
>
>
> On Sat, Jul 18, 2026 at 8:40 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
>> Vincent, Jon, Gary F, List,
>>
>> Vincent, you are quite right that I was merely making explicit what has
>> long been implicit -- and often enough *explicit* --in your work. It
>> was certainly not my intention to suggest otherwise.
>>
>> If, as Peirce argues, intelligence learns from experience, then we need
>> to ask not only what counts as experience, but also *how experience is
>> mediated within communities of inquiry*. Scientific experience, after
>> all, is not merely that of isolated individuals because the fruits of those
>> experiences are continually evaluated and disseminated through communal
>> practices: conference papers, books, lectures, etc.
>>
>> This tends to sharpen the AI question (at least for me). Even if AI
>> systems do not themselves 'have experience', they may still 'participate'
>> in inquiries whose experiential grounding remains thoroughly human and
>> communal. If that is so, then the normative question becomes increasingly
>> important: It is not simply what AI systems can do, but what are the ends
>> of its participation in inquiry, Jon's concern in initiating this thread.
>> In my view, technology ought to assist in deepening inquiry and, so,
>> contributing to human flourishing, not merely by accelerating computation,
>> and *certainly not* by concentrating power. In my view, the jury is
>> still out on the role and value of AI.
>>
>> Again, like Gary Fuhrman, I am deeply concerned that the development of
>> AI is largely being directed by a small number of individuals and
>> corporations whose priorities seem not at all aligned with the broader
>> well-being of humanity or the planet. And I tpp am deeply troubled by the
>> enormous energy and water demands of contemporary AI data centers.
>>
>> So, perhaps the most important question regarding AI may be whether its
>> future development will be governed primarily by commercial interests or by
>> a commitment to human flourishing and ecological responsibility.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>> On Sat, Jul 18, 2026 at 12:05 PM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon, List,
>>>
>>> having thought about "expectation", and what you wrote, which of course
>>> is correct, I have come to this temporary conclusion:
>>>
>>> Premisses:
>>>
>>> 1. (not necessarily true): Expectation, which antecedes the sign, is
>>> such an essential requirement for a sign, that it must be a part of the
>>> sign triad, otherwise Peirce´s method of mostly leaving the interpreter
>>> out
>>> of consideration would not be justified.
>>> 2. Everything that antecedes the sign token pertains (...) to the
>>> dynamical object (your post).
>>>
>>> Conclusion: The interpreter´s expectation belongs to the dynamical
>>> object. Now this case:
>>>
>>> Somebody is looking at a cloud and sees a face in it, of somebody he
>>> knows.
>>>
>>> Before, we were talking about the (necessary) purpose of a sign. But
>>> what is the sign in this case? Is it the assumed similarity between the
>>> cloud and the face? I guess so, because if it were the cloud, it would not
>>> have a purpose, just a reason, which is chance due to chaotic turbulence.
>>> So I guess, the cloud is not the sign, so is the cloud what people (Peirce
>>> too?) call "sign vehicle"? But the assumed similarity is the interpretant
>>> too. Are sign and interpretant identical in this case? It cannot be the
>>> similarity (without "assumed"), because then it neither would have a
>>> purpose.
>>>
>>> Best, Helmut
>>> 17. Juli 2026 um 00:17
>>> "Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected]>
>>>
>>> Helmut, List:
>>>
>>> I already quoted Peirce's explicit statements that *every *sign's
>>> purpose is to express fact and *every *sign's ultimate interpretant is
>>> the Truth. Anyone is welcome to disagree with him about this, but it is
>>> fully consistent with his speculative grammar, in which every sign has a
>>> *final
>>> *interpretant in the sense of a final cause--the effect that it *would *have
>>> under ideal circumstances, including the shared beliefs of an indefinite
>>> community after unlimited investigation. It is also fully consistent with
>>> what he called "the Meliorist view" of human knowledge in a
>>> still-unpublished manuscript.
>>>
>>>
>>> CSP: [T]here are in the first place certain real facts, which are as
>>> they are quite independently of what you or I or any man may think about
>>> them. Secondly, truth, being the agreement of our assertions with those
>>> facts, is something definitely one way, and not otherwise. Thirdly,
>>> observation and reflection, stimulated by an eager desire to ascertain that
>>> truth, gradually lead minds toward it, so that, though ignorance and error
>>> always remain in reference to each question, yet they become gradually
>>> dispelled. (R 953, c. 1897)
>>>
>>>
>>> The dynamical interpretant--any effect that a sign token *does *have in
>>> an actual event of semiosis--always *succeeds *that sign token, while
>>> anything that *antecedes *it pertains instead to its dynamical object
>>> (cf. EP 2:410, 1907). It seems to me that an interpreter's expectation,
>>> like an utterer's intention, is a determination of that individual
>>> quasi-mind by *previous *signs--not an interpretant of the sign that is
>>> *currently
>>> *being uttered and interpreted. The latter is a determination of the
>>> commens, "that mind into which the minds of utterer and interpreter
>>> have to be fused in order that any communication should take place" (SS
>>> 196-7, EP 2:478, 1906 Mar 9).
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>
>>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2026 at 12:34 PM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Correction: Sorry! I meant dynamical interpretant (fat letters in the
>>> text below)
>>> Jon, List,
>>> I guess, the analysis, that AI processes symbols iconically, and does
>>> not have access to dynamical objects, is only correct as long as it merely
>>> crawls sites and posts in the internet. But what, if AI is connected with
>>> mechanical robots that interact in the real world, and have artificial eyes
>>> and ears? Maybe this already is so, maybe in Silicone Valley and China
>>> there are already some robots striding about?
>>>
>>> Purpose of a sign: I think, a sensible sign must have a purpose to exist
>>> (to be perceived). I don´t think, we can narrow "purpose" to play-impulse,
>>> habituation, reasonableness, and the quest for truth. I think, it may be
>>> just any purpose. The other requirement of a sign is, that it rings a bell,
>>> that it fits to an expectation. This is the requirement for any sign, while
>>> purpose is only a reqirement of a sensible sign. A sign, that does not have
>>> a purpose, but fits to an expectation, is not a sensible, but a false sign,
>>> like a theme conspiracy theorists use to have with numbers or faces in
>>> smoke clouds. A sign, that has a purpose, but the purpose is completely
>>> different from the expectation, and so from the interpretation too, is also
>>> a false sign, but may be corrected in the following semiosis, other than a
>>> purposeless sign, whose interpretant, and retrospectively it itself, only
>>> can be discarded.
>>>
>>> In any case, this expectation is a part of the *dynamical*
>>> interpretant, because it cannot be a part of the other two in any case, and
>>> neither a part of the object. But this would mean, that a part of the
>>> *dynamical* interpretant pre-exists.
>>>
>>> Best, Helmut
>>>
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