Gary R., List: GR: First, I do not think that every object possesses an 'unchangeable core identity.' That seems to introduce a fixed essence where, as I see it, continuity itself may be a sufficient explanation. For example, I remain the same person from one day to the next, and not because something immutable underlies my various 'changes' (Phillip drunk today, sober tomorrow in Peirce's famous example), but because my present condition is historically and bodily (indexically?) continuous with my earlier states. This is to say that *identity* may consist in the *continuity of an ongoing history*. I would be very interested to read Jon's take on this matter.
My take on this matter is along similar lines. Here is the passage where Peirce employs the example of Phillip drunk vs. Phillip sober. CSP: Time is that diversity of existence whereby that which is existentially a subject is enabled to receive contrary determinations in existence. Phillip is drunk and Phillip is sober would be absurd, did not time make the Phillip of this morning another Phillip than the Phillip of last night. The law is that nothing dyadically exists as a subject without the diversification which permits it to receive contrary accidents. (CP 1.494, c. 1896) Accordingly, identity is the dyadic relation between "that which is existentially a subject" and itself, regardless of any "contrary determinations" that it receives at different moments in time. Put another way, identity consists in a bundle of habits having a continuity of reactions; and I agree with Vincent Colapietro's remarks about the latter in his 1989 book, *Peirce's Approach to the Self: A Semiotic Perspective on Human Subjectivity*. VC: Existence is the mode of being of an individual substance considered as a continuity of *reactions*; insofar as it is *actually *reacting against other things, it exists. Persistence is the mode of being of such a substance seen as a *continuity *of reactions; insofar as it endures throughout a series of reactions, it persists. In other words, existence (because it is an instance of opposition) designates the aspect of 2ns exhibited by any individual substance, while persistence (because it is a case of continuity) designates one of the ways in which it manifests 3ns. (p. 83) Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Sep 29, 2026 at 6:02 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Helmut, Jon, List, > > Before turning to the details, I want to thank you, Helmut, for > introducing and developing this topic. It has led me to think again about > how semiosis operates in relation to real-world experience -- something I > haven't considered in quite this way or with this intensity for a long > time. > > I think your analysis has several strengths. Your distinction between > *parallel > signs* and *subsequent signs* seems right as different communities may > indeed attend simultaneously to different aspects of the same object, while > subsequent semioses may enter into an object’s developing history. I also > agree that every kind of generality needn't be called a symbol: that crow > that repeatedly drops walnuts onto a hard surface to break it open has > acquired a practical habit. That habit, while obviously not verbally > symbolized still, in Peirce’s broader sense, functions through a *general > habit* such that the crow’s learned behavior has at least a symbol-like > dimension (although I'm uncertain as to whether that's the optimal way to > express it). > > I have a few reservations regarding some of your other remarks. First, I > do not think that every object possesses an 'unchangeable core identity.' > That seems to introduce a fixed essence where, as I see it, continuity > itself may be a sufficient explanation. For example, I remain the same > person from one day to the next, and not because something immutable > underlies my various 'changes' (Phillip drunk today, sober tomorrow in > Peirce's famous example), but because my present condition is historically > and bodily (indexically?) continuous with my earlier states. This is to say > that *identity* may consist in the *continuity of an ongoing history*. I > would be very interested to read Jon's take on this matter. > > I also do not think that differences in immediate objects 'migrate via the > interpretant into the dynamical object'. Certainly a given interpretant can > *affect* conduct, and conduct may change the physical or social > situation. But the relation seems to me to be much more indirect: object > --> sign --> interpretant --> *conduct --> changed situation**.* Nothing > moves backwards from the immediate object into the dynamical object. but > semiosis can lead to conduct with which subsequent semiosis has to adapt to. > > There may also be counterexamples to what I see as too strict a > distinction between parallel and successive signs. One may interpret the > same museum specimen differently tomorrow without the specimen itself > changing -- successive signs needn't involve a changed dynamic object. On > the other hand, 'parallel' interpretations *may* bring about actions that > do change it. For example (although admittedly highly unlikely), the > biologist might analyze tissue samples as at the same time the museum > curator makes the decision to put the specimen on display concurrently with > the taxidermist completing his work. > > I think that there are counter-examples to your claim that every object is > a boundary object. Suppose I put a piece of quartz I find in a drawer and > never show it nor mention it to anyone. It remains an object but it does > not mediate between distinct social worlds. It makes more sense to me to > say that virtually any object *can become* a boundary object, but that it > does so only when it functions across different communities while retaining > an identity across their differing practices. Otherwise, it seems to me > that 'boundary object' would become just another name for 'object' so that > the concept of 'boundary object' loses its distinctive -- and potentially > useful -- meaning. > > Finally, I also question your claim that 1. an unchangeable core > identity, 2. interpretive differences entering subsequent dynamic objects, > and 3. every object being a boundary object can be established by deduction > alone. Certainly deduction can tell us *what follows if those assumptions > are accepted*, but not whether they adequately describe actual > experiences. Indeed, your own abductive and inductive procedure -- forming > the hypothesis and seeking counterexamples -- seems much more > methodologically Peircean. So, I would suggest a narrower conclusion: an > object may be differently represented while remaining identifiable as the > same object, but it becomes a boundary object only when different > communities recognize and use it within their respective communal practices. > > Best, > > Gary R >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
