Helmut, Jon, List, Before turning to the details, I want to thank you, Helmut, for introducing and developing this topic. It has led me to think again about how semiosis operates in relation to real-world experience -- something I haven't considered in quite this way or with this intensity for a long time.
I think your analysis has several strengths. Your distinction between *parallel signs* and *subsequent signs* seems right as different communities may indeed attend simultaneously to different aspects of the same object, while subsequent semioses may enter into an object’s developing history. I also agree that every kind of generality needn't be called a symbol: that crow that repeatedly drops walnuts onto a hard surface to break it open has acquired a practical habit. That habit, while obviously not verbally symbolized still, in Peirce’s broader sense, functions through a *general habit* such that the crow’s learned behavior has at least a symbol-like dimension (although I'm uncertain as to whether that's the optimal way to express it). I have a few reservations regarding some of your other remarks. First, I do not think that every object possesses an 'unchangeable core identity.' That seems to introduce a fixed essence where, as I see it, continuity itself may be a sufficient explanation. For example, I remain the same person from one day to the next, and not because something immutable underlies my various 'changes' (Phillip drunk today, sober tomorrow in Peirce's famous example), but because my present condition is historically and bodily (indexically?) continuous with my earlier states. This is to say that *identity* may consist in the *continuity of an ongoing history*. I would be very interested to read Jon's take on this matter. I also do not think that differences in immediate objects 'migrate via the interpretant into the dynamical object'. Certainly a given interpretant can *affect* conduct, and conduct may change the physical or social situation. But the relation seems to me to be much more indirect: object --> sign --> interpretant --> *conduct --> changed situation**.* Nothing moves backwards from the immediate object into the dynamical object. but semiosis can lead to conduct with which subsequent semiosis has to adapt to. There may also be counterexamples to what I see as too strict a distinction between parallel and successive signs. One may interpret the same museum specimen differently tomorrow without the specimen itself changing -- successive signs needn't involve a changed dynamic object. On the other hand, 'parallel' interpretations *may* bring about actions that do change it. For example (although admittedly highly unlikely), the biologist might analyze tissue samples as at the same time the museum curator makes the decision to put the specimen on display concurrently with the taxidermist completing his work. I think that there are counter-examples to your claim that every object is a boundary object. Suppose I put a piece of quartz I find in a drawer and never show it nor mention it to anyone. It remains an object but it does not mediate between distinct social worlds. It makes more sense to me to say that virtually any object *can become* a boundary object, but that it does so only when it functions across different communities while retaining an identity across their differing practices. Otherwise, it seems to me that 'boundary object' would become just another name for 'object' so that the concept of 'boundary object' loses its distinctive -- and potentially useful -- meaning. Finally, I also question your claim that 1. an unchangeable core identity, 2. interpretive differences entering subsequent dynamic objects, and 3. every object being a boundary object can be established by deduction alone. Certainly deduction can tell us *what follows if those assumptions are accepted*, but not whether they adequately describe actual experiences. Indeed, your own abductive and inductive procedure -- forming the hypothesis and seeking counterexamples -- seems much more methodologically Peircean. So, I would suggest a narrower conclusion: an object may be differently represented while remaining identifiable as the same object, but it becomes a boundary object only when different communities recognize and use it within their respective communal practices. Best, Gary R On Mon, Sep 28, 2026 at 10:58 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary, Jon, Ulysses, List, > > I guess, that "It retains enough indexical continuity, so to speak -- it > is *this particular specimen*--" (Gary) counts for all objects: Same but > different. And this is so not only with parallel signs' immediate objects, > but also with subsequent dynamical objects (like one day I am happy, next > day I am unhappy, and have cut my hair, but still am the same person). So > every object has an unchangeable core identity, like a person has. > > The difference between parallel and subsequent signs is, that in parallel > signs, differences of the object are merely in the immediate part, while in > subsequent signs they are in the dynamical part too, as the differences, > that with parallel signs are in the immediate object, subsequently migrate > via the interpretant into the dynamical object. > > Humans have the core identity symbolized (e.g. terms for something used to > sit on), but symbolization is not a prerequisite: Craws have a > not-symbolized concept of the method of cracking a walnut by letting it > drop on a hard surface. > > The differences are connotations, and often symbolical, indexical, or > iconical circularities, and/or due to induction or abduction, but (hardly? > Or never?) seldom due to pure deduction (deduction based on deducted > premisses, based on deducted premisses, (...), based on axioms, if such a > deduction might exist anyway besides in mathematics- another barrel to > open). > > And: Every object is a boundary object. > > These statements are just due to induction and abduction. Any > counterexamples? Or, how to prove them deductively? > > Best, > Helmut > > > 27. September 2026 um 01:48 > "Gary Richmond" <[email protected]> > *wrote:* > > Jon, Ulysses, List, > > Ulysses’ museum specimen seems an especially good example because the same > physical thing remains available to several communities while functioning > differently within each of them. Jon’s second account therefore carries > weight: biologists, museum administrators, and taxidermists bring different > habits of interpretation formed by different practices and different > collateral experience. No one has to retrospectively select a feature of > the object since what each notices is already conditioned by their prior > experience. > > Still, I wonder whether Jon’s two alternatives, "two possible ways of > accounting for different semiotic analyses of a particular sign token," > need be sharply separated. The same token -- the specimen -- may > participate in several sign types at once because -- as a biological > example, as an asset of a museum, and as an instance of taxidermic > technique -- *the physical token is constrained by different habits of > interpretation*. The token remains the same, while the immediate objects > differ. There may also be a sense in which the dynamical object also > differs: the species in the first case, the institutional value in the > second, and the preservation process in the third. Indeed, this may be > what makes it a boundary object: It retains enough indexical continuity, > so to speak -- it is *this particular specimen*-- to allow for > communication across communities while remaining malleable enough to enter > several different lines of inquiry, of semiosis. In a word, the communities > are not united by identical interpretations, but they are also not dealing > with wholly unrelated objects. > > I question treating collateral experience as another component added to > the specimen to form a kind of composite sign. Rather, it supplies the > prior acquaintance -- the collateral knowledge -- and the habits by which > the sign’s object can be identified and interpreted. To repeat: our three > interpreters do not first encounter an object and then simply freely select > certain qualities. Rather, their training has already formed different > interpretive habits. > > So, while I agree with the central point of Jon’s #2 I'd allow something > of #1 as well. Different dynamical interpretants arise from different > semiotic histories, yet those histories may also determine the specimen as > a token of different sign types offering different immediate objects and, > perhaps, even different -- though overlapping -- dynamical objects. That is > to say that the “sameness” of a boundary object may itself be, shall we > say, *semeiotically layered* rather than just 'given'. > > Best, > > Gary R > > On Sat, Sep 26, 2026 at 12:18 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Ulysses, List: > > As I understand it, Peirce's semeiotic requires collateral > experience/observation for *identifying *the object of a sign; an > interpreter must in some way already be acquainted with that object in > order to understand any sign that refers to it. With that in mind, I can > suggest at least two possible ways of accounting for different semiotic > analyses of a particular sign token, such as a taxidermic specimen at a > museum. > > 1. The *dynamical *object is the same in all cases, but the *immediate > *object is different because the sign *type *is different in each > case; and since different sign types have different immediate and final > interpretants, it is not surprising that their sign tokens produce > different dynamical interpretants. > 2. The sign type is the same in all cases, such that its dynamical and > immediate objects are also the same, along with its immediate and final > interpretants; but the sign token determines different dynamical > interpretants in different interpreting quasi-minds because the latter have > been determined *previously *by different signs, resulting in > different habits of interpretation. > > Personally, I lean toward #2, which matches the colloquial description and > seems consistent with your hunch. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Sep 25, 2026 at 5:34 PM Ulysses <[email protected]> wrote: > > My understanding of a boundary object is something that means slightly > different but partially overlapping things for different communities and > thus can bring groups together but does not truly unite them. > > The example I am familiar with is a taxidermic specimen at a museum. For > biologists it might be a token exemplar of a species. For museum > administrators it might be valuable because of the relative rarity of > species and how it aligns with the museum’s mission. In this case it would > be sign of reputation or some social/normative value. For taxidermists > themselves, the very same specimen might be a sign of specific techniques > of animal preservation. > > I think examples like this bring about a few questions for Peircean > semiotics. While colloquially we say it is the same object, is the object > of the sign really the same in each of these cases? What is the sign in > each of these cases, and does it include what Peirce sometimes terms > collateral experience/collateral observation? For example do the different > rational communities bring different experiences to bear on the object > (based on their training) and form different composite signs (specimen + > collateral experience) which form the basis of different interpretants? > > It seems like each group is picking up on different iconic and indexical > qualities that coexist in the same object. Colloquially I would say they > form different interpretations of the same thing. The way I would normally > talk about it would include how individual acts of deliberation are > consciously choosing to focus on different aspects of the object. I am not > exactly sure how to square this with a language of interpretants where > interpretants are always the product of previous steps in process because > it seems like there are interpretative acts being made that single out what > qualities in the object are being attended to before the object is even > considered as a sign. > > My hunch would be that, through different training, people habituate their > individual minds to form different percepts when in contact with the same > object and this becomes the foundation of different perceptual judgements, > leading to different chains of semiosis. In this case it’s not that the > interpretant formed is reaching back in time and selecting the qualities in > the object but rather a long running chain of previous semiosis is already > forming different intermediate signs which become the inputs to the > different interpretants. > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or > "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go > to [email protected] . ► UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L > <[email protected]> . But, if your subscribed email account is > not your default email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE > PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben > Udell. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
