Have I posted twice a day? Sorry, I was careless, if so. Now is a new day here. My below post was a bit off-topic, sorry again, as my examples were about subsequent signs, but your example (taxidermic specimen) about parallel signs. But anyway, you, Jon, have explained, why with subsequent signs the dynamical objects are different ones, with a quote by Kelly Parker: The new DO includes the previous interpretant, as Kelly Parker wrote, or is the DO of the previous interpretant, as you wrote.
(Btw: I don´t understand, what the term "universe" has to do in Kelly Parker´s text. As a metaphor for a field of discourse, ok, but for a sign triad?? You won´t find the quote by scrolling down, as somebody always deletes the thread´s tail, I don´t know why, to save server capacity?).
Now, parallel signs too have DOs that include different previous interpretants, so I would say, these DOs too are different ones.
Best,
Helmut
Jon, Ulysses, List,
if the dynamical object is not material, but a concept, or e.g. an institution consisting of concepts, the dynamical object changes or is replaced due to the semiosis, e.g. a debate including resolutions. Some connotations cease to exist (e.g. that a state´s government always is a monarchy), and others come into being (e.g. that a parliament is in charge for decisions). The dynamical object "axe", if it would have remained the same, would still have a flintstone blade. Ok, a government still governs, and you might say, that "axe" is not aboute the blade material, but about the way of handling it, and what it does and how... The computers, that calculated the first journey to the moon, were not machines, but persons, mostly women. "Intelligence", before the first machine-computer, was not connected with machines. Smart experts said, that a self-running steam engine could never be, because machines lack the "elan vital" only persons have. Until a boy, working in a mine, connected the valve and a moving part of the machine with a piece of string.
Best,
Helmut
26. September 2026 um 18:17
"Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected]>
wrote:Ulysses, List:
As I understand it, Peirce's semeiotic requires collateral experience/observation for identifying the object of a sign; an interpreter must in some way already be acquainted with that object in order to understand any sign that refers to it. With that in mind, I can suggest at least two possible ways of accounting for different semiotic analyses of a particular sign token, such as a taxidermic specimen at a museum.
- The dynamical object is the same in all cases, but the immediate object is different because the sign type is different in each case; and since different sign types have different immediate and final interpretants, it is not surprising that their sign tokens produce different dynamical interpretants.
- The sign type is the same in all cases, such that its dynamical and immediate objects are also the same, along with its immediate and final interpretants; but the sign token determines different dynamical interpretants in different interpreting quasi-minds because the latter have been determined previously by different signs, resulting in different habits of interpretation.
Personally, I lean toward #2, which matches the colloquial description and seems consistent with your hunch.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
On Fri, Sep 25, 2026 at 5:34 PM Ulysses <[email protected]> wrote:
My understanding of a boundary object is something that means slightly different but partially overlapping things for different communities and thus can bring groups together but does not truly unite them.The example I am familiar with is a taxidermic specimen at a museum. For biologists it might be a token exemplar of a species. For museum administrators it might be valuable because of the relative rarity of species and how it aligns with the museum’s mission. In this case it would be sign of reputation or some social/normative value. For taxidermists themselves, the very same specimen might be a sign of specific techniques of animal preservation.I think examples like this bring about a few questions for Peircean semiotics. While colloquially we say it is the same object, is the object of the sign really the same in each of these cases? What is the sign in each of these cases, and does it include what Peirce sometimes terms collateral experience/collateral observation? For example do the different rational communities bring different experiences to bear on the object (based on their training) and form different composite signs (specimen + collateral experience) which form the basis of different interpretants?It seems like each group is picking up on different iconic and indexical qualities that coexist in the same object. Colloquially I would say they form different interpretations of the same thing. The way I would normally talk about it would include how individual acts of deliberation are consciously choosing to focus on different aspects of the object. I am not exactly sure how to square this with a language of interpretants where interpretants are always the product of previous steps in process because it seems like there are interpretative acts being made that single out what qualities in the object are being attended to before the object is even considered as a sign.My hunch would be that, through different training, people habituate their individual minds to form different percepts when in contact with the same object and this becomes the foundation of different perceptual judgements, leading to different chains of semiosis. In this case it’s not that the interpretant formed is reaching back in time and selecting the qualities in the object but rather a long running chain of previous semiosis is already forming different intermediate signs which become the inputs to the different interpretants.
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