Evgenii, List, Thanks for posting a link to your paper. When I clicked on the blue portion of the link I wasn't taken to your paper but to Preprints.org. Later I cut and pasted the entire hyperlink (including that which was not shaded blue) and got to a page with a link to your paper. Just before doing that I looked for it on the internet by title and found that the complete hyperlink, https://www.preprints.org/manuscript/202603.0037 takes one directly to your paper.
Best, Gary R On Wed, Sep 30, 2026 at 6:50 AM Evgenii Rudnyi <[email protected]> wrote: > List, > > I could give you an example to discuss this issue - a burning candle. > Recently by using this example, I have discussed sophisticated > relationships between theoretical and experimental physics. It could be > interesting to analyze this in your terms. > > My starting point is Faraday's book "The Chemical History of a Candle" > (1861). This is a mixture of theory and experiments at the level of > chemistry and continuum mechanics. There are no words about atoms there. > Now there is statistical and quantum mechanics and new experiments > related to this example. Hence our understanding of what is going on in > the burning candle greatly expanded. It gives a good possibility to > discuss this development in semiotics terms. > > In my paper there are no equations, but general knowledge of physics is > still required. Provided there is interest and hence questions, I could > answer them here. > > Burning Candle and Levels of Organization, 2026, PREPRINTS.ORG, > doi:10.20944/preprints202603.0037.v1 > > Best wishes, > > Evgenii Rudnyi > > > Am 30.09.2026 um 01:01 schrieb Gary Richmond: > > Helmut, Jon, List, > > > > Before turning to the details, I want to thank you, Helmut, for > introducing > > and developing this topic. It has led me to think again about how > semiosis > > operates in relation to real-world experience -- something I haven't > > considered in quite this way or with this intensity for a long time. > > > > I think your analysis has several strengths. Your distinction between > *parallel > > signs* and *subsequent signs* seems right as different communities may > > indeed attend simultaneously to different aspects of the same object, > while > > subsequent semioses may enter into an object’s developing history. I also > > agree that every kind of generality needn't be called a symbol: that crow > > that repeatedly drops walnuts onto a hard surface to break it open has > > acquired a practical habit. That habit, while obviously not verbally > > symbolized still, in Peirce’s broader sense, functions through a *general > > habit* such that the crow’s learned behavior has at least a symbol-like > > dimension (although I'm uncertain as to whether that's the optimal way to > > express it). > > > > I have a few reservations regarding some of your other remarks. First, I > do > > not think that every object possesses an 'unchangeable core identity.' > That > > seems to introduce a fixed essence where, as I see it, continuity itself > > may be a sufficient explanation. For example, I remain the same person > from > > one day to the next, and not because something immutable underlies my > > various 'changes' (Phillip drunk today, sober tomorrow in Peirce's famous > > example), but because my present condition is historically and bodily > > (indexically?) continuous with my earlier states. This is to say that > > *identity* may consist in the *continuity of an ongoing history*. I would > > be very interested to read Jon's take on this matter. > > > > I also do not think that differences in immediate objects 'migrate via > the > > interpretant into the dynamical object'. Certainly a given interpretant > can > > *affect* conduct, and conduct may change the physical or social > situation. > > But the relation seems to me to be much more indirect: object --> sign > > --> interpretant --> *conduct --> changed situation**.* Nothing moves > > backwards from the immediate object into the dynamical object. but > semiosis > > can lead to conduct with which subsequent semiosis has to adapt to. > > > > There may also be counterexamples to what I see as too strict a > distinction > > between parallel and successive signs. One may interpret the same museum > > specimen differently tomorrow without the specimen itself changing -- > > successive signs needn't involve a changed dynamic object. On the other > > hand, 'parallel' interpretations *may* bring about actions that do change > > it. For example (although admittedly highly unlikely), the biologist > might > > analyze tissue samples as at the same time the museum curator makes the > > decision to put the specimen on display concurrently with the taxidermist > > completing his work. > > > > I think that there are counter-examples to your claim that every object > is > > a boundary object. Suppose I put a piece of quartz I find in a drawer > and > > never show it nor mention it to anyone. It remains an object but it does > > not mediate between distinct social worlds. It makes more sense to me to > > say that virtually any object *can become* a boundary object, but that it > > does so only when it functions across different communities while > retaining > > an identity across their differing practices. Otherwise, it seems to me > > that 'boundary object' would become just another name for 'object' so > that > > the concept of 'boundary object' loses its distinctive -- and potentially > > useful -- meaning. > > > > Finally, I also question your claim that 1. an unchangeable core > identity, > > 2. interpretive differences entering subsequent dynamic objects, and 3. > > every object being a boundary object can be established by deduction > alone. > > Certainly deduction can tell us *what follows if those assumptions are > > accepted*, but not whether they adequately describe actual experiences. > > Indeed, your own abductive and inductive procedure -- forming the > > hypothesis and seeking counterexamples -- seems much more > methodologically > > Peircean. So, I would suggest a narrower conclusion: an object may be > > differently represented while remaining identifiable as the same object, > > but it becomes a boundary object only when different communities > recognize > > and use it within their respective communal practices. > > > > Best, > > > > Gary R > > > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
