Thank you, Edwina
Actually, to give proper credit, this relation Psi/Phi was described by
Peirce himself in a letter to Keyser in 1908 (manuscript L 233 of Robin
Catalogue). There he describes the psi as the realm of habit breaking
("soul-stuff"), and the phi as the realm of habit taking ("matter").
I have just applied the idea to my solenoid, and found out that it works
fine.
Best,
Vinicius
2014-03-21 13:07 GMT-04:00 Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>:
> Excellent outline, Vinicius. I very much like your relationship between
> Psi and Phi
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> *From:* Vinicius Romanini <vinir...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Catherine Legg <cl...@waikato.ac.nz>
> *Cc:* Peirce List <Peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Friday, March 21, 2014 12:54 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign
> is ANYTHING called "a
>
> Dear Cathy,
>
> Yes, and I also remember us having a good milkshake for lunch that day.
>
> What I call the solenoid of semeiosis is a diagram of my understanding of
> the relations among the sign aspects. Topologically, the solenoid is torus
> that connects its end with its own beginning (like the ancient ouroboros,
> for instant). It is identical to the Moebius strip and Klein's bottle, all
> of them having this same property of turning around itself.
>
> I use the solenoid to explain my periodic table of classes of signs.
> Actually, I call it "periodic" for the single reason that the solenoid has
> periods.
>
> The best way to present my table would be as the form of a snail. It is
> presented in my website as a flat triangular figure because it makes easy
> to deal with it. I have a hard time explaining all this and usually the
> first question I get when people first see it is about the "holes" in the
> periodic table, which are there precisely because it is a 2D projection of
> a 3D figure. The mapa mundi also has holes (or deformities) due to the same
> reason.
>
> The solenoid is better understood if you choose a bottom-up analysis. The
> loops or periods represent habit formation among the aspects. The first
> loop, at the bottom, represents the "habit of habit breaking" (Psi), while
> the second represents the "habit of habit taking" (Phi). Together, these
> two loops express how the sign develops toward the final interpretant.
>
> When the habits of these two loops are balanced, we observe intelligence
> and life. It is what Peice calls the entelechy or the "perfect sign".
> If the habit of the loop Phi becomes too strong, it suffocates the period
> bellow and we observe the diminishing of the novelty in semeiosis, up to
> the point we have only cristalized spacetime (the vacuum, for instance). On
> the other hand, if the "habit of habit breaking" becomes predominant as to
> dissolve the "habit of habit taking", we have the rapid growth of entropy
> and homogenization (an explosion, for instance). In neither cases life and
> intelligence is possible. A gradient between the two extremes would account
> for anything we can observe.
>
> The same goes to the periods above.
>
> Using some formation rules, I was able to extract from the solenoid all 66
> possible classes of signs. It would be too complicated to explain it in
> this short outline, but you can have a hint of how it works by figuring out
> how I define the representamen (S, or the sign itself) caught in semeiosis.
> Whenever S and FI (final interpretant) are both qualities, we have
> qualisigns. Whenever both S and FI are secondness, we have sinsigns.
> Whenever both S and FI are thirdness, we have legisigns.
>
> Degenerations are acconted when we have different categories in S and FI.
> For instance, if S is thirdness and FI is secondness, we have replicas
> (wich are secondness of thirdness).
>
> With some similar rules, I correctly get Peirce's 10 genuine classes of
> signs in the same relation they appear in Peirce's famous triangle (they
> are pictured in bold in my periodic table), and then expand them to 66
> classes based on all their possible degenerations.
>
> Basically, that's what the solenoid is about.
>
> Vinicius
>
>
>
>
>
>
> 2014-03-21 5:20 GMT-04:00 Catherine Legg <cl...@waikato.ac.nz>:
>
>> Hi Gary!
>>
>>
>>
>> Thanks for this overview of the contemporary bio-semiotic landscape as
>> you see it. I find such synoptic thinking really helpful myself. I just
>> have a couple of scattered remarks.
>>
>>
>>
>> In Sao Paulo in November 2012 I went to a very interesting presentation
>> by Vinicius on his solenoid of semiosis. My understanding is that it is
>> considerably more complex than a simple spiral insofar as it draws on
>> Peirce's 'three threes' of sign-analysis (qualisign-sinsign-legisign,
>> icon-index-symbol, term-proposition-argument) which produce 9
>> possibilities. Its diagram was at least three dimensional on the screen if
>> I remember rightly. Perhaps Vinicius, who I understand is on the list, can
>> tell us more.
>>
>>
>>
>> Regarding your criticism of Edwina's view that, "it doesn't clearly
>> distinguish between semiosis and physical existence"
>>
>> How does one clearly distinguish between semiosis and physical existence?
>> J
>>
>>
>>
>> Cheers, Cathy
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Gary Fuhrman [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
>> *Sent:* Friday, 21 March 2014 4:44 a.m.
>>
>> *To:* biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
>> *Cc:* Peirce List
>> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is
>> ANYTHING called "a
>>
>>
>>
>> I think this discussion on the biosemiotics list has been very fruitful,
>> and would like to add a few metacomments which I'm also copying to peirce-l
>> because they relate directly to Peirce's logic and semiotics. By the
>> way, the subject line I've copied here comes from John Deely, and appears
>> to be truncated, but I've left it because it reminds me of a line from
>> Wallace Stevens: "Where was it one first heard of the truth? The the."
>>
>>
>>
>> First, I think a comparison of Deely's "spiral" of semiosis with Vinicius
>> Romanini's "solenoid of semiosis" would throw a lot of light on Peirce's
>> classification of signs. Both are represented in sets of youtube videos:
>> see
>>
>> http://www.youtube.com/view_play_list?p=E9651802BCDC14BF
>>
>> and http://www.minutesemeiotic.org/. Both of these, as far as I can
>> tell, adhere to the ethic of terminology which prescribes that once
>> somebody has named an identifiable phenomenon or concept, and that name has
>> been accepted *in that field*, future workers *in that field* should
>> maintain that usage of that term, for the simple reason that any
>> specialized field requires a consistent lexicon shared by all the workers
>> in that field. (However, nobody should expect such consistency to prevail
>> in other contexts, including interdisciplinary dialogues, where the terms
>> have to be explicitly defined or their usage inferred from the context.)
>> Within the field of Peircean semiotics, Deely and Romanini have been
>> working pretty much independently, as far as I know, and that's why the
>> comparison of "spiral" and "solenoid" should illuminate how Peircean
>> semiotics is evolving. I would not, however, recommend either of the above
>> to beginners in Peircean semiotics; they would be much better off to start
>> with the de Waal book on Peirce, in my opinion.
>>
>>
>>
>> The second metapoint I'd like to make, or reiterate, is that the products
>> of any analysis -- the "elements" identified by it -- are determined not only
>> by the inherent qualities of what's being analyzed, but also by the purpose
>> of the analysis. Peirce's analysis of semiotic phenomena is essentially a
>> *logical* analysis: starting with the traditional question of how
>> arguments work, he proceeded to analyze arguments into propositions,
>> propositions into subject and predicate (and copula), those elements of the
>> proposition into signs, etc. His aim was to make this analysis *as
>> elementary and as universal* as possible, so that it generates terms
>> capable of explaining how the most primitive forms of semiosis are related
>> to the most highly developed form, which is the argument. Part of that
>> explication relates human reasoning to the much more comprehensive "logic
>> of the universe" which we call the "laws of nature".
>>
>>
>>
>> On the biosemiotics list, we have at least two "semiotic" analyses which
>> differ from the Peircean because their purposes are different. One is
>> Howard Pattee's, and his purpose, as far as I can tell, is to restate (I
>> won't say "solve") the traditional "symbol-matter problem" *in physics*.
>> Since he limits himself to the specialized lexicon of physics, and has no
>> interest in logic (not even in the forms of reasoning employed by
>> physicists), he has no use for the Peircean analysis of signs, and
>> generalizes from this to the vociferously expressed opinion that
>> *biosemiotics* has no use for the minute Peircean analysis of semiosis.
>> (Yet, oddly enough, he also claims that his usage of the term "symbol" is
>> the same as Peirce's).
>>
>>
>>
>> The other analysis, also delivered quite vociferously, is Edwina
>> Taborsky's. She also insists that her analysis is Peircean to the core, but
>> I think she's just about the only one who believes this. As far as I can
>> tell, the purpose of her analysis is to work out a consistent
>> *pansemiotic* theory of the "organization of matter", using a
>> quasi-mathematical method. From what I've seen, her analysis is very clever
>> and does appear to be consistent. Personally I have found no use for it,
>> because to me it seems to be purely mathematical, i.e. hypothetical rather
>> than experiential. Mathematicians may well feel differently. Anyway I would
>> classify Taborskian pansemiotics as a separate and distinct branch of
>> theoretical biosemiotics, one that biologists in particular have little use
>> for, because it doesn't clearly distinguish between semiosis and physical
>> existence. One can't explain a special relationship between life and signs
>> on that basis, and that is the relationship that most biosemioticians are
>> interested in.
>>
>>
>>
>> I don't expect that either Edwina or Howard will accept my description of
>> their work, and that's fine, I only mention them to illustrate my point
>> that the products of analysis are partially determined by the purposes of
>> the analysis. I do think this is important for a basic understanding of
>> Peirce, because his analyses varied with *his* purposes. For instance,
>> sometimes his analysis of the proposition would "throw into the subject
>> everything that can be removed from the predicate", while at other times,
>> what
>> the predicate is depends on what we choose to consider as a subject.(This
>> wording is from the article by Francesco Bellucci on "Peirce's
>> Continuous Predicates" in *Transactions* 2013, no. 2, pp. 178-202.) I
>> think if we kept this in mind -- and recognized 'that it is no
>> inconsiderable art, this business of "phaneroscopic" analysis by which one
>> frames a scientific definition' (EP2:403) -- it would eliminate many
>> "logomachies" or terminological disputes which serve no useful purpose.
>>
>>
>>
>> gary f.
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Deely, John N. [mailto:jnde...@stthom.edu <jnde...@stthom.edu>]
>> *Sent:* 19-Mar-14 6:34 PM
>> *To:* biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
>> *Subject:* [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called
>> "a
>>
>>
>>
>> The "representamen" is not a relation, but one of three terms within or
>> "under" a single triadic relation, the one that serves as the sign-vehicle
>> (one of Peirce's terms, by the way). The "significate" (or object) may or
>> may not be an existential unit in itself: Napoleon as Emperor of the French
>> at one time was such an "existential unit in itself"; Hamlet as Prince of
>> Denmark never was. So there can often be a dyadic interaction with
>> resultant dyadic relation between representamen and significate.
>>
>> A relation I not an action but rather a suprasubjective
>> connection or link that arises from actions. The representamen as such is
>> such because of the postion it occupies in a given triadic relation; but
>> the representamen is indeed often a thing, like that red-colored octagon
>> with white markings commonly called "a stop sign". What doesn't represent
>> another than itself, insofar as it does not, is simply not actually a
>> representamen.
>>
>> It remains that what you call the "triadic sign" is the
>> consequent of one relation irreducibly triadic; whence there is no such
>> thing as "a non-triadic sign"; a system of signs indeed is a set of
>> relations; but a given "sign" is a set of terms united under one relation.
>>
>> (Try that video -- <
>> http://www.youtube.com/view_play_list?p=E9651802BCDC14BF> -- all five
>> parts, however.)
>>
>>
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -----------------------------
>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
>> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
>> BODY of the message. More at
>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> --
> Vinicius Romanini, Ph.D.
> Professor of Communication Studies
> School of Communications and Arts
> University of Sao Paulo, Brazil
> www.minutesemeiotic.org
> www.semeiosis.com.br
>
> Skype:vinicius_romanini
>
> ------------------------------
>
>
> -----------------------------
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm.
>
>
>
>
>
--
Vinicius Romanini, Ph.D.
Professor of Communication Studies
School of Communications and Arts
University of Sao Paulo, Brazil
www.minutesemeiotic.org
www.semeiosis.com.br
Skype:vinicius_romanini
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
