CORRECTIONS! I bothered to scroll down further on the page to which I
linked, and found the following topics AFTER "The Course of Research":
On Systems of Doctrine. On Classifications. On Definition and the
Clearness of Ideas. On Objective Logic. On the Uniformity of Nature.
The first three of those are parts of methodeutic, in cenoscopic
philosophy, and the last two concern metaphysics, or applications of
logic in metaphysics. So Peirce was discussing course of research as
a topic in methodeutic, seeking to generalize to a
cenoscopic-theoretical level from historical examples.
In a draft of "On Objective Logic", which gets into metaphysical
concerns, Peirce says,
The remaining three memoirs are of the nature of elucidations of
sound methodeutic by applying it in practice to the solution of
certain questions, which, although they do not belong to logic,
are of special interest in the discussion of logic.
There is only one memoir after "On Objective Logic" and that's "On the
Uniformity of Nature" raises there for Peirce the question of
nominalism vs. realism. That the topic is nature, and that such a
metaphysical question gets raised, strongly suggest that for him the
topic is in metaphysics.
Best, Ben
On 4/15/2014 12:11 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Jeffrey D., list,
I don't know if this is the sort of thing that you meant by a
genealogical approach, but I suddenly recalled Peirce's discussion of
the course of research near the end of his Carnegie application of
1902. http://cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-09.htm
Peirce evidently has paid some attention to a genetic or genealogical
approach.
Final Version - MS L75.389-390
MEMOIR 29
ON THE COURSE OF RESEARCH
Comparing the two wings of the special sciences, i.e.,
psychognosy and physiognosy, and taking the history of their
development as a basis, but correcting the history, as well as we
can, in order to make it conform to what good logic and good
economy would have made it, we get the idea of rational courses of
development which these branches might have followed. Between
these two there is a striking parallel; so that we can formulate a
general rational course of inquiry. Now passing to the study of
the history of special sciences, also modified by the same
process, we find some traces of the same law; or to express it
more clearly, it is as if the special science showed us one part
of the general scheme under a microscope. By successively
examining all the sciences in this way (or all I am sufficiently
able to comprehend), we can fill in details and make the general
formula more definite. We find here a succession of conceptions
which we can generalize in some measure, but which we find it
difficult to generalize very much without losing their peculiar
"flavors." These I call the categories of the course of research.
They have not the fundamental character of the categories of
appearance, but appear, nevertheless, to be of importance.
There are also a passage from Draft D and a long passage from Draft E
that goes into much more detail. The location of those discussions in
the Carnegie application - the last of the discussions of subject
matter - is consistent with the location of Science of Review, also
called Synthetic Philosophy, in his system. However, the discussion
suggests that he might be interested in generalizing some of the
discussion to methodeutical theory in cenoscopic philosophy
(philosophy as a class of Science of Discovery), and the location of
the discussion in the Carnegie application (which doesn't cover
metaphysics or the special sciences) is not too inconsistent with that.
Best, Ben
On 4/14/2014 9:06 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Jeffrey D., list,
For my part I don't have an opinion on whether Peirce should have
paid more attention to hermeneutics and genealogical thinking and
should have had a higher opinion of dialectics. Still, for what it's
worth, I've done a little text-searching in CP, W, and CN, and here
are some results.
Peirce did pay attention to dialectics, since he read plenty of Kant,
Hegel, and classical philosophers. He didn't think highly of it. He's
less harsh about Hegel's dialectics than about Royce's and those of
unnamed others. I can't find him commenting on Kant's dialectics.
From "A Guess at the Riddle", Chapter 1, (1886-7)
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/guess/guess.htm , EP
1:256, he says about Hegel :
[....] Finally Hegel's plan of evolving everything out of the
abstractest conception by a dialectical procedure, though far
from being so absurd as the experientialists think, but on the
contrary representing one of the indispensable parts of the
course of science, overlooks the weakness of individual man, who
wants the strength to wield such a weapon as that.
In a note added in 1893 (CP 5 Endnotes) to (CP 5.392) "The Fixation
of Ideas", Peirce classes Hegel's dialectic as belonging to the
method of inclinations, by which I think Peirce means the method of
the _/a priori/ _:
As for Hegel, who led Germany for a generation, he recognizes
clearly what he is about. He simply launches his boat into the
current of thought and allows himself to be carried wherever the
current leads. He himself calls his method _/dialectic/ _,
meaning that a frank discussion of the difficulties to which any
opinion spontaneously gives rise will lead to modification after
modification until a tenable position is attained. This is a
distinct profession of faith in the method of inclinations.
His criticisms of dialectics sometimes run along the line that it
involves pretending to doubt. In Peirce's review (1885) of Josiah
Royce's _The Religious Aspect of Philosophy _, CP 8.45, W 5:229:
[....] The modern dialectician (if he will pardon a touch of
exaggeration) would have such a man say to himself, Now I am
going to be sceptical, but only provisionally so, in order to
return to my faith with renewed conviction! But the whole history
of thought shows that men cannot doubt at pleasure or merely
because they find they have no positive reason for the belief
they already hold. [....]
On Socratic dialectic, in an unpublished version or outtake or the
like c.1900 of Peirce's review of Josiah Royce's _The World and the
Individual _, CP 8.110:
[....] For very seldom is anybody really convinced by the
Socratic style of dialectic. Rather point out to a man a new
fact, or one that he had overlooked; and then he himself, seeing
it to be pertinent, will straightway begin to revise his opinion.
[....]
As to hermeneutics (and exegetics) I can't find any instances of the
string hermeneu or the name Dilthey in Peirce's writings. He mentions
Schleiermacher a few times in passing. The string exege appears a few
times in passing. So maybe Peirce paid little attention to that
school or approach.
I'm not sure what you mean by the 'genealogical' approach unless you
mean in a history-of-ideas sense, Peirce once wrote to Dewey that a
'genetic' approach to teaching a science makes sense in teaching some
fields but is detrimental in others.
Best, Ben
On 4/13/2014 11:10 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
List,
This chapter on the philosophy of science breaks with the established pattern
of following Peirce's architectonic. Given the centrality of scientific
inquiry in his philosophical theory, there is good reason to devote a separate
chapter to this topic. When I compare Peirce's view to those developed by
other major philosophers, I can't help but wonder if Peirce has drawn the
boundaries of philosophical theorizing too narrowly. In his phenomenological
theory and in his normative sciences, so much attention has been devoted to the
philosophical foundations of the scientific method, that one might wonder if he
has paid too little attention to the kinds of questions that figure prominently
in the philosophical theories developed by the likes of Plato, Aristotle,
Aquinas, Kant, Heidegger, and others.
With these kinds of concerns in mind, let me try to frame two questions.
Peirce is trying to model philosophical inquiry on the scientific method. In
turn, the scientific method is itself the main focus of his philosophical
inquiries. Has the single minded focus on scientific method come at too high a
price? Has it caused him to pay too little attention to other methods:
dialectical, genealogical, hermeneutic? Has it caused him to pay too little
attention to other kinds of philosophical questions about morality, art, and
the like?
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Benjamin Udell [[email protected]
]
Sent: Sunday, April 13, 2014 8:46 AM
To:[email protected]
Subject: Re: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of
Science
Jeffrey, Sam, Jeff K., list,
