Jeff, List, Yes. It would appear that we are in agreement.
Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Thu, May 8, 2014 at 6:01 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Gary R., List, > > It appears that we are in agreement with respect to the answers to these > three questions. > > 1) Is it possible to characterize pure theoretical inquiry in terms of > any of those other alternate methods? No. > 2) Is all inquiry that is guided by those methods practically oriented > in the sense that the ends governing such inquiry have a finite time > horizon? Yes. > 3) Is the scientific method the only method that is grounded on the aim > of indefinitely continuing the tests needed to eliminate possible sources > of error--and a recognition that only the community of inquirers is > capable of carrying out such an aim? Yes. > > Like you, I don't think we will gain much insight into the argument of > Fixation by trying to identify one kind of inference or another with the > alternatives to the scientific method. All methods of inquiry employ all > three modes of inference. Only the scientific method, however, involves a > consistent application of the leading principles so that the conduct is > properly self-controlled. > > On my reading of the text, I think that an analysis of the possible > relations that can obtain between the leading principles, and the the ends > and incentives that regulate our conduct matters much for understanding the > argument. One advantage of interpreting the argument as an objection to > any attempt to ground inquiry on what Kant calls material practical > principles is that this approach articulates the necessary features of the > kind of self-control that is requisite for the success of the method. As > such, I think that Peirce's account of the connection between the leading > principle of induction and the idea of a long run is something that we can > understand in relation to the ends that govern inquiry. > > --Jeff > > Jeff Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > NAU > (o) 523-8354 > ------------------------------ > *From:* Gary Richmond [[email protected]] > *Sent:* Thursday, May 08, 2014 12:40 PM > *To:* Phyllis Chiasson > *Cc:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of > Science > > Phyllis, Jeff, list, > > It may be that one can imagine and number of ways in which the several > inference patterns figure in the non-scientific methods of fixing belief. > However, I don't think such associations are essential, or, for that > matter, very interesting--at least not to me. The attempt to definitively > link abduction/deduction/and induction to these methods seems to me to be a > Procrustean affair. After all, the employment of the three inferences > patterns in the method of science--and in the order abduction -> deduction > -> induction -- seems to me to represent the essence of the method of > inquiry which Peirce recommends throughout his life straight through to the > Neglected Arugment. > > Jeff wrote: > > How about if we ask a different kind of question. Given the > descriptions of the other methods for fixing belief, is there any real > difference between theory and practice? That is, if we consider the > arguments Peirce makes in the first lecture collected in RLT, is it > possible to characterize pure theoretical inquiry in terms of any of those > other methods? > > I'd say, no. I suppose it's possible to derive some theory out of a > reflection on what it means to be a good mother, Peirce's example in RLT, > and no doubt some psychologist, sociologist, cultural anthropologist, etc. > has done so. But if so one would hope that her inquiry followed the method > of science. Otherwise, as did Peirce, I have no doubt as to what > constitutes a good mother and I see no particular need to inquire further > into it. It is a settled belief for me (I have been able to observe a > rather large sample of good mothers in my life time beginning with my own). > > Or, is all inquiry that is guided by those methods practically oriented > in the sense that the ends governing the inquiry have a finite time > horizon? > > I'd say, yes. One has only to look at the history of ideas to see where > "inquiry" through these other methods led, and how long the results of such > "inquiry" lasted (I'm not talking about art or religion or such commonsense > notions as seem in no need of criticism). The exception may be the a priori > method--but even here, whatever good hypotheses might have been generated > by this method, authentic inquiry will require their testing, so we're back > to the method of science. > > On the basis of Peirce's account of induction, the validity of > particular acts of inductive inference requires of us we identify our > interests with the larger community of inquiry because only the community > is capable of continuing the tests needed to eliminate possible sources of > error. Only on the basis of such an identification will have have reason > to think that our answers will tend to converge on the truth. > > Exactly so, and it is this which is the theme of my part of the paper > Ben and I both recently referenced, mine centering on the 1878 "The > Doctrine of Chances." Only the scientific method allows for the necessary > *long > run* which might eliminate sources of error. > > Best, > > Gary R. > > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > > On Thu, May 8, 2014 at 2:54 PM, Phyllis Chiasson <[email protected]>wrote: > >> Gary, list: >> Here's how I see it: >> Authority & tenacity have to do with crude induction (on the part of the >> believer, if not the source). A priori depends upon a fixed >> (non-abductively derived) hypothesis (again upon the part of the believe, >> if not fhe source) and the method of science is retroduction. Each of the >> latter two requires gradual induction. >> >> Regards, >> Phyllis >> >> Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Ben, Frank, Gary F., List, >> >> I can't say that I see the 4 methods of fixing belief closely linked to >> the 3 patterns of inference nor the 3 categories. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R. >> >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> >> >> On Wed, May 7, 2014 at 1:18 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Frank, Gary F., Gary R., list, >>> >>> When I said that the method of opinion came to seem to me to consist in >>> authority trying to operate in a situation of the method of development of >>> opinion (the _*a priori*_), I meant that it came to seem to be a >>> composite method, a view that you suggest at one point in your post. >>> >>> At some point I was thinking of associating inference modes with the >>> method, only I did it a little differently. But unlike with other things >>> that I say below, I kept quiet at the time, because I had already discussed >>> the three unscientific methods of inquiry at length. >>> >>> You associated abductive inference with tenacity; inductive inference >>> with authority; and deductive inference with the _*a priori*_. I >>> 'switched' the partners of the first two. >>> >>> **Inductive inference and the method of tenacity.** I saw the method of >>> tenacity as involving a kind of misapplication of the method of learning >>> (not necessarily cognitive inquiry) by practice and repetition, which is >>> first of all a method of learning how to do things skillfully (practice >>> makes perfect). One keeps repeating one's opinion, as if to do so were a >>> gradual induction in support of it. But it's a willful induction indeed. >>> The opinion itself may be generated by any means, as long as it is one's >>> first opinion on the given subject, since to the extent that the opinion is >>> not initial, the method is not a method of persistence, repetition, willful >>> inertia. >>> >>> **Abductive inference and the method of authority/contest.** I had seen >>> method of authority as a species or phase of a method of struggle or >>> contest or vying, a phase such that one side becomes dominant. The method >>> of contest involves a kind of misapplication of the learning method of >>> trial and error (and variation), which is first of all a method of learning >>> how to struggle and develop character. In this mis-application, one tries >>> to impose one's opinion, as if to do so were an abductive inference >>> producing it ("I'm right because I'm gonna win!") - an abductive inference >>> is, after all, itself a kind of experimental trial, testing a >>> presupposition of one's capacity to guess; in the method of contest, the >>> test really is of one's capacity to win, but the winner's opinion wins too >>> on the view that _*might makes right*_. In the authoritarian phase, >>> most have joined, or acquiesced to, the winning side. But the winner's >>> might, even when not kinetically active, remains in place, holding others >>> down. The 'might' may be any kind of what the anthropologists have called >>> 'mana' - political and martial strength, wealth (funding etc.), glory and >>> charisma, and status. The opinion itself may have originally been reached >>> by whatever means. >>> >>> **Deductive inference and the method of _**a priori**_.** Before this >>> thread, I thought of the method of _*a priori*_ as the method of >>> contest/authority of glamour, charisma, etc., but now I think that at most >>> they intersect. In the method of a priori, an opinion is adopted, not >>> because it is the most popular or glamorous or hip opinion, but because it >>> is indeed to one's taste. It is a kind of mis-application of the learning >>> method of appreciation and emulation, better known as 'identification and >>> imitation', which is first of all a method of learning to value and >>> developing sensibiity. The opinion represents some values that one likes or >>> admires, or is the opinion of some figure whose values one likes or >>> admires, and adopts. It's not necessarily one's first opinion, instead it >>> is, if anything, one's latest opinion (not necessrily one's last and final >>> opinion), one's personal fad; this is the most hedonistic method, in which >>> opinion is not a weapon or a means, but a culminal pleasure itself, in >>> virtue of its content. That is, the method focuses on _*telos*_ as >>> culmination and ignores entelechy. Still, the shift of the apriori-arrived >>> opinion may be slow in time; and while it is personal, it is also social, >>> insofar as it involves freely chosen self-herding and emulation not only of >>> idealized models but of actual people. Peirce does discuss it in terms of >>> the development of intellectual fashion and taste of the public, not just >>> of the individual; and there may be fashion leaders and fashion followers. >>> One selects the opinion from among the various opinions on offer at the >>> buffet of the currents of thought. From its pleasantness and agreeability, >>> one infers as if by deduction its truth; or more precisely one likes and >>> expresses it as if the liking and expressing were a deduction, a necessary >>> inference, compelled not by authority or tenacity but by the current of >>> one's thought. It fits with one's other likings and is 'agreeable to >>> reason.' >>> >>> Well, I gave it a try. >>> >>> Best, Ben >>> On 5/7/2014 1:01 AM, Frank Ransom wrote: >>> >>> Gary F., Gary R., Ben, List, >>> >>> Gary F, I'm basically leaning on Liszka's scholarship. In his book, he >>> identifies the method of public opinion as a fifth method, positioned >>> between the method of authority and the method of the a priori (which >>> positioning Ben suggests as well). Having seen what you and Ben reference, >>> I suppose Liszka might have been mistaken. Then again, I find myself >>> agreeing with Ben that there seems to be something distinct about the >>> method of public opinion. As Ben also supposes, the method of consensus >>> might be a species of the method of the a priori. If the method of public >>> opinion is really about consensus, as it seems to me to be, then perhaps >>> Peirce replaced the method of public opinion or consensus with the method >>> of the a priori because the method of the a priori incorporates public >>> opinion or consensus while also covering other cases pertinent to the >>> fermentation of ideas. >>> >>> Personally, I suppose I would consider the method of public opinion, or >>> consensus, distinct from the method of the a priori, due mostly to the fact >>> that I have always considered the method of the a priori to be >>> characteristically a method pursued by a single mind like Plato, Descartes, >>> or Kant, sifting through ideas and ending with what they are inclined to >>> think must be the best answer to a given question or problem; while the >>> method of public opinion strikes me as more a matter of coherence, not so >>> much between ideas, but between the beliefs of the members of a community. >>> Thinking on it like this, I'm inclined to view the method of public opinion >>> as after, not before, the method of the a priori, since the method of >>> science will, in facing reality, inevitably lead to a consensus in the >>> community--the key difference between the method of public opinion and the >>> method of science consisting in the difference between what the community >>> is led to believe today versus what the community is destined to believe. >>> >>> But perhaps this makes the method of public opinion unduly overlap with >>> the method of authority. I have to admit that placing the method of public >>> opinion between the method of authority and the method of the a priori >>> appears more reasonable in light of this, since it shares in both the >>> community-orientation of the method of authority and the free play of ideas >>> in the method of the a priori. I think Peirce is himself not altogether >>> clear about how to properly characterize the method of public opinion, >>> whether it is a sort of softer approach to the method of authority, or >>> whether it is a kind of community approach to the comparing of ideas found >>> in the method of the a priori. >>> >>> Then again, I have wondered about what makes the three non-scientific >>> methods what they are, and I have something of an idea about them that I >>> offer for consideration. If considered from the standpoint of inference and >>> taking a hint from the division of the kinds of inference (which partially >>> makes sense, since methodeutic follows upon the work of critical logic), >>> the method of tenacity might be a strict adherence to one's abductions, the >>> method of authority might rely on enforced inductions (that is, involving >>> some rather brutal facts, pardon the wordplay), and the method of the a >>> priori might rely mostly on deduction, a comparing of ideas with one >>> another and their consistency or inconsistency with one another. This last >>> would certainly engender the coherence theory of truth, as Gary F suggests >>> the method of the a priori, considered as the method of consensus, would. >>> As for the method of public opinion, and its gradual metamorphosis into the >>> method of the a priori, I wonder whether it might originally have involved >>> some combination of two of the kinds of inference without the third, but >>> over time Peirce (probably not consciously) came to want to make each of >>> the three non-scientific methods as distinct from one another as possible, >>> leading to each one signifying a method primarily committed to one kind of >>> inference over the other two; whereas the method of science will involve >>> all three kinds working together. If my hypothesis has some truth to it, >>> then it should be possible to consider three methods, distinct from the >>> four identified in "The Fixation of Belief," that involve combinations of >>> two kinds of inference while minimizing the third. But this would probably >>> get a bit messy, as one would likely be inclined to see similarities >>> between examples of these hybrid methods with the other, simpler methods >>> and look to categorizing any given example of the hybrid methods as more or >>> less falling into one of the simpler methods (tenacity, authority, a >>> priori), or perhaps as a part of a larger example of the method of science. >>> >>> Whether this idea regarding the methods can be reconciled with Peirce's >>> discussion of just what makes the method of science what it is--direct >>> engagement with, and testing of, reality--I don't know. I suppose it can be >>> objected that the fact that the method of science deals with reality and >>> the idea that the method of science needs all three kinds of inference do >>> not have a clear connection with another. Also, it can be argued that the >>> other three methods really do use all three kinds of inference, or perhaps >>> at least two (as one might imagine that the a priori method involves not >>> only deduction but also abduction). Well, I admit that both objections are >>> reasonable. But the latter objection is a little weak, as it involves a >>> point about how to properly classify the methods, and I find that the >>> proper classification is the one that would lead to more fruitful results, >>> which I would maintain is associated more with my proposed approach (though >>> admittedly further inquiry is needed to prove it so). As to the former >>> objection, I have no way to meet it as of yet, but can only say that >>> because no connection is immediately apparent is no real argument against >>> there being such connection. So, I guess I'm just saying that there's room >>> for further reflection on the suggestion of associating the most basic >>> division of kinds of method with the reliance of a given kind of method >>> upon one or more of the modes or kinds of inference. >>> >>> --Franklin >>> >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm. > > > > > >
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