I have often referred to it implicitly and explicitly here on the list that the focus of my interest is sociology of knowledge. From this viewpoint the "Fixation of belief" is a incredibly important paper. Nevertheless i struggle with it.
I struggle with it because it downplays in my opinion the power of doubt. Real vivid doubt is like napalm. You don't get rid of it, it sticks on you and burns like hell. I strongly believe that people who have made a really disturbing experience, are in long run forced on the path of the method of science, because their mind has been opened to a different worldview. The other methods may cause temporal relief, but source of the pain is still there. The method of authority doesn't fix the belief of a person who doubts. Authority may shut the person up, it may drive a person into madness, because authority declares the experience made impossible, but it can't fix belief. It's the same with the a priori method. If one of your basic assumptions really has been shaken, no force on this earth will fix it again. Also tenacity brings relief only for some time. You can burry your head, but in some corner of you head your doubt is still alive and gnaws on your thought. Therefore i use Peirce against Peirce: If authority, a priori or tenacity makes you act again upon your doubted belief, then your doubt has not been real, it was a paper doubt. Why? Because the source of all doubt is, in my opinion, a real and vivid and powerful experience. That authority, tenacity or a priori makes you belief again, means nothing else than denying the reality of your own experience. >From my point of view the reason that the scientific method isn't the 'normal' >mode, is the power of belief and habit which prevents people from doubting. >Knowledge itself works as a constraint to experience. Other people can stare >at exactly the same point like us, but they don't see the same, because they >don't have the same knowledge. Foucault described this phenomenon with the >words: "Mendel said the truth, but he wasn't within the biological truth of >his time". Biologists had to learn to see like he has seen and had to learn >his methods. I think this can be brought inline with Peirce, since this means >just to give the others a recipe for making an experience. This is exactly the course of scientific education. You are thaught theories, classifications and practices. By getting used to them you start to see what the rest of the community already sees. But isn't your teacher an authority for you? Isn't a theory or classification some kind of a priori? Don't we need tenacity to test a theory again and again like the wasp in the bottle searches for an exit? (thanks Eugene for this interpretation!) But why should others use my recipe? I believe the only reason is just because they are open for new things - they follow some kind of ethos. This brings me back to my exchange with Cathy and Phyllis. We can expand our knowledge about natural things because they resist us. And if there is regularity, this regularity will show up if we stick to the same method. But i don't believe this works on matters of morality. There is nothing natural that resist us. Others may resist us like an authority in the Fixation of Believe, but the others can be wrong and hence don't function as a corrective. Or in other words: I can break the human law, but the natural law will break me. That's the reason why i think that the self correction hypothesis works on natural things and not on societal things like morals. This raises different questions for me: Do societal generals like beauty, madness or justice have the same ontological status like generals like energy, a meter or gravity? Isn't the only moral evil narrow mindedness? Isn't open mindedness not just another word for reasonables? Isn't reason the best answer to the question: How do we want to live together? If we answer these questions with 'yes', isn't then science the continuation of politics with different means? Isn't then the ethos of being open minded a priori to every aesthetics? This opens up a magic bermuda triangle between ethics, epistemology and sociology of knowledge where my ability to think forward regulary drowns. Best Stefan On 8. Mai 2014 21:40:29 MESZ, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: >Phyllis, Jeff, list, > >It may be that one can imagine and number of ways in which the several >inference patterns figure in the non-scientific methods of fixing >belief. >However, I don't think such associations are essential, or, for that >matter, very interesting--at least not to me. The attempt to >definitively >link abduction/deduction/and induction to these methods seems to me to >be a >Procrustean affair. After all, the employment of the three inferences >patterns in the method of science--and in the order abduction -> >deduction >-> induction -- seems to me to represent the essence of the method of >inquiry which Peirce recommends throughout his life straight through to >the >Neglected Arugment. > >Jeff wrote: > >How about if we ask a different kind of question. Given the >descriptions >of the other methods for fixing belief, is there any real difference >between theory and practice? That is, if we consider the arguments >Peirce >makes in the first lecture collected in RLT, is it possible to >characterize >pure theoretical inquiry in terms of any of those other methods? > >I'd say, no. I suppose it's possible to derive some theory out of a >reflection on what it means to be a good mother, Peirce's example in >RLT, >and no doubt some psychologist, sociologist, cultural anthropologist, >etc. >has done so. But if so one would hope that her inquiry followed the >method >of science. Otherwise, as did Peirce, I have no doubt as to what >constitutes a good mother and I see no particular need to inquire >further >into it. It is a settled belief for me (I have been able to observe a >rather large sample of good mothers in my life time beginning with my >own). > >Or, is all inquiry that is guided by those methods practically oriented >in >the sense that the ends governing the inquiry have a finite time >horizon? > >I'd say, yes. One has only to look at the history of ideas to see where >"inquiry" through these other methods led, and how long the results of >such >"inquiry" lasted (I'm not talking about art or religion or such >commonsense >notions as seem in no need of criticism). The exception may be the a >priori >method--but even here, whatever good hypotheses might have been >generated >by this method, authentic inquiry will require their testing, so we're >back >to the method of science. > >On the basis of Peirce's account of induction, the validity of >particular >acts of inductive inference requires of us we identify our interests >with >the larger community of inquiry because only the community is capable >of >continuing the tests needed to eliminate possible sources of error. >Only >on the basis of such an identification will have have reason to think >that >our answers will tend to converge on the truth. > >Exactly so, and it is this which is the theme of my part of the paper >Ben >and I both recently referenced, mine centering on the 1878 "The >Doctrine of >Chances." Only the scientific method allows for the necessary *long >run*which might eliminate sources of error. > >Best, > >Gary R. > > >*Gary Richmond* >*Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >*Communication Studies* >*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > >On Thu, May 8, 2014 at 2:54 PM, Phyllis Chiasson <[email protected]> >wrote: > >> Gary, list: >> Here's how I see it: >> Authority & tenacity have to do with crude induction (on the part of >the >> believer, if not the source). A priori depends upon a fixed >> (non-abductively derived) hypothesis (again upon the part of the >believe, >> if not fhe source) and the method of science is retroduction. Each of >the >> latter two requires gradual induction. >> >> Regards, >> Phyllis >> >> Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Ben, Frank, Gary F., List, >> >> I can't say that I see the 4 methods of fixing belief closely linked >to >> the 3 patterns of inference nor the 3 categories. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R. >> >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> >> >> On Wed, May 7, 2014 at 1:18 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> >wrote: >> >>> Frank, Gary F., Gary R., list, >>> >>> When I said that the method of opinion came to seem to me to consist >in >>> authority trying to operate in a situation of the method of >development of >>> opinion (the _*a priori*_), I meant that it came to seem to be a >>> composite method, a view that you suggest at one point in your post. >>> >>> At some point I was thinking of associating inference modes with the >>> method, only I did it a little differently. But unlike with other >things >>> that I say below, I kept quiet at the time, because I had already >discussed >>> the three unscientific methods of inquiry at length. >>> >>> You associated abductive inference with tenacity; inductive >inference >>> with authority; and deductive inference with the _*a priori*_. I >>> 'switched' the partners of the first two. >>> >>> **Inductive inference and the method of tenacity.** I saw the method >of >>> tenacity as involving a kind of misapplication of the method of >learning >>> (not necessarily cognitive inquiry) by practice and repetition, >which is >>> first of all a method of learning how to do things skillfully >(practice >>> makes perfect). One keeps repeating one's opinion, as if to do so >were a >>> gradual induction in support of it. But it's a willful induction >indeed. >>> The opinion itself may be generated by any means, as long as it is >one's >>> first opinion on the given subject, since to the extent that the >opinion is >>> not initial, the method is not a method of persistence, repetition, >willful >>> inertia. >>> >>> **Abductive inference and the method of authority/contest.** I had >seen >>> method of authority as a species or phase of a method of struggle or >>> contest or vying, a phase such that one side becomes dominant. The >method >>> of contest involves a kind of misapplication of the learning method >of >>> trial and error (and variation), which is first of all a method of >learning >>> how to struggle and develop character. In this mis-application, one >tries >>> to impose one's opinion, as if to do so were an abductive inference >>> producing it ("I'm right because I'm gonna win!") - an abductive >inference >>> is, after all, itself a kind of experimental trial, testing a >>> presupposition of one's capacity to guess; in the method of contest, >the >>> test really is of one's capacity to win, but the winner's opinion >wins too >>> on the view that _*might makes right*_. In the authoritarian phase, >most >>> have joined, or acquiesced to, the winning side. But the winner's >might, >>> even when not kinetically active, remains in place, holding others >down. >>> The 'might' may be any kind of what the anthropologists have called >'mana' >>> - political and martial strength, wealth (funding etc.), glory and >>> charisma, and status. The opinion itself may have originally been >reached >>> by whatever means. >>> >>> **Deductive inference and the method of _**a priori**_.** Before >this >>> thread, I thought of the method of _*a priori*_ as the method of >>> contest/authority of glamour, charisma, etc., but now I think that >at most >>> they intersect. In the method of a priori, an opinion is adopted, >not >>> because it is the most popular or glamorous or hip opinion, but >because it >>> is indeed to one's taste. It is a kind of mis-application of the >learning >>> method of appreciation and emulation, better known as >'identification and >>> imitation', which is first of all a method of learning to value and >>> developing sensibiity. The opinion represents some values that one >likes or >>> admires, or is the opinion of some figure whose values one likes or >>> admires, and adopts. It's not necessarily one's first opinion, >instead it >>> is, if anything, one's latest opinion (not necessrily one's last and >final >>> opinion), one's personal fad; this is the most hedonistic method, in >which >>> opinion is not a weapon or a means, but a culminal pleasure itself, >in >>> virtue of its content. That is, the method focuses on _*telos*_ as >>> culmination and ignores entelechy. Still, the shift of the >apriori-arrived >>> opinion may be slow in time; and while it is personal, it is also >social, >>> insofar as it involves freely chosen self-herding and emulation not >only of >>> idealized models but of actual people. Peirce does discuss it in >terms of >>> the development of intellectual fashion and taste of the public, not >just >>> of the individual; and there may be fashion leaders and fashion >followers. >>> One selects the opinion from among the various opinions on offer at >the >>> buffet of the currents of thought. From its pleasantness and >agreeability, >>> one infers as if by deduction its truth; or more precisely one likes >and >>> expresses it as if the liking and expressing were a deduction, a >necessary >>> inference, compelled not by authority or tenacity but by the current >of >>> one's thought. It fits with one's other likings and is 'agreeable to >>> reason.' >>> >>> Well, I gave it a try. >>> >>> Best, Ben >>> On 5/7/2014 1:01 AM, Frank Ransom wrote: >>> >>> Gary F., Gary R., Ben, List, >>> >>> Gary F, I'm basically leaning on Liszka's scholarship. In his book, >he >>> identifies the method of public opinion as a fifth method, >positioned >>> between the method of authority and the method of the a priori >(which >>> positioning Ben suggests as well). Having seen what you and Ben >reference, >>> I suppose Liszka might have been mistaken. Then again, I find myself >>> agreeing with Ben that there seems to be something distinct about >the >>> method of public opinion. As Ben also supposes, the method of >consensus >>> might be a species of the method of the a priori. If the method of >public >>> opinion is really about consensus, as it seems to me to be, then >perhaps >>> Peirce replaced the method of public opinion or consensus with the >method >>> of the a priori because the method of the a priori incorporates >public >>> opinion or consensus while also covering other cases pertinent to >the >>> fermentation of ideas. >>> >>> Personally, I suppose I would consider the method of public opinion, >or >>> consensus, distinct from the method of the a priori, due mostly to >the fact >>> that I have always considered the method of the a priori to be >>> characteristically a method pursued by a single mind like Plato, >Descartes, >>> or Kant, sifting through ideas and ending with what they are >inclined to >>> think must be the best answer to a given question or problem; while >the >>> method of public opinion strikes me as more a matter of coherence, >not so >>> much between ideas, but between the beliefs of the members of a >community. >>> Thinking on it like this, I'm inclined to view the method of public >opinion >>> as after, not before, the method of the a priori, since the method >of >>> science will, in facing reality, inevitably lead to a consensus in >the >>> community--the key difference between the method of public opinion >and the >>> method of science consisting in the difference between what the >community >>> is led to believe today versus what the community is destined to >believe. >>> >>> But perhaps this makes the method of public opinion unduly overlap >with >>> the method of authority. I have to admit that placing the method of >public >>> opinion between the method of authority and the method of the a >priori >>> appears more reasonable in light of this, since it shares in both >the >>> community-orientation of the method of authority and the free play >of ideas >>> in the method of the a priori. I think Peirce is himself not >altogether >>> clear about how to properly characterize the method of public >opinion, >>> whether it is a sort of softer approach to the method of authority, >or >>> whether it is a kind of community approach to the comparing of ideas >found >>> in the method of the a priori. >>> >>> Then again, I have wondered about what makes the three >non-scientific >>> methods what they are, and I have something of an idea about them >that I >>> offer for consideration. If considered from the standpoint of >inference and >>> taking a hint from the division of the kinds of inference (which >partially >>> makes sense, since methodeutic follows upon the work of critical >logic), >>> the method of tenacity might be a strict adherence to one's >abductions, the >>> method of authority might rely on enforced inductions (that is, >involving >>> some rather brutal facts, pardon the wordplay), and the method of >the a >>> priori might rely mostly on deduction, a comparing of ideas with one >>> another and their consistency or inconsistency with one another. >This last >>> would certainly engender the coherence theory of truth, as Gary F >suggests >>> the method of the a priori, considered as the method of consensus, >would. >>> As for the method of public opinion, and its gradual metamorphosis >into the >>> method of the a priori, I wonder whether it might originally have >involved >>> some combination of two of the kinds of inference without the third, >but >>> over time Peirce (probably not consciously) came to want to make >each of >>> the three non-scientific methods as distinct from one another as >possible, >>> leading to each one signifying a method primarily committed to one >kind of >>> inference over the other two; whereas the method of science will >involve >>> all three kinds working together. If my hypothesis has some truth to >it, >>> then it should be possible to consider three methods, distinct from >the >>> four identified in "The Fixation of Belief," that involve >combinations of >>> two kinds of inference while minimizing the third. But this would >probably >>> get a bit messy, as one would likely be inclined to see similarities >>> between examples of these hybrid methods with the other, simpler >methods >>> and look to categorizing any given example of the hybrid methods as >more or >>> less falling into one of the simpler methods (tenacity, authority, a >>> priori), or perhaps as a part of a larger example of the method of >science. >>> >>> Whether this idea regarding the methods can be reconciled with >Peirce's >>> discussion of just what makes the method of science what it >is--direct >>> engagement with, and testing of, reality--I don't know. I suppose it >can be >>> objected that the fact that the method of science deals with reality >and >>> the idea that the method of science needs all three kinds of >inference do >>> not have a clear connection with another. Also, it can be argued >that the >>> other three methods really do use all three kinds of inference, or >perhaps >>> at least two (as one might imagine that the a priori method involves >not >>> only deduction but also abduction). Well, I admit that both >objections are >>> reasonable. But the latter objection is a little weak, as it >involves a >>> point about how to properly classify the methods, and I find that >the >>> proper classification is the one that would lead to more fruitful >results, >>> which I would maintain is associated more with my proposed approach >(though >>> admittedly further inquiry is needed to prove it so). As to the >former >>> objection, I have no way to meet it as of yet, but can only say that >>> because no connection is immediately apparent is no real argument >against >>> there being such connection. So, I guess I'm just saying that >there's room >>> for further reflection on the suggestion of associating the most >basic >>> division of kinds of method with the reliance of a given kind of >method >>> upon one or more of the modes or kinds of inference. >>> >>> --Franklin >>> >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY >ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >PEIRCE-L >>> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in >the >>> BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> -- Diese Nachricht wurde von meinem Android-Mobiltelefon mit K-9 Mail gesendet.
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