Hi Gary. I find your message below sufficiently puzzling that I suspect that we're somehow talking at cross purposes, though I don't yet see how that's happening. I agree with your characterization of the *Illustrations* as a whole, but I think that much of the point and much of the interest of "Fixation," is to prevent Peirce's discussion from being as tautological as you seem to be suggesting it is. Do you not think that much of the broad and persistent appeal of the paper derives from how normatively modest the resources Peirce draws on to induce a commitment to the scientific method are? In this first paper of the series, he seems remarkably reluctant to make "science" or even "truth" operative words.
I never said that the remark about each method having a "peculiar convenience" of its own is snide and condescending. I think that the paragraph containing that remark seems snide and condescending, by the standards that I think Peirce set earlier in the article. At this point in his discussion, I'd have expected Peirce to muster something better on behalf of the a priori method (if he were serious about articulating its strengths) than that it flatters our vanity and that it is in the nature of the method to adopt whatever belief we are inclined to. You were much more resourceful than that on behalf of the method in your discussion of art, for instance. Similar things could be said about the other two methods; earlier in the text, he seems to be much more appreciative of the strengths of such methods, judged merely as belief-fixing methods, and I find it odd that he is so ungenerous to vanquished foes at this point. But that's just another way of saying that my understanding of the paper remains limited. Best to all, Jeff ________________________________________ From: Gary Richmond [[email protected]] Sent: Sunday, May 04, 2014 2:06 PM To: Kasser,Jeff Cc: [email protected] Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science Jeff K, List, You concluded your recent message: I don't see him commensurating these strengths and weaknesses [of the three non-scientific methods] into all-things-considered assessments of these methods in comparison to one another. He does, of course, compare them unfavorably to the scientific method. I find the text of "Fixation" hard to interpret along these lines, though. To take one example, the paragraph near the end where he insists that each of the methods has a "peculiar convenience" of its own seems to me to descend into a snide condescension that seems to me in some tension with Peirce's often resourceful and fair-minded assessment of the unscientific methods. One has to recall, it seems to me, that 'Fixation' is the first in a series of papers titled "Illustrations of the Logic of Science" the purpose of which is "to describe the method of scientific investigation". It was also intended to be included in "Essays on the Reasoning of Science" (all emphasis added). The operative word above is "science". So, I don't see Peirce's comment that each method other than that of science has a "peculiar convenience" of its own snide or condescending--each has, and Peirce has been at pains to show the advantages of each. (Btw, I agree with Franklin that the several methods Peirce offers is somewhat--although not completely--arbitrary, and that it is certainly not, nor is it meant to be, systematic.) One can, for example, go quite far in the world of philosophy with the a priori method--as, for example, Hegel did--and create a vast army of like-minded thinker-disciples promulgating your philosophy for decades and decades, perhaps even centuries. One could probably say much the same for the method of authority (one thinks of aspects of the thought of the Catholic Church, for example), although I'm not so certain whether this is the case for the method of tenacity, at least in consideration of philosophy (but the businessman, for example, might very successfully employ it). But if you are pursuing the truth, if you are in search of a method which will in the long run bring you (us) to it, if you seek a method such that your (our) opinion will "coincide with the facts," then you will settle opinions by a method the essential nature of which is that it is self-corrective; you will fix your beliefs by using the method of science, since none of the other methods have this self-corrective capacity. You also wrote: I take Peirce's comment that the a priori method differs in no essential way from the method of authority, which is itself just the method of tenacity writ large, to be an indication that Peirce sees importantly different strengths and weaknesses among these methods, but not overall progress. I would tend to agree with you here, Jeff. But, again, the reason I'd say that there is no "overall progress" through the three (or four, in light of Franklin's comments) methods prior to the method of science is that, while there are decided advantages to each, these are not advantages for science. If that sounds tautological, well it probably is: we need a method which, in pursuit of the truth of reality (that is, one which is in accordance with the facts), is self-correcting in the long run to do science (including philosophy and metaphysics) well. Of course it seems natural to call it the method of science. Best, Gary Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York On Sat, May 3, 2014 at 5:52 PM, Kasser,Jeff <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Thanks for re-energizing our discussion of Chapter 6, Cathy. I was only dimly aware of your absence, but I was vividly aware that a conversational spark had been missing, and I hypothesized that Jeffrey D. and I simply hadn't managed to light that spark. But I think your return to the discussion has cured much of what was ailing us. Like Jeffrey D., I think there's a lot to be learned from the Kantian strategy that Smyth employs, and I would emphasize, in response to Cathy's original post on the topic, that this Kantian strand offers another way of bringing together the ethical and the efficiency strands of the argument in "Fixation." As I read him, Peirce is not arguing that a method like tenacity can't successfully yield settled beliefs on the time scale of an individual lifetime. Nor is he shifting illegitimately from the goal of fixing my beliefs in my lifetime to the goal of fixing everybody's beliefs in the very long run. The main sense in which tenacity can't work is that it can't be *chosen*. You might be able to fix your beliefs that way if you're sufficiently stubborn, unreflective, or isolated, but that still doesn't make tenacity a good answer to the logical question. Similarly, if I am sitting on 20 and take another card while playing blackjack, I might get an ace, in which case I'll cry all the way to the bank while you pronounce my method "irrational," which is, as Peirce says, just name-calling until we muster a clear account of the source of the relevant normativity. And this is where Smyth is a big help, though (if memory serves) he keeps his reading too clear of the efficiency issues for my taste. I would say that the fact that the method of tenacity sometimes works in sufficiently specific circumstances doesn't make the method a good one, nor does it make the method choosable (as opposed to merely pickable) by anybody who's clear about the logical question. In Jeffrey D.'s terms, I thus think that the argument of "Fixation" is prudential as well as moral. Do you think that these strands are combinable, Jeffrey? The recent discussions of how to characterize the unscientific methods brings me back to an earlier post of mine that Gary R. found unclear. What I meant to be asking, Gary, is whether you think that Peirce maintains that there's any clear sense in which the a priori method is better than the method of authority which is better than the method of tenacity. Quite a few readings treat the argument as exhibiting a kind of Hegelian progress, but I take Peirce's comment that the a priori method differs in no essential way from the method of authority, which is itself just the method of tenacity writ large, to be an indication that Peirce sees importantly different strengths and weaknesses among these methods, but not overall progress. I don't see him commensurating these strengths and weaknesses into all-things-considered assessments of these methods in comparison to one another. He does, of course, compare them unfavorably to the scientific method. I find the text of "Fixation" hard to interpret along these lines, though. To take one example, the paragraph near the end where he insists that each of the methods has a "peculiar convenience" of its own seems to me to descend into a snide condescension that seems to me in some tension with Peirce's often resourceful and fair-minded assessment of the unscientific methods. Best to all, Jeff K. ________________________________________ From: Benjamin Udell [[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>] Sent: Saturday, May 03, 2014 1:35 PM To: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science Gary R., Gary F., Jeffrey D., Cathy, list, Peirce said that all three unscientific methods lead to accidental and capricious beliefs - that is, that only the scientific method overcomes caprice, by hypothesizing that there are real things, and by actually testing claims about particular real things (including methods themselves). But I agree that there's something on the more active side about the methods of authority and tenacity as compared to the method of _a priori_, so as to make one think of some sort of pushiness. The method of _a priori_ involves allowing oneself to be carried by the current of thought wherever it leads - even if one is a thought leader like Hegel. (The scientific method also involves a certain passivity - allowing, even actively arranging for, oneself to be carried, determined, to the truth.) Yet for most people the method of authority involves being subjected to force, and such seems a situation of passivity, not agency. On a closer look at the authoritarian regime, however, one sees that many people do both - they enforce, and they are subjected to enforcement, regimentation. (The scientific method also involves subjecting oneself to an outer compulsion - that of truth.) Well, here's still another way maybe to do it: 1. Method of tenacity - rest inertia, patience, durability, stamina, growth thereof (opinion as resource for hoped-for eventual gain of pleasure / avoidance of pain). 2. Method of authority - force, agency (opinion as force or weapon for desired more-or-less direct gain of pleasure / avoidance of pain). Both of those could be considered instrumentalizations of opinion, similarly as Jeffrey D. was discussing, if I understood him correctly. But then we come to: 3. Method of _a priori_ (something like taste) - energy, vibrancy, passion, action as undergone (opinion as 'consumed' for pleasure / non-pain). This is 'passive' in the sense of ancient Greek _páschonta_, undergoing, except with a decidedly pleasurable or non-painful sense - it is something being acted on, driven, experiencing action on the receiving end. Latin _patiens_, like 'patient', does not always mean something 'undergoing' in a strong sense ('passion' is closer to the ancient Greek sense). Anyway, this method is more immediate, less instrument-mediated, than the other methods as a hedonism. I also wanted to try to address Jeffrey D.'s remarks in https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2014-05/msg00017.html but I've realized that I'm not sufficiently used to working with Kantian ideas. Jeffrey D. wrote: 1) Subjective and internal (tenacity) 2) Subjective and external (authority) 3) Objective and internal (a priori) 4) Objective and external (a priori) I do keep wondering about it. Best, Ben On 5/3/2014 1:03 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: I'm not sure "insistent" or "imperative" quite do it either. How about "arbitrary"? Anyhow, as you noted, Gary, what we're looking for would only work "for a thumbnail sketch" anyhow. Best, Gary Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York E202-O 718 482-5700<tel:718%20482-5700> *** *** *** *** "Gary Fuhrman" 05/03/14 9:56 AM >>> I'm inclined to agree with Jeff D. that "random" doesn't really capture the quality common to the first two methods - but I can't think of a single positive word that does, and I don't think Jeff has proposed one either. "Insistent" maybe? "Imperative"? I think "random" will do in a thumbnail sketch of the four methods, as long as we read it as the opposite of "reasonable" (but still open to rationalizing). gary f. -----Original Message----- From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>] Sent: 2-May-14 7:39 PM Cc: Peirce List Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science Gary R., Gary F., Cathy, List Having pointed to an alternate basis for classifying the other methods for fixing belief, let me offer a comment on your suggestion. The methods of tenacity and authority need not be random. In fact, great effort in reasoning can be spent defending one's own beliefs against evidence to the contrary, and similar efforts can be spent defending those held by the authorities that be. Instead of focusing on a lack of direction in those methods, I would recommend focusing on the instrumental way in which the the reasoning is being construed. The a priori method purports to hold higher ends, but contrary to what it is often asserted in defense of this method, it too treats the rules as instrumental in character. The advantage of the alternate reconstruction I am recommending is that it recognizes that these alternatives treat the requirements of valid reasoning as prudential and not moral requirements. The distinction between methods based on principles of prudence and the one method that treats the requirements of logic as ethical obligations does help to articulate Peirce's point in moralizing at the end of the essay--such as when he says that what is more wholesome than any belief is integrity of belief. What is more, it helps to makes sense of the suggestions in the text that, for these other methods, the requirements are all held to be conditional. --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Gary Richmond [[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>] Sent: Friday, May 02, 2014 1:51 PM To: Gary Fuhrman Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science Gary, Cathy, list, So, slightly modifying Cathy's list in consideration of Gary F's comments we get (and, personally, with an eye to introducing these methods to students): Method of Tenacity: private, random Method of Authority: public, random Method of Consensus: public, reasoned Method of Science: public, reasoned and tested Best, Gary R. ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. 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