How about "direct" as opposed to "analytical" or "critical" (as in critical thinking)?
Phyllis Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: >I'm not sure "insistent" or "imperative" quite do it either. How about >"arbitrary"? Anyhow, as you noted, Gary, what we're looking for would only >work "for a thumbnail sketch" anyhow. > > >Best, > > >Gary > >Gary Richmond >Philosophy and Critical Thinking >Communication Studies >LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >E202-O >718 482-5700 > >*** *** *** *** >>>> "Gary Fuhrman" 05/03/14 9:56 AM >>> >I'm inclined to agree with Jeff D. that "random" doesn't really capture the >quality common to the first two methods - but I can't think of a single >positive word that does, and I don't think Jeff has proposed one either. >"Insistent" maybe? "Imperative"? > >I think "random" will do in a thumbnail sketch of the four methods, as long >as we read it as the opposite of "reasonable" (but still open to >rationalizing). > >gary f. > >-----Original Message----- >From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:[email protected]] >Sent: 2-May-14 7:39 PM >Cc: Peirce List >Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of >Science > >Gary R., Gary F., Cathy, List > >Having pointed to an alternate basis for classifying the other methods for >fixing belief, let me offer a comment on your suggestion. The methods of >tenacity and authority need not be random. In fact, great effort in >reasoning can be spent defending one's own beliefs against evidence to the >contrary, and similar efforts can be spent defending those held by the >authorities that be. > >Instead of focusing on a lack of direction in those methods, I would >recommend focusing on the instrumental way in which the the reasoning is >being construed. The a priori method purports to hold higher ends, but >contrary to what it is often asserted in defense of this method, it too >treats the rules as instrumental in character. The advantage of the >alternate reconstruction I am recommending is that it recognizes that these >alternatives treat the requirements of valid reasoning as prudential and not >moral requirements. The distinction between methods based on principles of >prudence and the one method that treats the requirements of logic as ethical >obligations does help to articulate Peirce's point in moralizing at the end >of the essay--such as when he says that what is more wholesome than any >belief is integrity of belief. What is more, it helps to makes sense of the >suggestions in the text that, for these other methods, the requirements are >all held to be conditional. > >--Jeff > >Jeff Downard >Associate Professor >Department of Philosophy >NAU >(o) 523-8354 >________________________________________ >From: Gary Richmond [[email protected]] >Sent: Friday, May 02, 2014 1:51 PM >To: Gary Fuhrman >Cc: Peirce List >Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of >Science > >Gary, Cathy, list, > >So, slightly modifying Cathy's list in consideration of Gary F's comments we >get (and, personally, with an eye to introducing these methods to students): > >Method of Tenacity: private, random >Method of Authority: public, random >Method of Consensus: public, reasoned >Method of Science: public, reasoned and tested > >Best, > >Gary R. > > > >
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