Too complex. I think this is simple logic. More or less like sperm. One from many. Sometimes two or more. Clarity is a virtue.
*@stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>* On Fri, Aug 1, 2014 at 3:01 PM, Sungchul Ji <[email protected]> wrote: > Stephen wrote: > > " . . . the totality of what is in the mind is at best (6231-1) > subjected to a selection process that could ignore a > huge number of possibilities foreclosed by the process > of naming." > > This statement is consistent with the RPM category theory of everything > reproduced in Figure 1, since Step b corresponds to your "naming process". > Step b is thought to represent a one-to-many relation in that a given > phenomenon can generate many, say, n, possible models or interpretants, of > which only a subset m of n is selected by the environment based on m's > agreement or compatibility with reality as symbolized by Step c. The > Shannon information generated by selection process of Step b can be > estimated to be at most log_2 (n/m) bits. > > > a b > Reality -------------> Phenomenon --------------> Model > (Object) (sign) (Interpretant) > | ^ > | | > |____________________________________________________| > c > > Figure 1. The RPM category theory of everything. This is a mathematical > category because a x b = c, i.e., the path a-b leads to the same result as > the path c, where a = natural process, b = mental model, and c = > experimental or empirical validation. > > > With all the best. > > Sung > ___________________________________________________ > Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. > Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy > Rutgers University > Piscataway, N.J. 08855 > 732-445-4701 > > www.conformon.net > > > > > What's more public than this list? You and me make two. That's almost > > public. I would throw in Nietzsche who was openly hostile to the notion > > that words are a be and end all. Plus any author knows - certainly Peirce > > did - that the totality of what is in the mind is at best subjected to a > > selection process that could ignore a huge number of possibilities > > foreclosed by the process of naming. > > > > *@stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>* > > > > > > On Fri, Aug 1, 2014 at 1:12 PM, Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]> wrote: > > > >> Stephen -- "a slaying of what was there?" Do you mean the letter killeth > >> the spirit? J Actually I think this is pretty close to what I've said > >> (citing Eugene Gendlin) in Chapter 4 of *Turning Signs* ( > >> http://www.gnusystems.ca/bdy.htm#person). But then this is an > >> introspective view of mental activity, which according to Peirce is > >> unreliable unless we can investigate it logically through *public* > >> observations. > >> > >> > >> > >> gary f. > >> > >> > >> > >> *From:* Stephen C. Rose [mailto:[email protected]] > >> *Sent:* 31-Jul-14 6:39 PM > >> *To:* John Collier; Peirce List > >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the > >> basis for > >> > >> > >> > >> It is the penumbra of everything within the mind that you experience > >> prior > >> to putting a word to it that attests to the independent existence of > >> "uninterpreted phenomena". I think it is for this reason that the > >> writing > >> of words is always a sort of slaying of what was there. This is a > >> temporal > >> event. It proceeds I think from the conscious sense of there being more > >> than one can name and its editing down to one or more terms that is seen > >> to > >> be the named sign. This is my experience of how signs may evolve within > >> consciousness. > >> > >> > >> *@stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>* > >> > >> > >> > > > > >
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