Gary R,
My [biosemiotics:6117] sent off just before I read your post agrees with you.
I think the triad of 1ns, 2ns and 3ns has a dual aspect which may be
called X and Y, Yin and Yang, formal and material, phenomenal and
ontological, or syntactic and semantic, etc.
With all the best.
Sung
___________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
> Helmut,
>
> I think what you are pointing to as the "overall role" of the interpretant
> as 3ns is reflected in this passage:
>
> CP 2.274. A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a
> genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable
> of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same
> triadic
> relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. The
> triadic relation is genuine, that is its three members are bound together
> by it in a way that does not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations.
> That is the reason the Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere
> dyadic relation to the Object, but must stand in such a relation to it as
> the Representamen itself does. Nor can the triadic relation in which the
> Third stands be merely similar to that in which the First stands, for this
> would make the relation of the Third to the First a degenerate Secondness
> merely. The Third must indeed stand in such a relation, and thus must be
> capable of determining a Third of its own; but besides that, it must have
> a
> second triadic relation in which the Representamen, or rather the relation
> thereof to its Object, shall be its own (the Third's) Object, and must be
> capable of determining a Third to this relation. All this must equally be
> true of the Third's Thirds and so on endlessly; and this, and more, is
> involved in the familiar idea of a Sign. . .
>
> Many Peirce scholars, although not Edwina, I believe, see the following
> categorial relation in semiotics.
>
> Sign:
> representamen (1ns)
> |> interpretant (3ns)
> object (2ns)
>
> Then I think we *all *agree that each of these has it tricategorial
> relations:
>
> *(a) Representamen*:
> qualisign (1ns)
> |> legisign (3ns)
> sinsign (sin==single, 2ns)
>
> *(b) Object*:
> icon (1ns)
> |>symbol (3ns)
> index (2ns)
>
> *(c) Intepretant*:
> Rheme ('term' generalized for semiotic, 1ns)
> |> Argument (3ns)
> Dicisign ('proposition' generalized for semiotic, 2ns)
>
> In introducing the three trichotomies and, then, the 10-adic sign
> classification, Peirce writes:
>
> CP 2.243. Signs are divisible by three trichotomies; first [(a) above],
> according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent,
> or is a general law; secondly [(b) above], according as the relation of
> the
> sign to its object consists in the sign's having some character in itself,
> or in some existential relation to that object, or in its relation to an
> interpretant; third [(c) above], according as its Interpretant represents
> it as a sign of possibility or as a sign of fact or a sign of reason.
>
> Explicating the trichotomies (by which word, trichotomy, Peirce virtually
> *always* means some categorial trichotomy involving1ns, 2ns, and 3ns)
> based
> on CP 2.243 we get:
>
> *(a) Representamen*:
> qualisign (the sign is a mere quality)
> |> legisign (the sign is a general law)
> sinsign (the sign is an actual existent)
>
> *(b) Object*:
> icon (the relation of the sign to its object is some character in itself)
> |>symbol (the relation of the sign to its object is a relation to the
> interpretant)
> index (the relation of the sign to its object is an existential one)
>
> *(c) Intepretant*:
> Rheme (the interpretant represents the sign as one of possibility)
> |> Argument (the interpretant represents the sign as one of reason)
> Dicisign (the interpretant represents the sign as one of fact)
>
> Immediately before introducing the 10-adic sign classification and
> descriptions of the 10 sign classes Peirce writes:
>
> CP 2.254. The three trichotomies of Signs result together in dividing
> Signs
> into TEN CLASSES OF SIGNS, of which numerous subdivisions have to be
> considered. The ten classes are as follows: [he then gives descriptions of
> the 10]
>
> So, in this sense (and whether or not one sees the Interpretant as in
> itself expression of 3ns), Edwina is correct that only the Argument is an
> Interpretant representing its sign as a sign of reason, or, 3ns. Yet each
> and all of the 10 signs has within it a relation to its interpretant which
> is either rhematic, dicentic, or argumentative.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690*
>
>
> On Mon, Aug 25, 2014 at 3:08 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>> Edwina, with my classification of representamen, object, and
>> interpretant
>> as 1ns, 2ns, 3ns I have meant just the overall role in a sign, like
>> Peirce
>> said "a first, a second, a third". With "overall role" I mean, before
>> you
>> look at the sign classes. Object being nontemporal, ok, that was an
>> exaggeration: I meant to say, that it is (quite) permanent in the
>> looked-at
>> time scale (and a representamen is not. It is rather like an impulse: It
>> appears, calls the object, then it is gone). Final interpretant turning
>> into immediate object: Complicated, so just a reference: (Charles S.
>> Peirse´s philosophy of signs, essays in comparative semiotics" by Gerard
>> Deledalle, page 74, Indiana University Press 2001.)
>> This was not an attempt to convince you, Edwina, I am just hoping to not
>> disagree with you about absolutely everything.
>> Best, Helmut
>>
>> *Von:* "Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected]>
>>
>> Helmut - we'll just have to disagree - on just about everything.
>>
>> In my view, the Interpretant is NOT always in a mode of Thirdness.
>> Indeed, in Peirce's classification of signs (CP 2.254)...you will see
>> that
>> the Interpretant Relation is in a mode of Thirdness only in ONE sign -
>> the
>> pure Argument. Otherwise, in the other nine classes of signs, it is in a
>> mode of either Firstness or Secondness.
>>
>> I also disagree that Secondness is atemporal (nontemporality). It is, in
>> my view, very specifically temporal (in perfect time; i.e., like a
>> clock).
>> If a sign was atemporal, then, it couldn't exist 'as itself'..in brute
>> interaction with another sign. Matter organized in a mode of Secondness
>> is
>> in local space and 'this hic-et-nunc' time.
>>
>> The Representamen Relation, the relation of mediation, can be in any one
>> of the three categorical modes. When it is in Thirdness, it is in
>> progressive or continuous time. When it is in Secondness, it is in
>> 'perfect' hic et nunc time. When it is in Firstness it is in 'now'
>> time..which is non-linear with no past or future.
>>
>> I don't see how a final interpretant turns into an immediate object; the
>> final interpretant is objective while the immediate object is
>> subjective.
>>
>> And I think your speculation about induction/deduction is too 'hopping
>> convoluted' to answer in a reasonable manner.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> *From:* Helmut Raulien <http://[email protected]>
>> *To:* [email protected]
>> *Sent:* Monday, August 25, 2014 2:12 PM
>> *Subject:* [biosemiotics:6512] Abduction,
>>
>> And I think, nonlocality and nontemporality (into the future)
>> indicates
>> an interpretant (3ns), while locality (and nontemporality) indicates an
>> object (2ns). (Temporality indicates a representamen (1ns)) Might it be,
>> that the question whether deduction is 2ns or 3ns is based on the fact,
>> that the conclusion in a deduction is true, therefore a final
>> interpretant
>> (3ns), but a final interpretant then turns into an immediate object
>> (2ns)?
>> And the question, whether induction is 2ns or 3ns maybe based on the
>> following: There are three kinds of induction: crude, quantitative,
>> qualitative, said Peirce. I havent read it, but: If the induction is
>> complete, it is a deduction (3ns). And if the number of elements in the
>> set
>> is known (I have seen only 309 frogs, all green, and there are 16754391
>> frogs existing), a deduction (3ns) about subjective probability (eg.
>> that
>> the next hopping-by frog will be green, or that all frogs are green) is
>> implied in the elsehow 2ns induction.
>>
>> Helmut
>>
>> *Von:* "Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected]>
>>
>> To add another twist, isn't it the case that deduction determines
>> non-local necessary conclusions while induction is strictly local? That
>> is,
>> in my view, deduction provides a general rule that is valid and thus
>> necessary in ALL cases, regardless of spatial and temporal domain.
>> Induction, on the other hand does provide a general rule but it is valid
>> only for the local spatial domain and current time. Therefore deduction
>> operates within a mode of Thirdness and induction within a mode of
>> Secondness. Secondness, as Phyllis points out, is most certainly
>> 'necessary' in that the interactions are determined by the facts of
>> existentiality, but they are confined to that local space and current
>> time.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> *From:* Gary Richmond
>> *To:* Phyllis Chiasson
>> *Cc:* peirce-l@list iupui. edu ; biosemiotics@lists ut. ee ;
>> [email protected] ; Mary Libertin ; Helmut Raulien
>> *Sent:* Sunday, August 24, 2014 9:39 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: PEIRCE-L] Abduction, 1ns, Induction, 2ns,
>> Deduction, 3ns and Peirce's brief "confusion"
>>
>> Phyllis, all,
>>
>> It may be that rather then your brain being fogged, Phyllis, that I am
>> simply wrong in, perhaps, overstating my position. Peirce remained
>> indecisive, not completely certain in this matter as the material he
>> substituted for the undelivered notes suggests. And there is even some
>> hesitancy to come down definitively in the direction I've suggested in
>> those very notes.
>>
>> As Nathan Houser suggests somewhere, Peirce never quite fully reconciled
>> in his own thinking the relationship between those two trichotomies,
>> that
>> is, the three categories and the three inference patterns.
>>
>> As for "where I'm headed," all I can say is that I have not been able to
>> see things differently than I've presented them and I've found following
>> this way of seeing things helpful. But fallibility remains my watchword
>> in
>> this as in other philosophical matters.
>>
>> So, keep getting stronger, take your meds, listen to your doctors, and
>> don't stop posting!--it may well be that my analytical abilities are the
>> ones that are muddy.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary
>>
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>> *C 745*
>> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>>
>> On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 9:24 PM, Phyllis Chiasson <[email protected]>
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Gary, et all,
>>> Well, the docs warned me that there would probably be any of several
>>> cognitive consequences while I am taking these high doses of
>>> prednisone.
>>> This posting is probably a result of one or more of these effects, as I
>>> can't grasp where you are headed and I have a sense that my posting may
>>> be
>>> coming from an entirely different planet than this discussion is on. I
>>> think I know what I mean, but can't think how to clarify it.
>>>
>>> So, my response will have to wait until my brain fog clears (if ever).
>>> Meanwhile, I'm going to refrain from posting until I feel confident
>>> that at
>>> least some of my analytical abilities have returned.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>> Phyllis
>>>
>>> Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> Phyllis,
>>>
>>> I must say that I find some of your remarks confusing, You wrote:
>>>
>>> PC: Since deduction produces necessary results, it seems a little like
>>> brute actuality to me.
>>>
>>> But *necessity* (as lawfulness, as habit-taking, as necessary, that is,
>>> mathematical reasoning) is itself a character of thirdness for Peirce
>>> and
>>> exactly requires that there be *brute actuality* (vizl, that which has
>>> no reason, 2ns) *for it to work on* (embodied laws, *existential*
>>> 'results').
>>>
>>> This is also the notion of would-be's (i.e., would *necessarily *be *if
>>> *the
>>> habits/conditions were to come into being) in Peirce's letters to
>>> James.
>>> Would-be's are 3ns, as May-be's are 1ns and Is's are 2ns.
>>>
>>> On the other hand *brute actuality* is most decidedly given by Peirce
>>> as
>>> existential synonym for secondness.
>>>
>>>
>>> Actuality is something brute. There is no reason in it. I instance
>>> putting your shoulder against a door and trying to force it open
>>> against an
>>> unseen, silent, and unknown resistance. We have a two-sided
>>> consciousness
>>> of effort and resistance, which seems to me to come tolerably near to a
>>> pure sense of actuality. On the whole, I think we have here a mode of
>>> being
>>> of one thing which consists in how a second object is. I call that
>>> Secondness. (CP 1.24)
>>>
>>>
>>> You continued:
>>>
>>> PC: Also, hasn't the later Peirce always ascribed generalization to
>>> induction of all kinds (universal propositions as crude; qualitative &
>>> quantitative as gradual)? So, Hypothesis = 1st, deduction as
>>> explicatation/demonstration= 2nd, and Induction as classification,
>>> testing,
>>> verification (which seems like a generalizing process to me) = 3rd.
>>>
>>> I see it differently: "deduction as explication" is, in inquiry, the
>>> explication of the hypothesis for the purpose of devising tests to see
>>> to
>>> what extent the hypothesis conforms to reality. In such reasoning the
>>> 'demonstrations' are essentially mathematical, *necessarily* following
>>> from the hypothesis *if true*. While any given test certainly has it
>>> "generalized" characters, the testing is typically in the context of
>>> some
>>> 'brute actuality'.
>>>
>>> PC: Of course, the collapse of a universal proposition is a second, but
>>> I
>>> think that would be because the collapse is a necessary because the
>>> proposition (premise, etc) no longer holds. Not because it was
>>> inductively
>>> derived.
>>>
>>> I'm afraid I don't follow your reasoning here. For example, what do you
>>> mean by "the collapse of a universal proposition" in this context?
>>>
>>> For my own part, I'm thinking along the line of this quotation, that
>>> the
>>> general "consists in governing individual events":
>>>
>>>
>>> The very being of the General, of Reason, consists in its governing
>>> individual events. So, then, the essence of Reason is such that its
>>> being
>>> never can have been completely perfected. It always must be in a state
>>> of
>>> incipiency, of growth. , , [T]he development of Reason requires as a
>>> part
>>> of it the occurrence of more individual events than ever can occur. It
>>> requires, too, all the coloring of all qualities of feeling, including
>>> pleasure in its proper place among the rest. This development of Reason
>>> consists, you will observe, in embodiment, that is, in manifestation.
>>> (CP
>>> 1.615)
>>>
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> Gary
>>>
>>>
>>> *Gary Richmond*
>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>>> *Communication Studies*
>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>>> *C 745*
>>> *718 482-5690*
>>>
>>> On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 6:27 PM, Phyllis Chiasson <[email protected]>
>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Gary asked: Are you saying that you see him changing his mind yet
>>>> again
>>>> in that regard, Phyllis?
>>>>
>>>> I'm not sure. Since deduction produces necessary results, it seems a
>>>> little like brute actuality to me. Also, hasn't the later Peirce
>>>> always
>>>> ascribed generalization to induction of all kinds (universal
>>>> propositions
>>>> as crude; qualitative & quantitative as gradual)? So, Hypothesis =
>>>> 1st,
>>>> deduction as explicatation/demonstration= 2nd, and Induction as
>>>> classification, testing, verification (which seems like a generalizing
>>>> process to me) = 3rd. Of course, the collapse of a universal
>>>> proposition is
>>>> a second, but I think that would be because the collapse is a
>>>> necessary
>>>> because the proposition (premise, etc) no longer holds. Not because it
>>>> was
>>>> inductively derived.
>>>>
>>>> Of course, you're correct that I'm thinking of inferences for inquiry
>>>> (methodeutic) rather than
>>>> Regards,
>>>> Phyllis
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>> Phyllis, all,
>>>>
>>>> Ah, so Peirce changes his mind as to the subdivisions he will make of
>>>> abduction and induction as he delves ever deeper into these in the
>>>> N.A.,
>>>> there in consideration of *inquiry*, not merely as forms of
>>>> *inference*.
>>>> But I see no evidence in the N.A. (or elsewhere) that he changed his
>>>> mind
>>>> about the *categoriality *of induction and deduction. Are you saying
>>>> that you see him changing his mind yet again in that regard, Phyllis?
>>>>
>>>> Best,
>>>>
>>>> Gary
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *Gary Richmond*
>>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>>>> *Communication Studies*
>>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>>>> *C 745*
>>>> *718 482-5690*
>>>>
>>>> On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 5:32 PM, Phyllis Chiasson <[email protected]>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Gary R wrote:that Induction split, at once, into the Sampling of
>>>>> Collections, and the Sampling of Qualities. . . " (*Pragmatism as a
>>>>> Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on
>>>>> Pragmatism*, Turrisi, ed. 276-7).
>>>>>
>>>>> Yet later, in1908 in NA, Peirce identified 1. Retro. 2 deduction
>>>>> types
>>>>> (theorematic & axiomatic sp?) And 3 kinds of induction (crude,
>>>>> qualitative,
>>>>> quantitative).
>>>>>
>>>>> Phyllis
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> *Helmut, Cathy, Josh, Mary, lists, *
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *On several occasions over the years I've taken up the matter of the
>>>>> categorial assignations Peirce gave deduction and induction, the most
>>>>> recent being a peirce-l post of March, 2012, in response to Cathy
>>>>> Legg writing: "I don't see how one might interpret induction as
>>>>> secondness though. Though a *misplaced* induction may well lead to
>>>>> the secondness of surprise due to error."
>>>>> https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg00747.html
>>>>> <https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg00747.html>*
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *So, this is a subject which clearly keeps coming up, most recently
>>>>> by you, Helmut, while a couple of weeks ago Cathy and Josh Black, at
>>>>> the Peirce Centennial Congress at U.Mass--or more precisely, on the
>>>>> way from that Congress to Milford, PA, where a group of us placed a
>>>>> plaque commemorating that Congress on a wall of Arisbe, Peirce's home
>>>>> there--both held for induction as 3ns and deduction as 2ns, while
>>>>> I've been arguing, as has Mary Libertin on the biosemiotics list
>>>>> recently, just the reverse, that, except for a brief lapse (discusses
>>>>> below), Peirce saw induction as 2ns and deduction as 3ns. *
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *One can find in Patricia Ann Turrisi's edition of the 1903 Harvard
>>>>> Lectures on Pragmatism notes for "Lecture 5: The Normative Sciences"
>>>>> a long note (#3) from which the following excerpt gives an account of
>>>>> Peirce's lapse (his brief change of mind in the categorial
>>>>> assignations), the reason for it, and his late tendency to more or
>>>>> less settle his opinion again as deduction being 3ns and induction
>>>>> 2ns. He writes:*
>>>>>
>>>>> *"Abduction, or the suggestion of an explanatory theory, is
>>>>> inference*
>>>>>
>>>>> *through an Icon, and is thus connected with Firstness; Induction,
>>>>> or*
>>>>>
>>>>> *trying how things will act, is inference through an Index, and is
>>>>> thus*
>>>>>
>>>>> *connected with Secondness; Deduction, or recognition of the
>>>>> relations*
>>>>>
>>>>> *of general ideas, is inference through a Symbol, and is thus
>>>>> connected*
>>>>>
>>>>> *with Thirdness. . . [My] connection of Abduction with Firstness,*
>>>>>
>>>>> *Induction with Secondness, and Deduction with Thirdness was
>>>>> confirmed*
>>>>>
>>>>> *by my finding no essential subdivisions of Abduction; that
>>>>> Induction*
>>>>>
>>>>> *split, at once, into the Sampling of Collections, and the Sampling
>>>>> of*
>>>>>
>>>>> *Qualities. . . " (*Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right*
>>>>>
>>>>> *Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism*, Turrisi, ed.*
>>>>>
>>>>> *276-7).*
>>>>>
>>>>> *
>>>>> Shortly after this he comments on his brief period of "confusion" in
>>>>> the matter.
>>>>>
>>>>> *
>>>>>
>>>>> *"[In] the book called *Studies in Logic by Members of the Johns*
>>>>>
>>>>> *Hopkins University*, while I stated the rationale of induction
>>>>> pretty*
>>>>>
>>>>> *well, I confused Abduction with the Second kind of Induction, that
>>>>> is*
>>>>>
>>>>> *the induction of qualities. Subsequently, writing in the seventh*
>>>>>
>>>>> *volume of the Monist, sensible of the error of that book but not
>>>>> quite*
>>>>>
>>>>> *understanding in what it consisted I stated the rationale of
>>>>> Induction*
>>>>>
>>>>> *in a manner more suitable to Abduction, and still later in
>>>>> lectures*
>>>>>
>>>>> *here in Cambridge I represented Induction to be connected with the*
>>>>>
>>>>> *third category and Deduction with the Second" [op. cit, 277].*
>>>>>
>>>>> *
>>>>> In the sense that for a few years Peirce was "confused" about
>>>>> these categorial associations of the inference patterns, he is at
>>>>> least partially at fault in creating confusion in the minds of many
>>>>> scholars about the categorial associations of the three inference
>>>>> patterns. Still, he finally sees the error of his ways and corrects
>>>>> himself:
>>>>>
>>>>> *
>>>>>
>>>>> *At present [1903] I am somewhat disposed to revert to my*
>>>>>
>>>>> *original opinion.*
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *And yet he adds that he "will leave the question undecided." *
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *Still, after 1903 he never again associates deduction with
>>>>> anything but 3ns, nor induction with anything but 2ns. *
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *As I wrote in 2012:
>>>>>
>>>>> *
>>>>>
>>>>> *GR: I myself have never been able to think of deduction as
>>>>> anything but*
>>>>>
>>>>> *thirdness, nor induction as anything but 2ns, and I think that I*
>>>>>
>>>>> *mainly have stuck to that way of thinking because when, in*
>>>>>
>>>>> *methodeutic, Peirce employs the three categories together in*
>>>>>
>>>>> *consideration of a "complete inquiry"--as he does, for example,
>>>>> very*
>>>>>
>>>>> *late in life in *The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God* in
>>>>> the*
>>>>>
>>>>> *section the CP editors titled "The Three Stages of Inquiry" [CP
>>>>> 6.468*
>>>>>
>>>>> *- 6.473; also, EP 2:440 - 442]--he *explicitly* associates
>>>>> abduction*
>>>>>
>>>>> *(here, 'retroduction', of the hypothesis) with 1ns, deduction (of
>>>>> the*
>>>>>
>>>>> *retroduction's implications for the purposes of devising tests of
>>>>> it)*
>>>>>
>>>>> *with 3ns, and induction (as the inductive testing once devised)
>>>>> with*
>>>>>
>>>>> *2ns.*
>>>>>
>>>>> *
>>>>>
>>>>> Best,
>>>>>
>>>>> Gary*
>>>>>
>>>>>
>> ------------------------------
>>
>>
>>
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>>
>>
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