Ben, now I'm confused. Where did I say that a sign (which I consider a
triadic set of Relations) is 'priman' or first, i.e., confined to
Firstness in all respects? I certainly don't agree with that - there
is only one Sign (triad) whose three Relations are all in a mode of
Firstness. The other 9 signs certainly are not. So - I'm not sure
where you get that impression from me.
The various manuscript quotes you provide are about the interaction of
the Three Relations and are not about the Three Categories of
Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness. I keep saying that one must be
careful not to mix up these two analytic frameworks.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
*From:* Benjamin Udell <mailto:[email protected]>
*To:* [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
*Sent:* Monday, August 25, 2014 6:07 PM
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6515] Re: Abduction,
Edwina, list,
I don't understand why you speak of _/confinement/_. To say that a
sign is priman, or is a first, in some sense, is not to say that
it is confined to firstness in all respects.
["Lectures on Pragmatism," CP 5.43, Quote]
The particular categories form a series, or set of series,
only one of each series being present, or at least
predominant, in any one phenomenon. The universal categories,
on the other hand, belong to every phenomenon, one being
perhaps more prominent in one aspect of that phenomenon than
another but all of them belonging to every phenomenon.
[End quote]
It seems a great deal like Peirce does not generally regard
categorial characterizations as particularly confining. If you
disagree with Peirce, then fine, I disagree with him on some
important things myself. But what is your argument that saying
that a sign is a priman in respect of object and interpretant
involves a confinement of the sign to 'a mode of firstness'?
[1905 - MS 939 - Notes on Portions of Hume's "Treatise of1
Human Nature". Quote]
[...] It is difficult to define a sign in general. It is
something which is in such a relation to an object that it
determines, or might determine, another sign of the same
object. This is true but considered as a definition it would
involve a vicious circle, since it does not say what is meant
by the interpretant being a "sign" of the same object.
However, this much is clear ; that a sign has essentially two
correlates, its object and its possible Interpretant sign. Of
these three, Sign, Object, Interpretant, the sign as being the
very thing under consideration is Monadic, the object is
Dyadic, and the Interpretant is Triadic. We therefore look to
see, whether there be not two Objects, the object as it is in
itself (the Monadic Object), and the object as the sign
represents it to be (the Dyadic Object). There are also three
Interpretants; namely, 1°, the Interpretant considered as an
independent sign of the Object, 2°, the Interpretant as it is
as a fact determined by the Sign to be, and 3° the
Interpretant as it is intended by, or is represented in, the
Sign to be. [...]
[End quote]
So, first off, he's saying that there is a sense in which, at the
same time, the Sign is Monadic, the Object is Dyadic, and the
Interpretant is Triadic. He doesn't seem worried that this will
somehow prevent the Sign from being a sinsign, legisign, index,
symbol, dicisign, or argument.
Then he relates this to the subdivisions of the correlates: the
Sign unsubdivided, remains ONE, the Object is divided into TWO,
the Dynamical and Immediate Objects, and the Interpretant into
THREE, though it is not either of his familiar trichotomies of
interpretants. This is a familiar pattern.
This question of what is the very thing under consideration goes
back to "On A New List," where the bearer of firstness is the
quale (which is what is under consideration); the bearers of
secondness are the relate (under consideration) and its correlate;
and the bearers of thirdness are Sign (under consideration), a
correlate of it the Object and its other correlate the
Interpretant. This is reflected again in the phaneroscopy -
normatives - metaphysics distinction. The phenomenon is the
_/appearance/_ under consideration. It's not that far conceptually
from appearance to manifestation. As a manifestation of an object,
something is a sign.
[1905 - SS. pp. 192-193 - Letter to Lady Welby (Draft)
presumably July 1905]
So then anything (generally in a mathematical sense) is a
priman (not a priman element generally) and we might define a
sign as follows:
A "sign" is anything, A, which,
(1) in addition to other characters of its own,
(2) stands in a dyadic relation Þ, to a purely active
correlate, B,
(3) and is also in a triadic relation to B for a purely
passive correlate, C, this triadic relation being such as to
determine C to be in a dyadic relation, µ, to B, the relation
µ corresponding in a recognized way to the relation Þ.
Then look at how Peirce is trying to work out relationships with
sign and category in successive drafts. He is not worried about
"confining" the sign to firstness or secondness or thirdness, even
though he sees it as having those categories in various ways
**irrespectively** of whether the sign is qualisign, sinsign,
legisign, icon, index, symbol, rheme, dicisign, or argument. The
priman-ness of the sign consists in its being the thing under
consideration, and in its material characters of its own,
considered apart from relations to other things.
[MS 793 -On Signs, four versions of a certain page 11. Quote]
a - A Sign would be a Priman Secundan to something termed its
Object and if anything were to be in a certain relation to the
sign called being Interpretant to it, the Sign actively
determines the Interpretant to be itself in a relation to the
same Object, corresponding to its own.
b - b - A "Sign" is a genuinely genuine Tertian. It would
generally be Priman in some characters, called its "Material
Characters". But in addition, it is essentially (if only
formally) Second to something termed its "Real Object", which
is purely active in the Secundanity, being immediately
unmodified by this secundanity; and these characters of the
Real Object which are essential to the identity of the Sign
constitute an ens rationis called the "Immediate Object".
Moreover, the Sign is conceivably adapted to being Third to
its Immediate Object for an ens rationis constituted thereby
in the same (generic) relation to that Object in which the
Sign itself stands to the same ; and this Third is termed the
"Intended Interpretant", but the ... [unfinished]
c - A Sign would be in some respects Priman, and its
determination as Priman are called its Material characters.
But in addition it is Second to what is termed its Real
Object, which is altogether active, and immediately unmodified
by this Secundanity, and in so far as the Sign is second to
it, it is termed the immediate Object. The Sign is conceivably
adapted to being third to its Immediate Object for something
in so far termed its Intended Interpretant; and the Sign only
functions as such so far as the Intended Interpretant is
Second to it for an Actual Interpretant which thus becomes
adapted become a sign of the Immediate [there is a question
mark above this word] Object for a further intended
Interpretant, and in so far as the Interpretant is such Third
it is termed Reflex Interpretant.
d - A "Sign" would be in some respects Priman, and its
determinations as such are called its "Material characters".
But in addition, it is Second to something termed its "Real
Object", which is purely active being immediately unmodified
by this Secundanity; and in so for as the sign is Second to
it, it is termed the "Immediate Object" thereof. The Sign is
conceivably adapted bo being Third to its Immediate Object for
something which should thereby be brought into the generically
same dyadic relation to that Object in which the Sign itself
stands to that Object, and this Third is called the "Intended
Interpretant"; but the Sign functions as such only in so far
as the Intended Interpretant is Second to it and is Third to
it for an existent termed the "Actual Interpretant", the modes
of... [unfinished]
[End quote]
Best, Ben
On 8/25/2014 4:29 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
As I keep pointing out, I consider it a serious error to confuse
Peirce's linear order of the processing semiosis of the triad
(moving from Object via Representamen to Interpretant and also,
within the mediative Representamen reasoning, to Object to
Interpretant)..as having anything at all to do with the modal
categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness!
Therefore, your (Gary R's) outline of the Sign - even though you
declare that 'many' agree with you - I certainly don't - and I'm
not going to bring in any 'ad populum' appeal. Again, I consider
it a profound error to merge the three categorical modes with the
linear processing order of the act of semiosis. Your outline
below contradicts the other small tables, a, b, c, which show the
nine Relations - with which I DO agree. After all, if the
representamen relation can be in a mode of Firstness, Secondness
and Thirdness...then how can you confine it to 1ns, as you do below?
Sign:
representamen (1ns)
|> interpretant (3ns)
object (2ns)
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
*From:* Gary Richmond <mailto:[email protected]>
*To:* [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]> ; Peirce-L
<mailto:[email protected]>
*Sent:* Monday, August 25, 2014 4:02 PM
*Subject:* [biosemiotics:6515] Re: Abduction,
Helmut,
I think what you are pointing to as the "overall role" of the
interpretant as 3ns is reflected in this passage:
CP 2.274. A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands
in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its
Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its
Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its
Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. The
triadic relation is genuine, that is its three members are
bound together by it in a way that does not consist in any
complexus of dyadic relations. That is the reason the
Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic
relation to the Object, but must stand in such a relation to
it as the Representamen itself does. Nor can the triadic
relation in which the Third stands be merely similar to that
in which the First stands, for this would make the relation
of the Third to the First a degenerate Secondness merely. The
Third must indeed stand in such a relation, and thus must be
capable of determining a Third of its own; but besides that,
it must have a second triadic relation in which the
Representamen, or rather the relation thereof to its Object,
shall be its own (the Third's) Object, and must be capable of
determining a Third to this relation. All this must equally
be true of the Third's Thirds and so on endlessly; and this,
and more, is involved in the familiar idea of a Sign. . .
Many Peirce scholars, although not Edwina, I believe, see the
following categorial relation in semiotics.
Sign:
representamen (1ns)
|> interpretant (3ns)
object (2ns)
Then I think we /all /agree that each of these has it
tricategorial relations:
_(a) Representamen_:
qualisign (1ns)
|> legisign (3ns)
sinsign (sin==single, 2ns)
_(b) Object_:
icon (1ns)
|>symbol (3ns)
index (2ns)
_(c) Intepretant_:
Rheme ('term' generalized for semiotic, 1ns)
|> Argument (3ns)
Dicisign ('proposition' generalized for semiotic, 2ns)
In introducing the three trichotomies and, then, the 10-adic
sign classification, Peirce writes:
CP 2.243. Signs are divisible by three trichotomies; first
[(a) above], according as the sign in itself is a mere
quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law; secondly
[(b) above], according as the relation of the sign to its
object consists in the sign's having some character in
itself, or in some existential relation to that object, or in
its relation to an interpretant; third [(c) above], according
as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility or
as a sign of fact or a sign of reason.
Explicating the trichotomies (by which word, trichotomy,
Peirce virtually /always/ means some categorial trichotomy
involving1ns, 2ns, and 3ns) based on CP 2.243 we get:
_(a) Representamen_:
qualisign (the sign is a mere quality)
|> legisign (the sign is a general law)
sinsign (the sign is an actual existent)
_(b) Object_:
icon (the relation of the sign to its object is some
character in itself)
|>symbol (the relation of the sign to its object is a
relation to the interpretant)
index (the relation of the sign to its object is an
existential one)
_(c) Intepretant_:
Rheme (the interpretant represents the sign as one of
possibility)
|> Argument (the interpretant represents the sign as one of
reason)
Dicisign (the interpretant represents the sign as one of fact)
Immediately before introducing the 10-adic sign
classification and descriptions of the 10 sign classes Peirce
writes:
CP 2.254. The three trichotomies of Signs result together in
dividing Signs into TEN CLASSES OF SIGNS, of which numerous
subdivisions have to be considered. The ten classes are as
follows: [he then gives descriptions of the 10]
So, in this sense (and whether or not one sees the
Interpretant as in itself expression of 3ns), Edwina is
correct that only the Argument is an Interpretant
representing its sign as a sign of reason, or, 3ns. Yet each
and all of the 10 signs has within it a relation to its
interpretant which is either rhematic, dicentic, or
argumentative.
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*
