Ben, Thanks for this post which included some quotations I hadn't seen before and certainly haven't studied. Your post supports and expands my expressed views (expands them even for me!)
And rather than rejecting this analysis--which is Peirce's!--out of hand and without studying, I would suggest to Edwina (who appears to be a speed reader) that she read Peirce--this Peirce in particular. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Mon, Aug 25, 2014 at 6:14 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > > Edwina, list, > > I don't understand why you speak of _*confinement*_. To say that a sign > is priman, or is a first, in some sense, is not to say that it is confined > to firstness in all respects. > > ["Lectures on Pragmatism," CP 5.43, Quote] > The particular categories form a series, or set of series, only one of > each series being present, or at least predominant, in any one phenomenon. The > universal categories, on the other hand, belong to every phenomenon, one > being perhaps more prominent in one aspect of that phenomenon than another > but all of them belonging to every phenomenon. > [End quote] > > It seems a great deal like Peirce does not generally regard categorial > characterizations as particularly confining. If you disagree with Peirce, > then fine, I disagree with him on some important things myself. But what is > your argument that saying that a sign is a priman in respect of object and > interpretant involves a confinement of the sign to 'a mode of firstness'? > > [1905 - MS 939 - Notes on Portions of Hume's "Treatise of1 Human Nature". > Quote] > [...] It is difficult to define a sign in general. It is something which > is in such a relation to an object that it determines, or might determine, > another sign of the same object. This is true but considered as a > definition it would involve a vicious circle, since it does not say what is > meant by the interpretant being a "sign" of the same object. However, this > much is clear ; that a sign has essentially two correlates, its object and > its possible Interpretant sign. Of these three, Sign, Object, > Interpretant, the sign as being the very thing under consideration is > Monadic, the object is Dyadic, and the Interpretant is Triadic. We > therefore look to see, whether there be not two Objects, the object as it > is in itself (the Monadic Object), and the object as the sign represents it > to be (the Dyadic Object). There are also three Interpretants; namely, 1°, > the Interpretant considered as an independent sign of the Object, 2°, the > Interpretant as it is as a fact determined by the Sign to be, and 3° the > Interpretant as it is intended by, or is represented in, the Sign to be. > [...] > [End quote] > > So, first off, he's saying that there is a sense in which, at the same > time, the Sign is Monadic, the Object is Dyadic, and the Interpretant is > Triadic. He doesn't seem worried that this will somehow prevent the Sign > from being a sinsign, legisign, index, symbol, dicisign, or argument. > > Then he relates this to the subdivisions of the correlates: the Sign > unsubdivided, remains ONE, the Object is divided into TWO, the Dynamical > and Immediate Objects, and the Interpretant into THREE, though it is not > either of his familiar trichotomies of interpretants. This is a familiar > pattern. > > This question of what is the very thing under consideration goes back to > "On A New List," where the bearer of firstness is the quale (which is what > is under consideration); the bearers of secondness are the relate (under > consideration) and its correlate; and the bearers of thirdness are Sign > (under consideration), a correlate of it the Object and its other correlate > the Interpretant. This is reflected again in the phaneroscopy - normatives > - metaphysics distinction. The phenomenon is the _*appearance*_ under > consideration. It's not that far conceptually from appearance to > manifestation. As a manifestation of an object, something is a sign. > > [1905 - SS. pp. 192-193 - Letter to Lady Welby (Draft) presumably July > 1905] > So then anything (generally in a mathematical sense) is a priman (not a > priman element generally) and we might define a sign as follows: > > A "sign" is anything, A, which, > > (1) in addition to other characters of its own, > > (2) stands in a dyadic relation Þ, to a purely active correlate, B, > > (3) and is also in a triadic relation to B for a purely passive correlate, > C, this triadic relation being such as to determine C to be in a dyadic > relation, µ, to B, the relation µ corresponding in a recognized way to the > relation Þ. > > Then look at how Peirce is trying to work out relationships with sign and > category in successive drafts. He is not worried about "confining" the sign > to firstness or secondness or thirdness, even though he sees it as having > those categories in various ways **irrespectively** of whether the sign > is qualisign, sinsign, legisign, icon, index, symbol, rheme, dicisign, or > argument. The priman-ness of the sign consists in its being the thing under > consideration, and in its material characters of its own, considered apart > from relations to other things. > > [MS 793 -On Signs, four versions of a certain page 11. Quote] > a - A Sign would be a Priman Secundan to something termed its Object and > if anything were to be in a certain relation to the sign called being > Interpretant to it, the Sign actively determines the Interpretant to be > itself in a relation to the same Object, corresponding to its own. > > b - b - A "Sign" is a genuinely genuine Tertian. It would generally be > Priman in some characters, called its "Material Characters". But in > addition, it is essentially (if only formally) Second to something termed > its "Real Object", which is purely active in the Secundanity, being > immediately unmodified by this secundanity; and these characters of the > Real Object which are essential to the identity of the Sign constitute an > ens rationis called the "Immediate Object". Moreover, the Sign is > conceivably adapted to being Third to its Immediate Object for an ens > rationis constituted thereby in the same (generic) relation to that Object > in which the Sign itself stands to the same ; and this Third is termed the > "Intended Interpretant", but the ... [unfinished] > > c - A Sign would be in some respects Priman, and its determination as > Priman are called its Material characters. But in addition it is Second to > what is termed its Real Object, which is altogether active, and immediately > unmodified by this Secundanity, and in so far as the Sign is second to it, > it is termed the immediate Object. The Sign is conceivably adapted to being > third to its Immediate Object for something in so far termed its Intended > Interpretant; and the Sign only functions as such so far as the Intended > Interpretant is Second to it for an Actual Interpretant which thus becomes > adapted become a sign of the Immediate [there is a question mark above this > word] Object for a further intended Interpretant, and in so far as the > Interpretant is such Third it is termed Reflex Interpretant. > > d - A "Sign" would be in some respects Priman, and its determinations as > such are called its "Material characters". But in addition, it is Second to > something termed its "Real Object", which is purely active being > immediately unmodified by this Secundanity; and in so for as the sign is > Second to it, it is termed the "Immediate Object" thereof. The Sign is > conceivably adapted bo being Third to its Immediate Object for something > which should thereby be brought into the generically same dyadic relation > to that Object in which the Sign itself stands to that Object, and this > Third is called the "Intended Interpretant"; but the Sign functions as such > only in so far as the Intended Interpretant is Second to it and is Third to > it for an existent termed the "Actual Interpretant", the modes of... > [unfinished] > [End quote] > > Best, Ben > > On 8/25/2014 4:29 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > As I keep pointing out, I consider it a serious error to confuse Peirce's > linear order of the processing semiosis of the triad (moving from Object > via Representamen to Interpretant and also, within the mediative > Representamen reasoning, to Object to Interpretant)..as having anything at > all to do with the modal categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness! > > Therefore, your (Gary R's) outline of the Sign - even though you declare > that 'many' agree with you - I certainly don't - and I'm not going to bring > in any 'ad populum' appeal. Again, I consider it a profound error to merge > the three categorical modes with the linear processing order of the act of > semiosis. Your outline below contradicts the other small tables, a, b, c, > which show the nine Relations - with which I DO agree. After all, if the > representamen relation can be in a mode of Firstness, Secondness and > Thirdness...then how can you confine it to 1ns, as you do below? > > Sign: > representamen (1ns) > |> interpretant (3ns) > object (2ns) > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > *To:* [email protected] ; Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Monday, August 25, 2014 4:02 PM > *Subject:* [biosemiotics:6515] Re: Abduction, > > Helmut, > > I think what you are pointing to as the "overall role" of the > interpretant as 3ns is reflected in this passage: > > CP 2.274. A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a > genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable > of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic > relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. The > triadic relation is genuine, that is its three members are bound together > by it in a way that does not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations. > That is the reason the Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere > dyadic relation to the Object, but must stand in such a relation to it as > the Representamen itself does. Nor can the triadic relation in which the > Third stands be merely similar to that in which the First stands, for this > would make the relation of the Third to the First a degenerate Secondness > merely. The Third must indeed stand in such a relation, and thus must be > capable of determining a Third of its own; but besides that, it must have a > second triadic relation in which the Representamen, or rather the relation > thereof to its Object, shall be its own (the Third's) Object, and must be > capable of determining a Third to this relation. All this must equally be > true of the Third's Thirds and so on endlessly; and this, and more, is > involved in the familiar idea of a Sign. . . > > Many Peirce scholars, although not Edwina, I believe, see the following > categorial relation in semiotics. > > Sign: > representamen (1ns) > |> interpretant (3ns) > object (2ns) > > Then I think we *all *agree that each of these has it tricategorial > relations: > > *(a) Representamen*: > qualisign (1ns) > |> legisign (3ns) > sinsign (sin==single, 2ns) > > *(b) Object*: > icon (1ns) > |>symbol (3ns) > index (2ns) > > *(c) Intepretant*: > Rheme ('term' generalized for semiotic, 1ns) > |> Argument (3ns) > Dicisign ('proposition' generalized for semiotic, 2ns) > > In introducing the three trichotomies and, then, the 10-adic sign > classification, Peirce writes: > > CP 2.243. Signs are divisible by three trichotomies; first [(a) above], > according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, > or is a general law; secondly [(b) above], according as the relation of the > sign to its object consists in the sign's having some character in itself, > or in some existential relation to that object, or in its relation to an > interpretant; third [(c) above], according as its Interpretant represents > it as a sign of possibility or as a sign of fact or a sign of reason. > > Explicating the trichotomies (by which word, trichotomy, Peirce > virtually *always* means some categorial trichotomy involving1ns, 2ns, > and 3ns) based on CP 2.243 we get: > > *(a) Representamen*: > qualisign (the sign is a mere quality) > |> legisign (the sign is a general law) > sinsign (the sign is an actual existent) > > *(b) Object*: > icon (the relation of the sign to its object is some character in itself) > |>symbol (the relation of the sign to its object is a relation to the > interpretant) > index (the relation of the sign to its object is an existential one) > > *(c) Intepretant*: > Rheme (the interpretant represents the sign as one of possibility) > |> Argument (the interpretant represents the sign as one of reason) > Dicisign (the interpretant represents the sign as one of fact) > > Immediately before introducing the 10-adic sign classification and > descriptions of the 10 sign classes Peirce writes: > > CP 2.254. The three trichotomies of Signs result together in dividing > Signs into TEN CLASSES OF SIGNS, of which numerous subdivisions have to be > considered. The ten classes are as follows: [he then gives descriptions of > the 10] > > So, in this sense (and whether or not one sees the Interpretant as in > itself expression of 3ns), Edwina is correct that only the Argument is an > Interpretant representing its sign as a sign of reason, or, 3ns. Yet each > and all of the 10 signs has within it a relation to its interpretant which > is either rhematic, dicentic, or argumentative. > > Best, > > Gary > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . 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