Edwina, list,
I don't understand why you speak of _/confinement/_. To say that a sign
is priman, or is a first, in some sense, is not to say that it is
confined to firstness in all respects.
["Lectures on Pragmatism," CP 5.43, Quote]
The particular categories form a series, or set of series, only one
of each series being present, or at least predominant, in any one
phenomenon. The universal categories, on the other hand, belong to
every phenomenon, one being perhaps more prominent in one aspect of
that phenomenon than another but all of them belonging to every
phenomenon.
[End quote]
It seems a great deal like Peirce does not generally regard categorial
characterizations as particularly confining. If you disagree with
Peirce, then fine, I disagree with him on some important things myself.
But what is your argument that saying that a sign is a priman in respect
of object and interpretant involves a confinement of the sign to 'a mode
of firstness'?
[1905 - MS 939 - Notes on Portions of Hume's "Treatise of1 Human
Nature". Quote]
[...] It is difficult to define a sign in general. It is something
which is in such a relation to an object that it determines, or
might determine, another sign of the same object. This is true but
considered as a definition it would involve a vicious circle, since
it does not say what is meant by the interpretant being a "sign" of
the same object. However, this much is clear ; that a sign has
essentially two correlates, its object and its possible Interpretant
sign. Of these three, Sign, Object, Interpretant, the sign as being
the very thing under consideration is Monadic, the object is Dyadic,
and the Interpretant is Triadic. We therefore look to see, whether
there be not two Objects, the object as it is in itself (the Monadic
Object), and the object as the sign represents it to be (the Dyadic
Object). There are also three Interpretants; namely, 1°, the
Interpretant considered as an independent sign of the Object, 2°,
the Interpretant as it is as a fact determined by the Sign to be,
and 3° the Interpretant as it is intended by, or is represented in,
the Sign to be. [...]
[End quote]
So, first off, he's saying that there is a sense in which, at the same
time, the Sign is Monadic, the Object is Dyadic, and the Interpretant is
Triadic. He doesn't seem worried that this will somehow prevent the Sign
from being a sinsign, legisign, index, symbol, dicisign, or argument.
Then he relates this to the subdivisions of the correlates: the Sign
unsubdivided, remains ONE, the Object is divided into TWO, the Dynamical
and Immediate Objects, and the Interpretant into THREE, though it is not
either of his familiar trichotomies of interpretants. This is a familiar
pattern.
This question of what is the very thing under consideration goes back to
"On A New List," where the bearer of firstness is the quale (which is
what is under consideration); the bearers of secondness are the relate
(under consideration) and its correlate; and the bearers of thirdness
are Sign (under consideration), a correlate of it the Object and its
other correlate the Interpretant. This is reflected again in the
phaneroscopy - normatives - metaphysics distinction. The phenomenon is
the _/appearance/_ under consideration. It's not that far conceptually
from appearance to manifestation. As a manifestation of an object,
something is a sign.
[1905 - SS. pp. 192-193 - Letter to Lady Welby (Draft) presumably
July 1905]
So then anything (generally in a mathematical sense) is a priman
(not a priman element generally) and we might define a sign as follows:
A "sign" is anything, A, which,
(1) in addition to other characters of its own,
(2) stands in a dyadic relation Þ, to a purely active correlate, B,
(3) and is also in a triadic relation to B for a purely passive
correlate, C, this triadic relation being such as to determine C to
be in a dyadic relation, µ, to B, the relation µ corresponding in a
recognized way to the relation Þ.
Then look at how Peirce is trying to work out relationships with sign
and category in successive drafts. He is not worried about "confining"
the sign to firstness or secondness or thirdness, even though he sees it
as having those categories in various ways **irrespectively** of whether
the sign is qualisign, sinsign, legisign, icon, index, symbol, rheme,
dicisign, or argument. The priman-ness of the sign consists in its being
the thing under consideration, and in its material characters of its
own, considered apart from relations to other things.
[MS 793 -On Signs, four versions of a certain page 11. Quote]
a - A Sign would be a Priman Secundan to something termed its Object
and if anything were to be in a certain relation to the sign called
being Interpretant to it, the Sign actively determines the
Interpretant to be itself in a relation to the same Object,
corresponding to its own.
b - b - A "Sign" is a genuinely genuine Tertian. It would generally
be Priman in some characters, called its "Material Characters". But
in addition, it is essentially (if only formally) Second to
something termed its "Real Object", which is purely active in the
Secundanity, being immediately unmodified by this secundanity; and
these characters of the Real Object which are essential to the
identity of the Sign constitute an ens rationis called the
"Immediate Object". Moreover, the Sign is conceivably adapted to
being Third to its Immediate Object for an ens rationis constituted
thereby in the same (generic) relation to that Object in which the
Sign itself stands to the same ; and this Third is termed the
"Intended Interpretant", but the ... [unfinished]
c - A Sign would be in some respects Priman, and its determination
as Priman are called its Material characters. But in addition it is
Second to what is termed its Real Object, which is altogether
active, and immediately unmodified by this Secundanity, and in so
far as the Sign is second to it, it is termed the immediate Object.
The Sign is conceivably adapted to being third to its Immediate
Object for something in so far termed its Intended Interpretant; and
the Sign only functions as such so far as the Intended Interpretant
is Second to it for an Actual Interpretant which thus becomes
adapted become a sign of the Immediate [there is a question mark
above this word] Object for a further intended Interpretant, and in
so far as the Interpretant is such Third it is termed Reflex
Interpretant.
d - A "Sign" would be in some respects Priman, and its
determinations as such are called its "Material characters". But in
addition, it is Second to something termed its "Real Object", which
is purely active being immediately unmodified by this Secundanity;
and in so for as the sign is Second to it, it is termed the
"Immediate Object" thereof. The Sign is conceivably adapted bo being
Third to its Immediate Object for something which should thereby be
brought into the generically same dyadic relation to that Object in
which the Sign itself stands to that Object, and this Third is
called the "Intended Interpretant"; but the Sign functions as such
only in so far as the Intended Interpretant is Second to it and is
Third to it for an existent termed the "Actual Interpretant", the
modes of... [unfinished]
[End quote]
Best, Ben
On 8/25/2014 4:29 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
As I keep pointing out, I consider it a serious error to confuse
Peirce's linear order of the processing semiosis of the triad (moving
from Object via Representamen to Interpretant and also, within the
mediative Representamen reasoning, to Object to Interpretant)..as
having anything at all to do with the modal categories of Firstness,
Secondness and Thirdness!
Therefore, your (Gary R's) outline of the Sign - even though you
declare that 'many' agree with you - I certainly don't - and I'm not
going to bring in any 'ad populum' appeal. Again, I consider it a
profound error to merge the three categorical modes with the linear
processing order of the act of semiosis. Your outline
below contradicts the other small tables, a, b, c, which show the nine
Relations - with which I DO agree. After all, if the representamen
relation can be in a mode of Firstness, Secondness and
Thirdness...then how can you confine it to 1ns, as you do below?
Sign:
representamen (1ns)
|> interpretant (3ns)
object (2ns)
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
*From:* Gary Richmond <mailto:[email protected]>
*To:* [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> ;
Peirce-L <mailto:[email protected]>
*Sent:* Monday, August 25, 2014 4:02 PM
*Subject:* [biosemiotics:6515] Re: Abduction,
Helmut,
I think what you are pointing to as the "overall role" of the
interpretant as 3ns is reflected in this passage:
CP 2.274. A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in
such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as
to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to
assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands
itself to the same Object. The triadic relation is genuine, that
is its three members are bound together by it in a way that does
not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations. That is the
reason the Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic
relation to the Object, but must stand in such a relation to it as
the Representamen itself does. Nor can the triadic relation in
which the Third stands be merely similar to that in which the
First stands, for this would make the relation of the Third to the
First a degenerate Secondness merely. The Third must indeed stand
in such a relation, and thus must be capable of determining a
Third of its own; but besides that, it must have a second triadic
relation in which the Representamen, or rather the relation
thereof to its Object, shall be its own (the Third's) Object, and
must be capable of determining a Third to this relation. All this
must equally be true of the Third's Thirds and so on endlessly;
and this, and more, is involved in the familiar idea of a Sign. . .
Many Peirce scholars, although not Edwina, I believe, see the
following categorial relation in semiotics.
Sign:
representamen (1ns)
|> interpretant (3ns)
object (2ns)
Then I think we /all /agree that each of these has it
tricategorial relations:
_(a) Representamen_:
qualisign (1ns)
|> legisign (3ns)
sinsign (sin==single, 2ns)
_(b) Object_:
icon (1ns)
|>symbol (3ns)
index (2ns)
_(c) Intepretant_:
Rheme ('term' generalized for semiotic, 1ns)
|> Argument (3ns)
Dicisign ('proposition' generalized for semiotic, 2ns)
In introducing the three trichotomies and, then, the 10-adic sign
classification, Peirce writes:
CP 2.243. Signs are divisible by three trichotomies; first [(a)
above], according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an
actual existent, or is a general law; secondly [(b) above],
according as the relation of the sign to its object consists in
the sign's having some character in itself, or in some existential
relation to that object, or in its relation to an interpretant;
third [(c) above], according as its Interpretant represents it as
a sign of possibility or as a sign of fact or a sign of reason.
Explicating the trichotomies (by which word, trichotomy, Peirce
virtually /always/ means some categorial trichotomy involving1ns,
2ns, and 3ns) based on CP 2.243 we get:
_(a) Representamen_:
qualisign (the sign is a mere quality)
|> legisign (the sign is a general law)
sinsign (the sign is an actual existent)
_(b) Object_:
icon (the relation of the sign to its object is some character in
itself)
|>symbol (the relation of the sign to its object is a relation to
the interpretant)
index (the relation of the sign to its object is an existential one)
_(c) Intepretant_:
Rheme (the interpretant represents the sign as one of possibility)
|> Argument (the interpretant represents the sign as one of reason)
Dicisign (the interpretant represents the sign as one of fact)
Immediately before introducing the 10-adic sign classification and
descriptions of the 10 sign classes Peirce writes:
CP 2.254. The three trichotomies of Signs result together in
dividing Signs into TEN CLASSES OF SIGNS, of which numerous
subdivisions have to be considered. The ten classes are as
follows: [he then gives descriptions of the 10]
So, in this sense (and whether or not one sees the Interpretant as
in itself expression of 3ns), Edwina is correct that only the
Argument is an Interpretant representing its sign as a sign of
reason, or, 3ns. Yet each and all of the 10 signs has within it a
relation to its interpretant which is either rhematic, dicentic,
or argumentative.
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*
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