Re:Frederik Stjernfelt
At:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13825
Frederik,
One small point that I find myself making on a periodic basis: I think it is better to describe
Peirce's take on logic as "non-psychologism" rather than anti-psychologoism", the main thing being
that logic is a normative rather than a descriptive science. The use of "anti-psychologism" tends
to drag in all sorts of implications that are alien to Peirce's perspective on the relation between
the two.
On a related point, especially pertinent to the current run of the bi(o)semiotics literature, is
whether "biologism" in logic be just as bad a diversion from the course of Peirce's semiotics and
logic as "psychologism" ever was. Or, to put it more positively, what would it take to place the
biological and psychological implementations of sign relations and inquiry processes in their proper
perspective?
Regards,
Jon
Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
Why "Natural Propositions"?
The book "Natural Propositions" grew out of my investigation of Peirce's general notion
of diagrams and diagrammatical reasoning in "Diagrammatology" (2007). If it is indeed the
case that all deduction takes place by means of transformation of diagrams, implicitly or
explicitly, it follows that a single diagram, before transformation, must depict a proposition,
namely that stating the premiss of the argument. (Likewise, the post-transformation diagram will
depict another proposition, that of the conclusion).
This observation made me take som interest in Peirce's notion of "proposition" -- or, as
he renames it in the generalization of triads which he undertook in shaping his final semiotics
from 1902-3 onwards -- "Dicisign". During a stay as visiting scholar in Berlin 2010 I
began working on this and realized that Peirce's notion of proposition deviates considerably from
the simultaneous conceptions of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein and others. Peirce's semiotic and
purely functional definition of proposition does not presuppose any specific formalism (like human
language or special, formalized languages), neither does it presuppose accompaniment of conscious,
intentional acts. Peirce simply said that a Dicisign is a sign which is involved twice with one and
the same object: 1) it refers to the object (P's generalization of the Subject part of a
proposition; 2) it describes that object (P's generalization of the Predicate).
This made me realize the revolutionary potential of such a definition: it is
not confined to human beings and it is not confined to language. So this gives
us the possibility of a semiotics which in a fluid way encompasses biological
communication as well as non-linguistic human semiotics involving pictures,
gestures, diagrams, etc. on a par with language.
One aspect of this definition -- the absence of conscious states of mind etc.
in the definition -- seems to me deeply related to Peirce's antipsychologism,
which made it natural to open the book with a chapter on that. Also, I think
psychologism has emerged as a new threat after certain developments in
cognitive science and the related turn to philosophy of mind in analytical
philosophy.
In the chapters (4-7) following the large Dicisign chapter, I try to develop
some possible consequences of the two extensions of propositions made possible
by the Dicisign concept.
The latter part of the book is connected to the Dicisign argument in a more
remote way, addressing further issues connected to diagrammatical reasoning:
the issue of operational vs. optimal iconicity, the early Ms. 725 diagram
experiments pertaining to natural kinds, the distinction between corollarial
and theorematic reasoning.
The final chapter expresses an ongoing interest I have in the history of the
philosophy of the Enlightenment, which is a booming field these years (Margaret
Jacob, Jonathan Israel, Martin Mulsow et al.) -- I think there is reason to
place Peirce in this ancestral tree rather than e.g. the poststructuralist one
to which he has sometimes been connected.
I am happy that the Peirce and Biosemiotics lists have agreed to discuss my
book and I look forward to all sorts of questions, comments, developments etc.
--
academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
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