Dear Kalevi, list -
No, I am not indirectly referring to non-empirical signs. That is probably a 
clumsy expression. Speaking of "empirical signs" I am implicilty contrasting 
them with our scientific notions of such signs.
So my claim is just that existing signs, out there, should not be 
conceptualized as falling in three groups of icons, indices, and symbols. These 
are sign aspects, and most existing signs involve all of these three aspects. 
That was my point in the below quote.
Best
F

Den 07/09/2014 kl. 12.00 skrev Kalevi Kull 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>:


Dear Frederik,

while using the concept of 'empirical sign' (see below) - do you mean there 
exist 'non-empirical signs'? Would you please exemplify.

Or is it rather so that there is no way to perceive an empirical sign (as a 
whole) - all we can point are the aspects only?

Best

Kalevi

:-)

02-09-2014 20:37 kirjutas Frederik Stjernfelt:



Peirce's basic semiotic triads qualisign-sinsign-legisign; icon-index-symbol, 
and rheme-dicisign-argument have very often been mistaken for mutual 
classifications of empirical signs. But they rather refer to aspects of 
empirical signs, and most empirical signs include several of those aspects. 
Thus, pure indices or pure icons, e.g. will be marginal exceptions.
The reason is that to P the main phenomenon is reasoning, the chain of 
arguments - and the whole of the semiotic machinery is developed to understand 
the physiology of reasoning - so icons, rhemes, etc. refer to specific aspects 
of the chain of reasoning.
Best
F





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