Subjectivity is everything that separates you from the rest of the universe;
suprasubjectivity is what joins you to what is "other than your subjectivity"
without regard to distance or location in space. For details see in particular,
perhaps,
<http://www.amazon.com/Objective-Reality-Semiotics-Communication-Cognition/dp/1934078085>,
although there is an article coming out in CSS title "Subjectivity,
Suprasubjectivity, and Semiosis".
Relation always requires a basis in some subjectivity, and a
terminus which is other than that founding subjectivity, while the relation
itself is over and above its foundation. Thus, e.g., ideas are foundations of
relation, objects are termini of relations, but the relation itself is what
provenates from the foundation as over and above (suprasubjective respecting)
that basis. It was in collapsing objects into ideas (conflating the two) that
was the essential of Descartes' "cogito" idea as nominalistic.
(hope this helps)
-----Original Message-----
From: Sungchul Ji [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Tuesday, September 02, 2014 18:38
To: Deely, John N.
Cc: Jon Awbrey; Edwina Taborsky; Gary Fuhrman; [email protected]; Peirce
List
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions
Dear John N,
Let me expose my ignorance.
What is "suprasubjectivity?
With all the best.
Sung
__________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology
and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway,
N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net<http://www.conformon.net>
> But do note that what all relations have in common is
> suprasubjectivity
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:[email protected]]
> Sent: Tuesday, September 02, 2014 9:55
> To: Edwina Taborsky
> Cc: Gary Fuhrman; [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>;
> Peirce List
> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions
>
> Re: Edwina Taborsky
> At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13840
>
> Edwina,
>
> Setting terminology aside for just a moment, there is at present a
> general lack of understanding as to what constitutes (1) a relation,
> (2) a triadic relation, (3) a triadic sign relation. Those subjects
> are treated by Peirce in his logic of relative terms and the
> corresponding mathematics of relations, all of which is clear enough
> in his early papers. Without a grasp of that background, most of what
> he writes later is doomed to be mis-interpreted.
>
> Jon
>
> Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>> Gary F - thanks for this introduction.
>>
>> I think it's important to clarify that, first, the interactions
>> between the sign and the object; and the sign and the interpretant,
>> are relations - my use of this term has prompted serious criticism on
>> the Peirce list! I continue to use the Peircean term of
>> 'representamen' for this mediate sign...rather than sign. I confine
>> the term 'sign' to the full triad of object-representamen-interpretant.
>>
>> And I think it's important to acknowledge that there are nine such
>> relations available to semiosis - not just the three of icon, index
>> and symbol - which refer anyway, only to the relation of the
>> representamen to the object and ignore the other two vital semiosic
>> processes of the representamen-in-itself and the relation to the
>> interpretant.
>>
>> Edwina
> --
>
> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list:
> http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>
>
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