John wrote: One irreducibly triadic relation uniting three distinct terms constitutes a "sign" formally, what is called "sign" in common speech being but the foreground element - a "sign" only materially, better termed a representamen or 'sign-vehicle' -- representing another than itself to or for an interpretant.
Thanks for making this important point so lucidly. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Tue, Sep 2, 2014 at 6:56 PM, Deely, John N. <[email protected]> wrote: > Edwina, interaction as such (agere et pati) is not relation; relation is > what *arises from* and *continues after* such interaction has ceased. One > irreducibly triadic relation uniting three distinct terms constitutes a > "sign" formally, what is called "sign" in common speech being but the > foreground element - a "sing" only materially, better termed a > representamen or 'sign-vehicle' -- representing another than itself to or > for an interpretant. > > > > *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* Tuesday, September 02, 2014 9:32 > *To:* Gary Fuhrman; [email protected] > *Cc:* Peirce List > *Subject:* [biosemiotics:6595] Re: Natural Propositions > > > > Gary F - thanks for this introduction. > > > > I think it's important to clarify that, first, the interactions between > the sign and the object; and the sign and the interpretant, are > *relations* - my use of this term has prompted serious criticism on the > Peirce list! I continue to use the Peircean term of 'representamen' for > this mediate sign...rather than sign. I confine the term 'sign' to the full > triad of object-representamen-interpretant. > > > > And I think it's important to acknowledge that there are nine such > relations available to semiosis - not just the three of icon, index and > symbol - which refer anyway, only to the relation of the representamen to > the object and ignore the other two vital semiosic processes of the > representamen-in-itself and the relation to the interpretant. > > > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > > *From:* Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]> > > *To:* [email protected] > > *Cc:* Peirce List <[email protected]> > > *Sent:* Tuesday, September 02, 2014 10:09 AM > > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:6592] Natural Propositions > > > > Thanks for getting this thread started, Frederik. I hope the discussion of > "anti-psychologism" (due to start next week, led by Jeff Kasser) will help > to resolve some of the past debates we've had on the biosemiotics list > about the relationship between logic and psychology. > > > > One comment I'd like to add to your introduction here: several members of > this list have incorporated the terms *icon, index* and *symbol*, used in > a more or less Peircean way, into their biophysical evolutionary and > origin-of-life theories. But they have had little or no use for Peirce's > other two sign trichotomies, and often use that first trichotomy in an > exclusive sense, as if a given sign had to fit into one (and only one) of > those types. I think your book will change all that, showing as it does a > dicisign -- that is, a sign complete enough to be *true* -- must involve > *both* iconic and indexical components, but does * not* have to be > symbolic. But a really basic introduction to the other basic sign types > might be useful at this stage, for those who aren't familiar with them. > > > > *Icon/index/symbol* is the trichotomy of signs according to their > relations to their objects, and probably needs no introduction here. > > > > The trichotomy according to the mode of being of the sign itself is > *qualisign/sinsign/legisign* (Peirce experimented with other names for > them, but these are the most widely used). A qualisign is a quality that is > a sign; a sinsign is an existing thing or actual event that functions as a > sign; a legisign is a law (such as a law of nature, a rule or a habit) that > functions as a sign, mostly by governing actual occurrences. > > > > The other trichotomy is according to the sign's relation to its > interpretant, and was recognized in traditional logic as > *term/proposition/argument* -- an argument being a sequence of > propositions, and a proposition a combination of terms. But traditional > logic was hampered by its close connection to language and the grammar of > languages. It was to escape this limitation that Peirce generalized those > concepts (as you aptly put it) to create the trichotomy > *rheme/dicisign/argument*. Thus the new term *dicisign* was crucial for > Peirce's explanation of *cognitive* semiosis as more basic than either > human thinking or language (and therefore basic to both). I won't go into > this further until we get to Chapter 3, but I thought it would be best to > set the stage now. > > > > gary f. > > > > *From:* Frederik Stjernfelt [mailto:[email protected] <[email protected]>] > *Sent:* 1-Sep-14 5:26 PM > *To:* [email protected] > *Subject:* [biosemiotics:6592] Natural Propositions > > > > > > > Why "Natural Propositions"? > > The book "Natural Propositions" grew out of my investigation of Peirce's > general notion of diagrams and diagrammatical reasoning in > "Diagrammatology" (2007). If it is indeed the case that all deduction takes > place by means of transformation of diagrams, implicitly or explicitly, it > follows that a single diagram, before transformation, must depict a > proposition, namely that stating the premiss of the argument. (Likewise, > the post-transformation diagram will depict another proposition, that of > the conclusion). > > This observation made me take som interest in Peirce's notion of > "proposition" -- or, as he renames it in the generalization of triads which > he undertook in shaping his final semiotics from 1902-3 onwards -- > "Dicisign". During a stay as visiting scholar in Berlin 2010 I began > working on this and realized that Peirce's notion of proposition deviates > considerably from the simultaneous conceptions of Frege, Russell, > Wittgenstein and others. Peirce's semiotic and purely functional definition > of proposition does not presuppose any specific formalism (like human > language or special, formalized languages), neither does it presuppose > accompaniment of conscious, intentional acts. Peirce simply said that a > Dicisign is a sign which is involved twice with one and the same object: 1) > it refers to the object (P's generalization of the Subject part of a > proposition; 2) it describes that object (P's generalization of the > Predicate). > > This made me realize the revolutionary potential of such a definition: it > is not confined to human beings and it is not confined to language. So this > gives us the possibility of a semiotics which in a fluid way encompasses > biological communication as well as non-linguistic human semiotics > involving pictures, gestures, diagrams, etc. on a par with language. > > One aspect of this definition -- the absence of conscious states of mind > etc. in the definition -- seems to me deeply related to Peirce's > antipsychologism, which made it natural to open the book with a chapter on > that. Also, I think psychologism has emerged as a new threat after certain > developments in cognitive science and the related turn to philosophy of > mind in analytical philosophy. > > In the chapters (4-7) following the large Dicisign chapter, I try to > develop some possible consequences of the two extensions of propositions > made possible by the Dicisign concept. > > The latter part of the book is connected to the Dicisign argument in a > more remote way, addressing further issues connected to diagrammatical > reasoning: the issue of operational vs. optimal iconicity, the early Ms. > 725 diagram experiments pertaining to natural kinds, the distinction > between corollarial and theorematic reasoning. > > The final chapter expresses an ongoing interest I have in the history of > the philosophy of the Enlightenment, which is a booming field these years > (Margaret Jacob, Jonathan Israel, Martin Mulsow et al.) -- I think there is > reason to place Peirce in this ancestral tree rather than e.g. the > poststructuralist one to which he has sometimes been connected. > > > I am happy that the Peirce and Biosemiotics lists have agreed to discuss > my book and I look forward to all sorts of questions, comments, > developments etc. > > > ------------------------------ > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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