Dear Clark - I am not sure complexity is enough, also because of the fact that we have no agreed-upon measurement of the degree of complexity of processes. I tend to think two things are important here: 1) simple metabolism, self-sustaining chemaical cycles - whose self-sustainment implies they are prone to adapt to searching for the compounds they need to continue the cycle, 2) complexity of the molecules involved, implying, as a matter of physico-chemical organizations, that the tertiary structures of such compounds may be (stably but not 100% securely) identified from how they appear on the periphery - so that so-called "active sites" on the periphery may serve as signs for the whole compound (say, a protein), from the p-o-v of a metabolism. But this is getting ahead of the story which should be more about Dicisigns … Best F
Den 15/09/2014 kl. 23.50 skrev Clark Goble <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> : Wow. Lots of posts since I checked in last. I’ll try to answer as best I can in the time I have. It’s a very busy week for me, so apologies if I don’t answer or answer in a half hearted way. > On Sep 12, 2014, at 3:26 PM, Sungchul Ji > <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > Clark wrote: > > "Material science for instance is part of physics and > has examples more in line with that." > > I did not get he point you are trying to get across. > Can you elaborate on it ? My point is that there’s a level of complexity here that lets us describe something as sign-like. DNA and the morphological structures the coded proteins create are one example. One can look at decreasing levels of complexity and where one places the cutoff point is a bit like the sorites paradox of when someone is bald. Consider a *very* simple example of a transistor. Now there are some sign-like aspects to how a transistor functions but probably few, including Frederik, would call it a sign. (Following Frederik’s argument here) However there are more complex feedback loops such as the effect of thermal history of materials on how they solidify. At a certain point of complexity it seems to me one might call it sign-like even if we aren’t doing biology with morphologies, RNA, DNA and so forth. I don’t know where Frederick might say the complexity is sufficient. (Or if he’d say such complex materials even count against RNA) My point is just that in one sense such studies are themselves physics even if we think of physics more in terms of basic laws. Really it’s just me suggesting there’s a bit of demarcation issue between fields of science that perhaps transgresses attempts to have a neat taxonomy. (And I know Peirce was very much a proponent of clear taxonomies - I just think science in the 20th century suggests that to be ultimately futile) This isn’t an argument against Frederick. More just a semantic note about the meaning of “physics.”
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