Stefan, all, I think that there's much to be said for your suggestion of our jettisoning 'truth' and replacing it with 'knowledge', at least in science. There are, I believe, strong hints of this notion in Peirce as well, for example, here:
When our logic shall have paid its *devoirs* to Esthetics and the Ethics, it will be time for it to settle down to its regular business. That business is of a varied nature; but so far as I intend in this place to speak of it, it consists in ascertaining methods of sound reasoning, and of proving that they are sound, not by any instinctive guarantee, but because it can be shown by the kinds of reasoning already considered, especially the mathematical, of one class of reasonings that they follow methods which, persisted in, must eventually lead to the truth in regard to those problems to which they are applicable,* or, if not to the absolute truth, to an indefinite approximation thereto, while in regard to another class of reasonings, although they are so insecure that no reliance can be placed upon them, it will be shown in a similar way that yet they afford the only means of attaining to a satisfactory knowledge of the truth, in case this knowledge is ever to be attained at all, doing so by putting problems into such form that the former class of reasonings become applicable to them.* This prospectus of how I am to proceed is sufficient to show that there can be no ground of reasonable complaint that unwarranted assumptions are made in the course of the discussion. Nothing will be assumed beyond what every sincere and intelligent person will and must confess is perfectly evident and which, in point of fact, is not really doubted by any caviller (CP2.200, emphasis added). These hints follow naturally from the principle of fallibility, and from the knowledge that pragmatism is offered by Peirce as but a method of *asymptotically approaching the truth* of any matter being inquired into, the communities of scientists correcting errors along the way. Still, on the way to scientific knowledge societies may discover laws invaluable for developing tools of at least potential value to humanity and to the earth and its inhabitants, for example, the technologies which led to the development of the internet or, my personal favorite, modern plumbing. That we can misuse these tools and technologies, and do so today as we have throughout human history, is an ethical matter (quite distinct from the ethics of scientific inquiry which Peirce addresses). Best, Gary . *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Fri, Sep 26, 2014 at 5:52 AM, sb <peirc...@semiotikon.de> wrote: > > Ben, Garys, list, > > seems i took some things down the wrong pipe (see my post to Gary). There > is not much in what you say that I'd disagree with. But there is still the > truth-problem, but maybe this is just a problem of labeling. > > For me truth has no little errorbars, but i'm apodictic here like "god > doesn't throw dices". What is true now, can't be false later. Yes, truth is > not changeable. And we don't have this truth. > > But by introducing the "distincton between opinion and true opinion" it > seems to me you are trying to reintroduce truth under a new flag. Something > is true or not true, do we know with absolute certainty that something is > true or not true? No, we can't and therefore you have to introduce the > errorbars. But errorbars and truth don't fit together, something is true or > not and not possibly-maybe-a-little -less-than-true. Samples can have > errorbars but not truth and hence true opinion as something actual existent > doesn't seem sound to me. > > This Foucault quote shows the paradox "Mendel said the truth but he wasn't > within the biological truth of his time" you are already adressing. Now > exchange Mendel with Newton. Is Newtons mechanics true or false? Hmm, i > would say neither, it works under certain circumstances. So yes, inquiry > can be succesful! In this little example we had three meanings of truth: as > actual opinion, truth as better viable opinion and truth as true opinion at > the end of all time. > > That's the reason why i wouldn't use truth and opinion as opposites. I > belief the better distinction is knowledge and opinion like the greece doxa > and episteme. Important is wether you can give a sound justification for > your belief or not. Knowledge is justified belief and opinion unjustified > belief. > > Is there much difference between what you and i said except not using the > word "truth"? > > Best > Stefan > > > P.S.: Introducing the errorbars into this topic is problematic, because it > assumes bayesian statistics. But yes it is important to argue for the > reasonableness of a knowledge claim and to point at possible shortcomings > but this just means to justify. > > Stefan, Gary R., Gary F., list, > > I'm not sure how much there is in what you say that I'd disagree with. > > I'd point out that I wasn't attempting to describe social influences on > research in real depth, but just to indicate that I believe that they exist > and that I had given them at least a little thought. > > "Light pseudo-hallucinatory fun" was just my way of referring to fanciful > fun in the mind. I wasn't jumping to the end of "the long run" or of > sufficient investigation except in that sense in which every one of us does > in asserting a proposition, making a declarative statement. To assert a > proposition is to say that anybody who _*were*_ to investigate it far > enough _*would*_ find it to be true. Note the conditional modal 'would' > as per Peirce's repeated formulation of truth as the end of inquiry. > > All this idea of truth as _*only*_ at the end of the longest run, as > attainable _*only*_ by a perfect sign incorporating all possible > perspectives at the end of all times, goes against Peirce's idea that > inquiry can succeed without taking forever or almost forever. When you > think that you've reached the truth about something, then you think that > your actual opinion coincides with the final opinion that would be reached > by sufficient investigation. That final opinion to which sufficient > research would be destined is not affected by any person's or group's > actual opinion. The idea of the final opinion is a way of defining truth > pragmatically in relation to investigation. You can't have absolute > theoretical certainty that your actual opinion coincides with the final > opinion that would be reached; but you can have strong reasons to think > that it does. But even then, being scientifically minded, you would not _ > *define*_ the truth as yours or anybody's actual opinion. > > Now, statisticians add error bars to their graphs. One way, pointed out by > Peirce, to close a suspected gap between actual opinion and the ideal final > opinion is for one's actual opinion to include a confession of its own > possible error, its being merely plausible, or likely, or whatever, so > that, in asserting your opinion, you're asserting that anybody who were to > investigate far enough would find it likely that such-and-such is the case; > or even that anybody who were to investigate far enough would find it > likely that anybody who were to investigate far enough would find it likely > that such-&-such is the case. > > The proposition that I asserted was that conflating the ideas of truth and > opinion, making them the same thing in the mind, leads, like by having a > drink or a toke or both, to fanciful fun in the mind, the thought of > somehow having one's cake and eating it too, for example, some idea of > people's conflicting opinions/truths as involving conflicting realities, > various actual worlds, somehow intersecting, maybe in a somewhat magical > way like in an old _Dr. Strange_ comic book. But maybe I'm wrong. Maybe > some people never get any pleasurable sensation out of it at all. > > The distinction between opinion and truth, which can also be formulated as > the distincton between opinion and true opinion, is one that Peirce > certainly held with; he strongly opposed James's idea of changeable truths. > Peirce held that opinions, propositions, etc., can be true and can be > false. He did not believe that truths can be false. > > Sometimes it is hard to arrive at a firm conclusion about which opinion is > true, and sometimes something that one firmly believed turns out false, it > feels as if one's truth turned out to be false. As Robert Creeley wrote > somewhere, "What I knew / wasn't true". That doesn't make the truth-opinion > distinction spurious. But there won't be a 'constructive' definition of > truth from philosophy that will empower philosophy to hand out warrants of > truth, validity, soundness, etc., to particular conclusions claimed by > researchers in the special sciences. > > I certainly agree that it is good to approach the object from multiple > perspectives. The idea of convergence is not just the idea of one person > approaching every more closely to the truth from a single direction, but > also of various researchers converging from various starting points (and > zigzagging too) till things fit together like in a crossword puzzle, as > Haack said. > > Best, Ben > On 9/24/2014 8:36 AM, sb wrote: > > Ben, Gary, R., Gary F., > > i've got to start from the end of your post. You speak of the society > "rewarding diciplines" and this sheds a light on your idea of sociology in > this discussion. Your sociology consists of conscious actors who reward, > strive for power, wealth or status. This is more a rational choice approach > which is not the thing i was trying to hint at with my Fleck example. And > thats also not the thing sociology of knowlede is interested in. It's about > the knowledge underlying societal habits. There are so many things we take > for granted and we should explore why we (did) take them for granted. And > this not only the case in society it is also the case in the sciences. > > Why did microbiologist search for syphillis in the blood? They searched > there because for centuries it was taken for granted that there is > something like "syphillitic blood". Was it possible to reproduce the > results? No, it was almost impossible to stabilize the results. Nowadays we > would stop researching with results like this. But they kept on trying and > trying until Wassermann found a way to stabilize the experiment. Why did > the retry and retry? Because it was clear that it had to be there! > > The snake example: The snake example is so trivial and easy to understand > that we don't have to discuss it. Yes, it bites you -> you are dead in > tradtion A or B. There is no incompatiblity. But this is not a real world > example of a living science. Sciences are complex, they consist of > assumptions, crafting in the lab/the field, cognitive training etc.. They > are much more than the simple "if A then B" of logic. Much knowledge and > training is needed to come to the point where one can write down a > proposition like "if A then B". > > Nobody doubts that when you do exactly the same as another person that the > same will happen. "Experiences whose conditions are the same will have the > same general characters". But since scientific paradigms are such complex > structures it is not an easy task to create the same conditions. You think > its easy, just go to a lab and try to re-cook a Wassermann-test! You say > opinion and truth are not the same thing. Yes, sure ,but how should we deal > with the idea of the syphillitic blood? Is it opinion or truth? They found > it in the blood! And the idea to find it in the blood is certainly a > cultural import into science. > > But there are different Problems: a) Can there be different truths about > one object of investigation b) are there cultural imports into science that > influences the content of science and not only the organizational context > of research. What is organizational context? Org. context is for me all the > stuff you named: funding, rewarding, strive for power, money etc.. An > influence on the content instead is everything which is part of the "how we > see the object" of investigation. > > Karl Mannheim uses in "Ideology and Utopia" a good metaphor. He says that > we can look at a object from different perspectives and objectivation is > for him to take different positions relative to the object. Trying to > investigate the object beyond this is an absurdity like seeing without > perspective. > > You distinct between opinion and truth. Do you have the truth? No you > don't, like i don't. We both have beliefs we are willing to put on test. > But when you write somthing like: > > "Conflating opinion with truth seems to produce some light > pseudo-hallucinatory fun, at least that has been my consistent experience > since I was a teenager (as I said I do look at other perspectives). It's > the fun of absurdity. Yet, to build a theory on the acceptance of that > conflation is to build on broken logic, inquiry with its bones broken, > inquiry more susceptible than ever to social manipulation, inquiry less > likely than ever to be fruitful." > > it seems to me that you have the truth and you are able to destinct > between pseudo-hallucinations and non-hallucinations. You talk like you are > one of those who has left the cave and reached the light. Ben, i don't > really insinuate this, because it was written by you in the heat of the > moment. We are not far away from each other, but nonetheless this paragraph > shows we are still standing on different sides of a water devide. There is > a hair between us. My impression is you are trying to pull the > long-run-perspective on truth into the *now* to safe some kind of > non-perspective-truth in science. > > Now, truth is for me a perfect sign which incorporates all possible > perspectives on an object. But we will be there only at the end of all > times. As long as we are not there we only have beliefs we are willing to > act upon. And as long we have not reached the all-perspectives-mode we take > in positions on objects and phenomena that are influenced by our societal > position, tradtions and our culture. The point is now that modern science > with its non-prespective-truth tries to erase these influences in its > representation. Part of this strategy is to make influences, where the > cleaning has not been finished, to exceptions or to reduce the cultural > influences to failed knowledge. > > - Just take insulin shock therapy. How was it possible that psychic > ill were tortured that way? It was only possible in a certain culture of > medicine. A culture where a real phycicist had to cut or give drug. But > psychatrist didn't have these instruments and so they were inferior to real > phycicist. That's the reason why they were so eager to use insulin shocks, > because when they used it they were real phycicists. > - Look at nazi science. It is widley branded as pseudo-science to > clean science from this era. But there were nazi scientists whose > experiments would hold our standards today. But people say: Huh, in the > greater part it was pseudo science. Yes, so what? Just think of Feynmans > great "Cargo Cult Science", it shows that a lot of science today is pseudo. > How was nazi science possible? It was a child of nazi germany. > - Take the scientific revolution. Where did the knowledge of the > scientific revolution come from like Steven Shapin asks? The "new > scientists" laughed about the scholastics who discussed "how many angels > can dance on top of a needle", but the logic of the new scientists grounded > on the work of scholastics. In the field of chemistry the techniques of the > bench work stemmed from alchemy. Newton himself was an alchemist. > > All three examples are examples of the cleaning strategy. > > But back to the two problems: a) Can there be different truths about one > object of investigation? b) Are there cultural imports into science that > influence the content of science? > > > - Ad a): No, this is not possible. If there are two truths about one > object, then it is due to different perspectives. But since the > perspectives are different there are not the same conditions and hence not > the same conclusions. But within one perspective the results are > intersubjective and reproducable. > > > - Ad b) Yes, there are such imports and there are less dramatic > examples than those mentioned above. From my study time i knew at last 6 > different soil classifications. I googled it now and found out there are > even more and that pedologist have lost every confidence that there ever > will be a universal classification. If you look at the classification you > will reckon they are dependent on the soil usage and engeneering > techniques. But these both vary greatly with different cultures. > > But pedology, physics or chemistry are not the main battle field. We > find examples there, they are insteresting and shed a light on the cleaning > practices, but they are not of vital importance. Like Foucault identified > it, the main battle field is anthropology. There are everywhere cultural > and ideological components in the content of the sciences arround > anthropology. And that is the reason why people in the 60ies and 70ies read > his historical investigations, which ended in the 19th century, as > critiques of the then contemporary psychatry, medicine and criminology. He > showed what was implicitly taken for granted and people didn't like to see > that. > > All of this hasn't something to do with fallibilism. Fallibilism works > only in one perspective, the tertium non datur works only in one > perspective. It has to do with pluralism and the possibility of other world > views. And therefore it is a legitimate endeavour to search for traces of > culture, tradition, ideology within the content of sciences. They are not > free of them. Its like Fleck writes in "Wissenschaftstheoretische > Probleme": "It is an extraordinary interesting thing, how far scholars who > dedicate their whole life to destinct hallucinations from reality, are > unable to destinct their own dreams about science from the true form of > science". > > > Best > Stefan > > > > > > Stefan, Gary F., list, > > I was indeed addressing the snakebite example, just not mentioning it by > name. If two traditions, two people, two of anything, arrive at > incompatible conclusions about snakebites, then at most one of their > conclusions is true. That's what "incompatible conclusions" means. It > doesn't take Peircean semiotics or pragmatism to see it, it's elementary > definitions and logic. > > I haven't ever argued or believed that judgments, that two given > traditions' conclusions are incompatible, are infallible. I haven't ever > argued or believed that society does not influence, help, or hinder > inquiry, or contribute to focusing it in some directions rather than > others. This sort of thing will result in society's influencing the > opinions that result from actual inquiry. > > But opinion and truth are not the same thing. > > Conflating opinion with truth seems to produce some light > pseudo-hallucinatory fun, at least that has been my consistent experience > since I was a teenager (as I said I do look at other perspectives). It's > the fun of absurdity. Yet, to build a theory on the acceptance of that > conflation is to build on broken logic, inquiry with its bones broken, > inquiry more susceptible than ever to social manipulation, inquiry less > likely than ever to be fruitful. > > A challenge for inquiry and society is to overcome capricious or > mischievous skews produced by society's influence on inquiry, without > keeping society from helping inquiry thrive and vice versa. It's one thing > for society to reward some disciplines more than others. In various cases > there can be good reasons for that, bad reasons for that, and so on. The > economy of inquiry itself may sometimes impoverish inquiries that would not > have been all that costly and whose findings would have corrected and > improved the inquiries that do proceed, but people can't know everything in > advance, and people need to make choices. So inquiry will tend, even when > going comparatively well, to have defects. But it can also correct and > improve itself. It's another thing for society to reward disciplines with > power, wealth, glamour, status, only for producing conclusions that suit > society's preconceptions. And so on. > > Best, Ben > > On 9/23/2014 5:20 AM, sb wrote: > Gary F., Ben, List, > > yes, it is an extremist position. Ludwik Fleck in some of his texts about > the *Denkkollektive* (thought collectives) comes close to this point. But > his microbiological bench research maybe prevented him to fall prey to such > solipcism. Also Latours (maybe polemic) can be read this way, but even he > says now, facing the threat of climate change deniers, that he has gone to > far. Apart from these two (and alleged epigones of social constructivism of > different strives) i would say this is a crude misrepresentation of social > constructivism. > > Yes, you may be right that you and Ben are just responding, but i have the > imression that Stans polarization fell on just too fertile ground. Maybe it > activated an already existent resentiment?! Now when Gary and Cathy applaud > Bens post, i would follow them if it was not under the label of social > constructivism. If we call it solipcism/relativism/culturalism i'd be fine. > Nevertheless i feel uncomfortable with Bens post since it doesn't try to > understand Stans position. > > Stan braught up the example "one must not tease certain snakes". If you > tease the snake, it bites you, injects enough poison and there are no lucky > circumstances that safe you, then you will die! These are the plain facts. > But there can be different mythologies/theories arround this snake type. At > this point i always remember the end of Ecos "Name of the Rose" when Adson > and William discuss retrospective what has happend. Adson says to William: > "Over the whole investigation we had the false premisses and the false > hypothesis' but we came up with the right conclusion". Important in this > example is now that they start with predjudice which turns out to be false. > In the same manner scientists start with personaly, socially or tradionally > conditioned predjudices. > > All scientific theories have a social import which is not forced upon us > by reality. E.g. Fleck shows in his book that until the 20th century and > the discovery of the Wassermann-reaction the syphillis research was > influenced by the religious idea of the syphillitic blood as a punishment > of god. In an enlightment perspective it is important to understand and > explore such imports. Ben argues in his response only from an > epistemological standpoint and ignores the importance of the sociologcal > view Stan brings in. Sociologically the "claim of truth" as "truth" and the > will to act upon this truth is a interesting phenomenon. At the same time > Stan mixes up the epistemological and the sociological perspective and > thinks we can conclude from the sociology of knowledge to epistemology. > Once again, i do follow Bens critique, but it should also pick up the > sociological perspective. > > Science is not only brought forward by empirical research and new > theories, it is also brought forward by the critique of its own social > boundedness. Sure, the sociological is from a different sphere but since it > is from a different sphere it could and should inform science. From my > point of view social constructivism/ sociology of knowledge and pragmatism > are complementary, means pragmatism delivers the right epistemology for the > sociology of knowledge. > > Best > Stefan > > Am 22.09.14 14:22, schrieb Gary Fuhrman: > > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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